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Levirate marriage, whereby a widow is inherited by male relatives of her deceased husband, has anecdotally
been viewed as an informal safety net for widows who have limited property rights. This study investigates
why this widespread practice in sub-Saharan Africa has recently been disappearing. A developed game-theoretic
analysis reveals that levirate marriage arises as a pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium when a husband's clan
desires to keep children of the deceased within its extended family and widows have limited independent livelihood
means. Female empowerment renders levirate marriage redundant because it increases widows' reservation utility.
HIV/AIDS also discourages a husband's clan from inheriting a widow who loses her husband to HIV/AIDS, reducing
her remarriage prospects and thus, reservation utility because she is likely to be HIV positive. Consequently, widows'
welfare tends to decline (resp., increase) in step with the deterioration of levirate marriage driven by HIV/AIDS
(female empowerment). By exploiting long-term household panel data drawn from rural Tanzania and testing
multiple theoretical predictions relevant to widows' welfare and women's fertility, this study nds that HIV/AIDS
is primarily responsible for the deterioration of levirate marriage. Young widows in Africa may need some form of
social protection against the inuence of HIV/AIDS.
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1 Introduction
The economic knowledge and understanding of \culture" have considerably increased in recent years due to the
signicant improvements in empirical techniques and better data (e.g., Alesina and Giuliano, 2015; Fernandez, 2008).
Since culture is a form of social capital (e.g., Guiso et al., 2008), it is important to understand the mechanisms
facilitating its emergence, persistence, and evolution.
Broadly speaking, two approaches have been exploited in economic research, one of which regards culture as
(generalized) preferences/values internal to individuals (e.g., Guiso et al., 2006) and empirically examines factors
driving its evolution, such as wars (e.g., Rohner et al., 2013), technology (e.g., Alesina et al., 2013), social organizations
(e.g., Gneezy et al., 2016), economic shocks (e.g., Giuliano and Spilimbergo, 2014), and social fragmentation (e.g.,
Alesina and Ferrara, 2000, 2002). Since these preferences are relatively easy to measure through experimental games
or survey questions and widely comparable across societies, empirical research taking this approach has exploded.
However, any theoretical interpretation of data tends to be suggestive, with only a few exceptions (e.g., Lowes et al.,
2017; Tabellini, 2008). Alternatively, dening culture as equilibrium outcomes (e.g., Greif and Kingston, 2011) and
analyzing particular cultural institutions may lead to new insights with respect to the theoretical understanding of
cultural change, as often seen in studies pertaining to marriage-related social institutions (e.g., Anderson and Bidner,
2015; Gould et al., 2008; Jacoby and Mansuri, 2010). However, the extent to which the empirical ndings can be
generalized is a priori ambiguous, which, along with the limited availability of appropriate date, apparently discourages
economists from taking this approach and addressing the relevant important issues. While both approaches have pros
and cons, there is a marked paucity of economic studies adopting the latter one. The present study lls this gap.
More precisely, this study explores the reasons for the deterioration of levirate marriage (also known as widow or
wife inheritance) in sub-Saharan Africa. Levirate marriage is a common marital practice in many societies around the
world. According to this practice, a widow is inherited by the brother or other male relative of her deceased husband.
While this practice is still observed in many societies in present-day Africa (Potash, 1986; Radclie-Brown and Forde,
1987), as seen in Kenya (Agot, 2007), Nigeria (Doosuur and Arome, 2013), Sudan (Stern, 2012), Uganda (Ntozi, 1997),
and Zambia (Malungo, 2001), this century-old practice has recently begun to disappear.
This institutional change should also be given considerable attention on its own because anecdotally levirate
marriage has been considered to be an informal safety net that provides material support and social protection for
widows despite it being seen as treating women as \property." Therefore, it is expected that this institutional change
will have signicant consequences for economic development by altering both ex-ante (for currently married women)
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and ex-post (for current widows) welfare gains associated with widowhood. Until now, however, there has been no eort
by economists to better understand the role and socioeconomic consequences of this practice despite its popularity
and economic signicance.
This customary practice also has much policy relevance in sub-Saharan Africa, where widows comprise a signicant
proportion of the population because of their husbands' deaths being attributed to typical age dierences between a
couple and, more recently, the prevalence of HIV/AIDS. According to Potash (1986), a quarter of the adult female
population is widowed in many African societies. Traditionally, a widow has limited rights to the property of both her
natal and husband's families; therefore, her life is highly vulnerable. Furthermore, owing to a customary system of
exogamous and patrilocal marriage, a widow's close relatives (e.g., parents, siblings) typically live outside her current
residential village and, thus, cannot easily provide her with appropriate life protection. A relatively recent empirical
study conducted in northern Tanzania also found that a large increase in the murder of \witches," typically elderly
widowed women, is associated with their small contribution to a household's earning capacity (Miguel, 2005). Despite
the evident vulnerability of widows' livelihood, however, their protection has, thus far, not been actively considered on
the development agenda (compared with debates about \child" and \old-age" protection), and their lives and survival
strategies are insuciently understood (e.g., Djuikom and van de Walle, 2018; van de Walle, 2013).
To address the question, this study rst develops a theoretical framework wherein levirate marriage arises as a
pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium in an extensive-form game played by two agents, i.e., a widow and her
husband's clan.1 This model builds upon the assumption that in a patriarchal African society, great emphasis is
placed on continuation of generations (e.g., Caldwell and Caldwell, 1987; Tertilt, 2005). In this game, the clan rst
oers livelihood support to widows in the form of levirate marriage. Widows, who otherwise have only subsistence
resources, have an incentive to accept this oer although the material support is marginal. A husband's clan responds
to a widow's strategic choice by providing her with minimal social protection to keep the children and (as caretakers)
wives of the deceased within its extended family (e.g., Muller, 2005; Stern, 2012).
Following this framework, two possible mechanisms (and their combination) that result in the disappearance of
levirate marriage are considered. First, female empowerment (as a source of improved women's property rights, for
example) may make this practice obsolete while potentially increasing widows' welfare, as analyzed in the context of
other marriage-related social institutions (e.g., Anderson and Bidner, 2015; Tertilt, 2006).
Second, the recent spread of HIV/AIDS might also have destroyed this practice (e.g., Malungo, 2001; Ntozi,
1997; Perry et al., 2014). If a husband's death is attributed to AIDS, the wives may also be HIV positive. Then,
1While this theoretical framework is developed primarily in the African context, it may also apply to similar practices in other areas,
such as widow remarriage in northern India (e.g., Chowndhry, 1994).
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by having sexual intercourse with the widows, the inheritors (and their wives and even the children born to them
later) may get infected with HIV. In addition, because HIV/AIDS impairing widows' health increases their eective
child-rearing cost, a clan has to provide more livelihood support for HIV-positive widows than for seronegative ones
even if such sexual intercourse is avoided. Therefore, a husband's clan has a strong incentive to avoid this practice.
In this case, widows may lose this traditional safety net. Notably, this institutional change would not increase the
widows' welfare, because a clan already squeezes utility from widows even in the presence of levirate marriage, and
widows enjoy reservation utility both before and after the dissolution of levirate marriage. What is worse, since it
is expected that HIV-positive widows also have diculties in getting remarried, the spread of this infectious disease
could decrease widows' welfare by reducing their reservation utility while simultaneously eliminating levirate marriage.
This mechanism is not inconsistent with the markedly high HIV infection rate among widowed women in sub-Saharan
Africa (e.g., Tenkorang, 2014); for example, formerly married women have higher HIV infection rate than any other
(male and female) populations in Tanzania (Tanzania Commission for AIDS (TACAIDS), National Bureau of Statistics
(NBS), and ORC Macro, 2005, p. 77).
To empirically examine why levirate marriage is disappearing, this study uses one unique setting observed in
a long-term household panel survey conducted in Kagera, a rural region of northwest Tanzania (Kagera Health and
Development Survey, KHDS). Group discussions with the village leaders revealed that the practice of levirate marriage
had become less common in a signicant proportion of the sample villages between 1991 (wave 1 of the KHDS) and
2004 (wave 5). This study exploits this setting and develops a testing strategy that allows it to address its question.
While one straightforward way to assess the mechanisms responsible for the disappearance of levirate marriage is
to evaluate the probability that a widow enters into this customary marriage as a result of the spread of HIV/AIDS
and/or female empowerment, this approach cannot be adopted in this study. This is because information relevant to
widows' engagement in levirate marriage at the individual level is absent in the KHDS data.2
As an alternative, the above setting observed in the KHDS is used. As described above, it is theoretically predicted
that widows' welfare tends to decline (resp., increase) in step with the dissolution of levirate marriage as a result of
the spread of HIV/AIDS (female empowerment). Consequently, in this study, a correlation between the deterioration
of levirate marriage and widows' welfare is explored to elucidate the mechanisms responsible for this institutional
change, with the former discerned from the KHDS at the community level and the latter at the individual level. The
theoretical model indicates that this correlation is likely to be negative (resp., positive) if a primary factor driving
2Such information is also rarely obtained (even at the community level) from standard household surveys currently in use. Collection
of original panel data that records the deterioration of levirate marriage in the long term also prevents the immediate investigation of such
a signicant ongoing economic transition.
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such institutional change is HIV/AIDS (female empowerment).
In addition, a correlation between this institutional change and parental fertility decisions is also empirically
examined. As the theoretical model suggests, HIV/AIDS possibly increases fertility while destroying levirate marriage.
This fertility response arises if widows' de facto property rights are established in response to the reduction of male
labor force caused by HIV/AIDS, which in turn enables them to aord many children in widowhood. In Uganda (e.g.,
Mukiza-Gapere and Ntozi, 1995) and Zambia (e.g., Malungo, 2001), cases have increasingly been reported of property
being left to widows and their children owing to HIV/AIDS and the resulting deterioration of levirate marriage.
Since the empirical goal is to identify a correlation attributed only to the theoretical mechanisms that this study
focuses on, it is still required to exclude inuence of any confounding factors that prevent the current investigation
from estimating such a correlation. To meet this objective, this study takes a triple-dierence strategy that compares
relevant outcomes before (wave 1) and after (wave 5) the institutional change between villages that made the practice
of levirate marriage less customary and the remaining villages. The third source of dierence comes from a comparison
between widows and other females for estimating consumption or that between the young and old population for the
analysis of fertility. This approach allows controlling for time-varying village-level characteristics that aected the
KHDS villages over time in a dierent manner, i.e., village-specic linear time trends.
As the empirical analysis shows, the disappearance of levirate marriage was negatively associated with \young"
widows' consumption while having a positive correlation with \young" wives' fertility. Considering HIV/AIDS pri-
marily aecting prime-age husbands as well as higher fecundity revealed by young women, the absence of signicant
correlations for the remaining age cohorts may be seen as a result of the relevant falsication test. In addition, based
on further analyses pertaining to the prevalence of HIV/AIDS in a KHDS community, these correlations were more
pronounced in villages whereby this communicable disease increasingly exerted an unfavorable health inuence during
the sample periods. Moreover, HIV/AIDS decreased young widows' consumption and encouraged fertility of young
wives. The last two ndings are also consistent with the theoretical predictions and may be seen as the reduced-form
impacts of HIV/AIDS. Thus, all these ndings collectively provide support for the view that a primary factor facil-
itating the recent deterioration of levirate marriage in sub-Saharan Africa is HIV/AIDS. The ndings of prior case
studies as well as my careful eld observations in rural Tanzania also support this claim. According to this study's
ndings, young widows may urgently need social protection that shields them from the inuence of HIV/AIDS.
Taking an important but less popular approach exploited in economic studies of culture, this study develops the
\rst" economic theory of levirate marriage and empirically analyzes the reasons for its deterioration. The demon-
stration of its deterioration would improve the general understanding of conditions that facilitate the transformation
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of cultural institutions (e.g., Anderson, 2003; de la Croix and Mariani, 2015). In particular, several previous studies
indicate that \positive" socioeconomic shocks (e.g., English-education opportunities) aecting \disadvantaged" groups
(e.g., girls) could erode traditional institutions (e.g., caste) while \increasing" their welfare (Luke and Munshi, 2011;
Munshi and Rosenzweig, 2006). In contrast, this study will show that \negative" shocks (e.g., HIV/AIDS) supposedly
inuencing \advantaged" groups (e.g., a husband's clan) may also break down traditional institutions (e.g., levirate
marriage), possibly swiftly, while \reducing" disadvantaged groups' (e.g., widows') welfare.
In the developing world, informal institutions (e.g., informal insurance arrangements) play a signicant socioeco-
nomic role by supplementing weak formal institutions (e.g., Townsend, 1994). Nevertheless, according to Greif and
Iyigun (2013), \social institutions are ... all but absent from our analyses of economic growth and development." In
addition, in such a region, infectious diseases (e.g., Ebola, HIV/AIDS, malaria) tend to strike an economy, and their
unfavorable welfare consequences are often aggravated by a poor formal health system. Taken together, the present
study may also provide a valuable lesson applicable in other development settings, particularly when considering the
vulnerability or resistance of non-market institutions to deadly communicable diseases.
While previous studies have provided somewhat inconclusive evidence of the impact of HIV/AIDS on fertility (e.g.,
Fortson, 2009; Kalemli-Ozcan and Turan, 2011; Young, 2005, 2007), this research will also highlight the importance
of exploring its heterogeneity by showing one mechanism through which this infectious disease aects fertility.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a theoretical model that explains the mechanisms driving
the deterioration of levirate marriage. A strategy to test for the mechanisms responsible for this institutional change
is presented in Section 3, followed by the data overview in Section 4. Section 5 reports the empirical ndings, whose
interpretation is discussed in Section 6. Concluding remarks are summarized in Section 7.
2 A simple theoretical framework
This section oers a simple theoretical framework that considers the presence of levirate marriage in a traditional
economy as a pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium. The purpose is to facilitate the discussion that follows
in Section 3, whereby a strategy to empirically explore the mechanisms responsible for the deterioration of levirate
marriage is developed. All the relevant propositions are proved in Section S.7 in the supplemental appendix.
While the picture should not be over-simplied, the model builds upon several features of family relationships
widely observed in sub-Saharan Africa, as noted in Caldwell and Caldwell (1987) and elsewhere (e.g., Tertilt, 2005).
First, societies are patrilineal; succession is passed down the male line. Daughters, customarily, do not inherit their
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parents' property, and almost all females that reach marriageable age as determined by their respective societies,
enter into marital relationships. Owing to the rules of clan exogamy and patrilocality, at marriage, a woman often
moves some distance away from her natal village to her husband's home. Traditional belief systems place a great
emphasis on the continuation of generations. Thus, marriage can be seen as acquisition of a bride's reproductive
capacity by her husband's clan, which is made in exchange for bridewealth payments made to her parents. However, a
bride is typically left out of fertility decisions as they are largely made by senior male members of her husband's clan
(including the groom) in a patriarchal society. Nevertheless, mothers shoulder the main responsibility for providing
for the day-to-day material and emotional care of their children. As males must accumulate sucient wealth to aord
a bride (including bride prices), they usually marry later than females (e.g., Goody and Tambiah, 1974). The resulting
age dierences between couples mean that it is common to nd women who have lost their husbands.
Based on these stylized observations, consider an agrarian society with two agents: a widow (or her parents) (w)
and an extended family of her deceased husband, called here a \clan" (c). The sequence of actions taken by both agents
is as follows (see also Figure 1). First, after marriage, a husband's clan (particularly, male members) determines the
number of children n that a woman should bear before her husband's death. This assumption simplies the case of a
man's family members putting some pressure on a young couple's fertility decisions during their married life, which is
not implausible in reality. Second, after the husband's death, the clan chooses the amount of livelihood support s  0
that will be provided to the widows in the form of levirate marriage. While it is presumed here that a husband surely
dies before a wife does, analyses performed in subsection S.1.3 in the supplemental appendix relax this assumption.
In the face of an oer of livelihood support, a widow decides whether to accept levirate marriage. The acceptance
(action a) allows a widow to exploit her husband's property (e.g., house, land) while living with her children. In case
of rejection or absence of the provision (i.e., s = 0), she has two choices. First, she can formally inherit her husband's
property and live with her children (action z). Else, she can leave her husband's home (action l). Consequently, the
strategy prole taken by both agents can be characterized as (n, s, m), whereby m 2 (a; z; l) refers to choices that a
woman can make after her husband dies.
Following Tertilt (2005)'s theoretical model of marriage and fertility developed in the context of sub-Saharan
Africa, it is assumed that the clan chooses the number of children n, given the convex cost c(n) of raising them, such
that c0(n) > 0, c00(n) > 0, and c(0) = 0.3 This cost is incurred by either a mother whenever she is available or female
members of the clan. The payos vi(; ; ) of an agent i (either c or w) are demonstrated as follows; the rst and
second terms in parenthesis indicate the number of children n and the amount of s with the third term referring to a
3One example of the explanation for the convexity is unfavorable externalities that have a bearing on family members' health. If one
child contracts some infectious disease, often the remaining children (or even parents) also get infected.
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widow's action:
vc(n; s; a) = u(n)  s; (1)
vw(n; s; a) = s  c(n); (2)
vc(n; s; l) = u(n)  c(n)  ; (3)
vw(n; s; l) = r; (4)
vc(n; s; z) = u(n)  k; (5)
vw(n; s; z) = k   c(n): (6)
If the oered levirate marriage is accepted, the clan obtains positive utility u(n) such that u0(n) > 0, u00(n) < 0, and
u(0) = 0 by maintaining children of the deceased within its extended family. However, this utility can be achieved in
exchange of (endogenously determined) material support s (e.g., provision of subsistence needs, permission of access
to the clan's property). The widow can enjoy the support with children left in her charge, resulting in vc(n; s; a) =
u(n)   s and vw(n; s; a) = s   c(n). Notably, it is assumed that a widow gains no utility from just staying with her
children, which simplies the analysis.
In case of the rejection or absence of the oered levirate marriage, a widow receives exogenously determined
reservation utility r 2 R when she leaves her husband's home. For instance, she may receive this reservation utility
by remarrying or inheriting her parents' property.4 A widow can leave either with or without her children. If a widow
leaves with her children, she incurs the child-rearing cost c(n). If she leaves alone, she does not incur this cost while
facilitating female members of her husband's clan to take care of the children left behind. The child-rearing cost
incurred by the female members is assumed to be greater by an amount of  > 0, compared with the case where a
widow takes care of her own children. This is because the clan's female members have work to do at their own homes
(including raising their children) and thus, there are both the material and opportunity costs of taking care of the
children of the deceased.5 Note that given the aforementioned assumption that a widow receives no utility stemming
from \just stay together," she does not lose utility by separating from her own children. Consequently, a widow strictly
prefers to leave alone rather than to leave with her children, yielding vc(n; s; l) = u(n)  c(n)   and vw(n; s; l) = r.
4For example, it is reported that remarriage is an important alternative to levirate marriage for young widows' survival in Uganda
(Nyanzi et al., 2009).
5The model included these costs to explicitly consider why a clan encourages a widow to accept levirate marriage, rather than facilitating
its female members to take care of children of the deceased. However, the key theoretical implications demonstrated below remain unchanged
by treating  = 0, provided it is alternatively assumed that r0 < 0, r1 > r0, and r2 < r0. Moreover, it is also possible to regard the
child-rearing cost incurred by a clan as (1+)c(n), rather than c(n)+ . In this case, a woman's fertility possibly decreases when a widow's
reservation utility increases from r0 = 0 to r1 > 0, which is not indicated in the subsequent proposition 3. This fertility response arises
because a clan's child-rearing cost arising from widows' action l increases in proportion to the number of children. However, the remaining
theoretical implications are robust to this dierence when modeling a clan's child-rearing cost.
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A widow's separation from her own children is not uncommon in rural Africa, which is also reinforced by the
practice of bride prices. If a widow leaves with her children, she or her parents typically have to repay the bride price
(given to her parents at marriage) to the clan. On the other hand, if she moves out and leaves her children to the
husband's clan, this repayment is not required. Moreover, a widow may not suer much emotionally from leaving
alone. For example, widowed women belonging to the Luo in Kenya, an ethnic group famous for the practice of
levirate marriage, can easily return to meet their children even if they leave a husband's community (Potash, 1986, p.
41). Nevertheless, a widow's (emotional) cost resulting from separation from her own children is explicitly taken into
account in subsection S.1.2 in the supplemental appendix. As seen from the analysis, the key theoretical implications
demonstrated below are robust to this consideration.
Alternatively, a widow can also choose to make a livelihood with her children by using a socially accepted (and
thus, exogenous) amount of a husband's bequest k  0 transferred from a husband's clan to her (and measured by
transferable utility), which enables them to be self-sucient. For example, in a traditional society that does not allow
a widow to inherit property of the deceased, this amount is expected to be zero. These yield the remaining payo
proles vc(n; s; z) = u(n)  k and vw(n; s; z) = k   c(n).
[Here, Figure 1]
2.1 Optimal strategies and equilibrium
Depending upon the levels of a widow's property rights k and reservation utility r, it can be shown that levirate
marriage is subgame perfect. Assume that widows have limited independent livelihood means such that r = r0 = 0.
In addition, widows' rights to inherit a husband's property is also highly limited in the sense that k = k0  c(n),
whereby n satises u0(n) = c0(n). Then, it is easy to verify that
Proposition 1 When r = r0 = 0 and k = k0  c(n), the strategy prole (n; c(n); a) is subgame perfect, along with
the equilibrium number of children n and a widow's payo r0 = 0.
Since widows cannot support themselves independently, they have an incentive to receive support from their
husband's clan. In contrast, a clan also has an incentive to oer levirate marriage to retain the widow's children
within the extended family. Thus, this practice is sustained.
As the equilibrium payo indicates, while a widow receives material support (i.e., s = c(n)) from her husband's
clan by agreeing to a levirate marriage, the amount may not necessarily be large. Ethnographic studies (e.g., Doosuur
and Arome, 2013; Luke, 2002; Nyanzi et al., 2009) show that material support provided by inheritors is typically
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minimal, because the inheritors normally have to take care of their wives and children at their original home in
addition to the widows who continue to reside at their deceased husband's home (e.g., Ndisi, 1974). Thus, the model
prediction may be consistent with this nding.6 Furthermore, a clan protects widows because they take care of the
deceased's children with the child-rearing cost being smaller than the corresponding cost incurred by a clan's female
members, i.e., c(n) < c(n) +  .
2.2 Institutional change
Focusing on an economy that traditionally practices levirate marriage, the analysis in this subsection reveals several
mechanisms that trigger institutional changes.
2.2.1 Female empowerment: An increase in k
Female empowerment may render the practice of levirate marriage redundant. In Tanzania, many gender-oriented
perspectives were introduced in the political sphere in the 1990s. One remarkable example is the establishment of the
Land Act of 1999 and the Village Land Act of 1999, enabling men and women to enjoy equal land rights (Killian,
2011). In fact, in the KHDS data, several villages that prohibited widows from inheriting a husband's major properties
(e.g., land, house) appear to have removed this discrimination between 1991 and 2004. Assuming that a widow can
inherit a sucient amount of her husband's property such that k = k1 > c(n
),
Proposition 2 When r = r0 = 0 and k = k1 > c(n
), the strategy proles (n1; c(n1); a) and (n1; 0; z) are subgame
perfect, along with the equilibrium number of children n1 > n
 and a widow's payo r0 = 0.
Here, n1 satises k1   c(n1) = 0.
On one hand, securing a widow's right to inherit her husband's property increases her utility obtained outside
a levirate marriage. To encourage such widows to remain in this traditional marriage, a clan must increase the
amount of support s, which makes this practice costly and may undermine it. Note that increases in bequest amounts
allow widows to aord many children. Accordingly, a clan increases the number of children to the level of n1 >
n. On the other hand, in an economy that already practices levirate marriage, the proposition 2 also suggests that
solely improving widows' property rights may not always eliminate this social institution, because the strategy prole
(n1; c(n1); a) is still subgame perfect.
6From 2013 to 2015, I interviewed a number of rural people in Rorya, a district in the Mara region in northeast Tanzania. Rorya is
primarily settled by the Luo, an ethnic group that traditionally practices levirate marriage. In this survey, a relatively large number of Luo
widows indicated that material support from inheritors only helped satisfy their subsistence needs. This eld observation is also compatible
with the model prediction.
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2.2.2 Female empowerment: An increase in r
The female empowerment one observed in Tanzania in the 1990s might also have secured women's rights to inherit
their parents' property while increasing widows' reservation utility. Considering r = r1 > 0, it can be shown that
Proposition 3 When r = r1 >  and k = k0  c(n), the strategy prole (n; 0; l) is subgame perfect, along with the
equilibrium number of children n and a widow's payo r1 > 0. When r = r1   and k = k0  c(n), the strategy
prole (n; c(n) + r1; a) is subgame perfect, along with the equilibrium number of children n and a widow's payo r1
> 0.
When widows can suciently aord their own livelihood such that r1 >  , levirate marriage breaks down. Owing to
an increase in the availability of outside options, widows do not have to rely on levirate marriage to make a livelihood.
To prompt such widows to enter into a levirate marriage, a clan must increase the amount of support s, which makes
the practice costly. As a result, this practice disappears. In this case, the dissolution of a levirate marriage coincides
with an increase in a widow's welfare (i.e., r1 > 0).
Indeed, this equilibrium appears to exist among some ethnic groups in Tanzania, such as the Zita (as determined
through my eld interviews) and Nyakusa (Wilson, 1987, p. 123), with the former group primarily settling in the Bunda
district of the Mara region and the latter largely inhabiting the southern mountains of this country. For instance, Zita
widows are traditionally allowed to return to their natal villages in case of their husband's death without repaying bride
prices, conditional on their children being left behind. After returning home, they start a new life by inheriting their
parents' property and/or re-marrying, with their new husband now making bridewealth payments to their parents.
2.2.3 HIV/AIDS
The spread of HIV/AIDS can also destroy the practice of levirate marriage. When a husband dies of HIV/AIDS, a
widow is likely to be HIV positive. By inheriting (and having sexual intercourse with) a widow, a husband's clan
members (e.g., an inheritor, an inheritor's wife) may also contract HIV/AIDS. In addition, a seronegative widow may
also become infected with the deadly virus, provided that she is inherited by her husband's clan members who are HIV
positive and/or that her inheritor already has (possibly multiple) wives. These expected infection costs of a husband's
clan hc > 0 and of a widow hw > 0 can be included in payos realized in the strategy prole (n; s; a), i.e., vc(n; s; a)
= u(n)  s  hc and vw(n; s; a) = s  c(n)  hw.
In theory, it is possible for a clan's members to avoid having such sexual intercourse with a likely HIV-positive
widow even if they inherit her. In a traditional society, however, the occurrence of levirate marriage typically follows
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sexual cleansing. In other words, a brother-in-law or a clan's other male members perform one-time ritual sex with
a widow after the burial of her husband (e.g., Agot, 2007; Gunga, 2009). An uncleansed widow is perceived as
impure and dangerous to a community and her social interactions are quite restricted. Thus, this cleansing is a pre-
requisite for widows to be reintegrated into a society. Berger (1994) argues that in Uganda, levirate marriage is not
possible unless it comes with the traditional component of sexual cleansing. As Malungo (2001) observed in Zambia,
widows who underwent sexual cleansing are typically expected to contract levirate marriage. In addition, to fulll the
culturally prescribed rituals, using a condom is often unacceptable based on a traditional norms, as it means placing
a barrier between the ritual performers (i.e., widows and the inheritors) (e.g., Ambasa-Shisanya, 2007; Luke, 2002;
Perry et al., 2014). Furthermore, note that HIV/AIDS impairing widows' heath makes them less productive in various
activities (e.g., agricultural work, child care) and thus, increases their eective child-rearing cost, which yields the
same implication as hw > 0. Therefore, a clan inheriting HIV-positive widows would have to increase the amount of
livelihood support s, which makes levirate marriage more costly to the clan even if sexual intercourse is avoided.
The infection costs of HIV/AIDS do not necessarily make widows avoid levirate marriage. First, the infection risk
of a husband's clan (hc) does not aect a widow's decision to accept levirate marriage. In addition, a widow still has
an incentive to follow the customary practice as long as her husband's clan compensates for her infection risk (hw) by
increasing the material support given to her.
Compared with widows, a husband's clan has more reason to stop the practice of levirate marriage. First, a clan
becomes reluctant to oer levirate marriage as the corresponding expected infection risk hc reduces the utility arising
from adherence to this social custom. Second, to prompt a widow to accept levirate marriage, a clan must increase
its material support by the amount hw, which further discourages a clan from continuing this practice. Consequently,
Proposition 4 Assume that r = r0 = 0, k = k0  c(n), and the disease cost is high enough such that  < hc + hw.
Then, when   , the strategy prole (n0; 0; z) is subgame perfect, along with the equilibrium number of children
n0  n and a widow's payo r0 = 0. When  < , the strategy prole (n; 0; l) is subgame perfect, along with the
equilibrium number of children n and a widow's payo r0 = 0.
Here, n0 satises k0   c(n0) = 0 and   u(n)  c(n)  u(n0) + c(n0)  0 (by denition of n).
The high disease cost ( < hc + hw) discourages a clan from practicing levirate marriage. When the child-rearing
cost borne by a clan's female members is large (i.e.,   ), a clan prefers a widow to take care of her children by
relying on property bequeathed to her. However, since the amount of bequest is not large (i.e., k = k0  c(n)), she
cannot aord many children. As a result, the clan reduces the number of children to the level of n0  n. When
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raising children of the deceased is not costly to a clan (i.e.,  < ), the clan encourages a widow to leave her husband's
home alone.
In contrast with the second example of female empowerment (i.e., an increase in r), this HIV/AIDS-driven insti-
tutional change does not increase a widow's welfare because it keeps her equilibrium payo at the level of r0 = 0.
Intuitively, even if levirate marriage disappears because of the spread of HIV/AIDS, widows' social status remains low
both before and after its disappearance and therefore, there is no reason for them to experience welfare improvements.
To make matters worse, it is also possible that the infectious disease reduces widows' reservation payos. This is
possible because widows who lose their husbands to HIV/AIDS may also be HIV positive and therefore, face diculty
in nding a new marital partner. This situation can be interpreted as r = r2 < 0. As a corollary of the proposition
4, it is easy to expect that HIV/AIDS undermines levirate marriage while decreasing widows' welfare.
Kagera is one of the regions most seriously aected by HIV/AIDS in Tanzania. Owing to the government's great
eorts to fully understand the disease situation in this region, as seen in the Kagera AIDS Research Project initiated
in 1987 (Lugalla et al., 1999), people's awareness of AIDS had already been raised by the early 1990s (e.g., Killewo
et al., 1997; Killewo et al., 1998). In the KHDS data set, approximately 90% of 30 sample villages that had practiced
levirate marriage in the early 1980s made this practice less customary by 2004. The spread of HIV/AIDS might have
contributed to the disappearance of levirate marriage.
2.2.4 HIV/AIDS-induced female empowerment
In reality, the two mechanisms of female empowerment and of HIV/AIDS may not be mutually exclusive. One example
is that HIV/AIDS established widows' de facto property rights. In other words, the shrinkage of the male labor force
caused by HIV/AIDS enabled widows to obtain land rights in a family/village, as females had to control land owing
to a greater number of male deaths.
This HIV/AIDS-driven female empowerment is possible, going by the ndings provided by Goldstein and Udry
(2008); according to them, a person's agricultural eort is often associated with establishing his/her land tenure in
Africa. In addition, as will be delineated in subsection 6.1, this sort of female empowerment indeed appears to have
arisen in Uganda (e.g., Mukiza-Gapere and Ntozi, 1995) and Zambia (e.g., Malungo, 2001). When this situation,
reected as k = k1 > c(n
), occurs simultaneously with the aforementioned HIV/AIDS-induced decline in widows'
reservation payos (i.e., r = r2 < 0), it can be shown that
Proposition 5 When r = r2 < 0, k = k1 > c(n
), and the disease cost is high enough such that    r2 < hw + hc,
a strategy prole (n3; 0; z) is subgame perfect, along with the equilibrium number of children n3 > n
 and a widow's
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payo r2 < 0.
Here, n3 satises k1   c(n3) = r2.
In this example, HIV/AIDS destroys the practice of levirate marriage owing to both mechanisms explained in
subsection 2.2.1 and subsection 2.2.3. In this case, the disappearance of levirate marriage coincides with an increase
in the number of children (i.e., n3 > n
) as well as a decrease in widows' welfare (i.e., r2 < 0).7
2.3 Theoretical implication
This subsection summarizes important theoretical implications, along with a summary of the previous propositions
provided in Table 1. First, while levirate marriage can be seen as a safety net for widows (as anecdotally argued), the
material support such arrangements oer is minimal and only satises widows' subsistence needs.
Second, the disappearance of this practice may not necessarily mean that females are empowered. Given the
intricate relationship among HIV/AIDS, female empowerment, and institutional change, it is possible that the de-
terioration of levirate marriage is associated with a range of (positive, negative, or no) changes in widows' welfare
and women's fertility. It is also noted that in reality, the two factors of HIV/AIDS and female empowerment could
simultaneously contribute to the disappearance of levirate marriage.
Third, in the preceding model, a husband's clan (resp., a widow) is institutionally advantaged (disadvantaged) in a
traditional society sustaining levirate marriage. Thus, the mechanisms presented above imply that both the \positive"
socioeconomic shocks (e.g., female empowerment) aecting the disadvantaged group (e.g., a widow) and \negative"
shocks (e.g., HIV/AIDS) more pronouncedly aecting the advantaged group (e.g., a husband's clan) may disintegrate
traditional institutions, with the former increasing the disadvantaged group's welfare, and the latter reducing the
corresponding welfare.8
While the tendency of cultural institutions (i.e., the slow speed of institutional mobility) is not explicitly modeled
in this study, intuitively, it is likely that institutional change occurs more slowly in the case of female empowerment
compared with the case of HIV/AIDS, because the advantaged group that has historically beneted from the traditional
scheme may resist the transformation (e.g., Luke and Munshi, 2011; Munshi and Rosenzweig, 2006). If so, the swift
deterioration of levirate marriage in sub-Saharan Africa in recent years may be compatible with the case of HIV/AIDS.
7Admittedly, there are more women than men infected with HIV in sub-Saharan Africa (e.g., Anderson, 2018), which may, in principle,
enable women to nd a marital partner more easily than men because there are fewer women than men in marriage markets. However,
this conjecture does not necessarily invalidate the aforementioned argument because men still tend to avoid marrying HIV-positive women
(e.g., Ueyama and Yamauchi, 2009).
8Relatedly, Luke and Munshi (2011) and Munshi and Rosenzweig (2006) showed that \positive" economic shocks (e.g., English-education
opportunities, income generating opportunities) aecting disadvantaged groups (e.g., girls, low-caste groups) could contribute to dissolving
traditional institutions (e.g., caste) while improving their welfare.
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In addition, as seen from Table 1, the sum of a clan's and a widow's equilibrium payos is the greatest at the level
of u(n)  c(n) + r1    when a widow leaves her husband's home and receives a considerable amount of reservation
utility (i.e., r = r1 > ), followed by the levirate marriage equilibrium yielding u(n
) c(n). Note that simply making
it possible for a widow to inherit her husband's property (i.e., an increase in k) would reduce this total welfare to
the level of u(n1)   c(n1), compared with the case of the levirate marriage equilibrium.9 This total welfare cannot
necessarily be seen as social welfare, as it does not include the welfare accruing to a widow's children. Nevertheless,
these ndings may still suggest that the relationship between traditional institutions (apparently) violating women's
human rights and social welfare is not so simple.
Admittedly, the above theoretical model is a crude attempt to understand the practice of levirate marriage,
which has recently been disappearing in African societies. As seen from the analyses detailed in Section S.1 in the
supplemental appendix, however, the main theoretical implications are robust to several model extensions that consider
a widow's option to leave together with her own children, uncertainty about a couple's death, female (limited) power
to control fertility (moral hazard), and so on. As discussed in subsection 6.3 (and subsection S.1.4 in the supplemental
appendix in more detail), the analysis of female fertility control enables this study to consider the case that the
number of children would increase because of women's fertility eort. In addition, HIV/AIDS may also increase the
probability that a husband dies before he produces the optimal number of children, whose consequences are also
analyzed in subsection S.1.5 in the supplemental appendix.
[Here, Table 1]
3 An association test
Data exploited in this study is drawn from the KHDS, a longitudinal household panel survey comprising six waves,
with the rst four waves carried out between 1991 and 1994, and the remaining two waves conducted in 2004 and
2010, respectively. The empirical analysis is based on data drawn from the rst ve waves pertaining to all of the 51
KHDS villages.10 In wave 5, the survey team asked a group of village leaders whether it was common for a widow
to be inherited as a wife by the brother or other male relatives of the deceased currently, (approximately) 10 years
earlier, and 20 years earlier. Over 20 years, the number of villages commonly practicing levirate marriage signicantly
decreased from 31 to 17 (10 years ago) and 3 (wave 5). In this section, a strategy to explore the underlying mechanisms
9The improvement of widows' property rights is seen as a constraint which prevents a clan from choosing the desired number of children,
n. Given no change in widows' reservation utility, this type of female empowerment reduces a clan's utility from the levirate marriage
equilibrium without increasing widows' one.
10More precisely, the KHDS sample covers 51 communities located in 49 villages. However, this study uses \villages" and \communities"
interchangeably.
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responsible for the recent deterioration of levirate marriage based on this information is discussed.
3.1 Hypothesis building
Given the aforementioned theoretical model, a simple way to examine why levirate marriage has been disappearing is
to estimate the (reduced-form) impacts of HIV/AIDS and female empowerment on the likelihood that a widow enters
into a levirate marriage. However, this approach cannot be adopted in the current study because the KHDS data does
not have information on widows' engagement in such traditional marriages at the individual level. To the best of my
knowledge, it is dicult to nd alternative data sets that provide such information (and even the community-level
prevalence of levirate marriage) that lends itself to the current empirical investigation.
As an alternative, the mechanisms driving the dissolution of levirate marriage are tested by investigating a \cor-
relation" between institutional change, as discerned from the aforementioned community-level information included
in the KHDS, and changes in welfare outcomes (i.e., widows' welfare and married women's fertility) recorded at the
individual level. The relevant equilibrium predictions are summarized in Table 2, whereby changes in a widow's equi-
librium payos and women's fertility from the levirate marriage equilibrium are denoted as vw and n, respectively.
For example, if the disappearance of levirate marriage is associated with not only a decrease in widows' welfare but
also an increase in women's fertility, which is actually the case demonstrated in the subsequent empirical analysis, this
data pattern is compatible with the view (i.e., the proposition 5) that HIV/AIDS triggered the institutional change
while establishing widows' de facto property rights.
However, exploring a simple correlation across the relevant variables is not useful, because such a correlation is
attributable to many other factors.11 Therefore, the proposed testing method still requires an appropriate strategy
to identify a correlation stemming \only" from the mechanisms considered in the previous theoretical analysis. This
identication strategy is discussed in the following subsections. Unlike standard empirical studies, hereinafter, it is
said that the estimates are \biased" if the estimated correlation between the institutional change and welfare outcomes
arises from factors not relevant to the theoretical mechanisms that this study focuses on.
[Here, Table 2]
11For example, being infected with HIV/AIDS (that may correlate with the prevalence of HIV/AIDS and therefore of levirate marriage in
a community) may reduce a widow's welfare by deteriorating her health and thus, preventing her from engaging in any income-generating
activities. Or, women exposed to urban lifestyles and values may prefer to reduce the number of children as well as to avoid the practice
of levirate marriage simply because of the preference for modernity.
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3.2 Identication strategy
3.2.1 Institutional change and widows' welfare
Pooling data pertaining to females of reproductive age (15?50) in wave 1 and wave 5 of the KHDS, this study rst
estimates the log of per capita annual consumption yijt (i.e., a household's consumption divided by the number of its
members) of a female i in a period t (wave 1 or wave 5) as12
yijt = 1 + 2Djt  wijt + 3wijt + 4xijt + vjt + ijt; (7)
whereby Djt takes the value one if levirate marriage is no longer a customary practice in a KHDS village j in the
period t; wijt is a dummy variable, equal to one if the female i is widowed in the period t and zero otherwise; the
vector xijt contains other determinants of consumption specic to the female and her household in the period t (e.g.,
age, education, and land and household size, which are expected to measure the household's nancial capacity); vjt
represents a linear time trend specic to the KHDS village j; and ijt is a stochastic error. As noted above, existence
of levirate marriage in the past is only discerned from recall information provided by the wave 5 survey. Thus, it is
assumed that the Djt takes zero in wave 1, provided that the village leaders of the wave 5 survey had accepted that
levirate marriage had commonly been practiced (approximately) 10 years earlier in a surveyed village j. Throughout
the paper, the standard errors in equation (7) (and equation (8) explained below) are robust to heteroskedasticity and
clustered to allow for arbitrary correlations across individuals within a village.
Importantly, the coecient of interest, 2, should be interpreted as a correlation induced only by the theoretical
mechanisms that this study has in its scope (i.e., either HIV/AIDS, female empowerment, or the combination). In
fact, based on the proposition 1 in Section 2, it is likely that widows obtain reservation utility from the relationship
of levirate marriage. In this case, no causal impact of levirate marriage on widows' welfare is expected.
While the 2 should not be given a causal interpretation, as described above, it is still necessary to remove any
confounding factors that prevent this study from identifying the correlation resulting only from the aforementioned
theoretical mechanisms. For this, the specication (7) compares changes in consumption patterns of the relevant
females from wave 1 to wave 5 between villages where levirate marriage grew less customary during the sample
periods (16 villages) and all other villages (which means, dierence-in-dierences).13 Since this study exploits all the
12A household's consumption includes food consumption (seasonal and non-seasonal) and non-food consumption (e.g., education and
health expenditures, miscellaneous non-food expenditures). The consumption data has been cleaned by the KHDS team and the resulting
dataset is publicly available. See Kagera Health and Development Survey   Consumption Expenditure Data for the details at http:
//edi-global.com/publications/.
13More precisely, the former group consists of 16 communities located in 14 villages. See also footnote 10.
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KHDS villages, the latter group includes those with either Djt = 0 (one village) or Djt = 1 (32 villages) in both wave
1 and wave 5 as well as two villages with Djt = 1 in wave 1 and Djt = 0 in wave 5. While it is possible to separate this
group further, this was not done in this study to simplify the analysis.14 However, this dierence-in-dierences (DID)
approach is still eective, as long as the consumption patterns in these dierent types of villages, as one group, followed
a similar trend. Analyzing data pertaining to only the aforementioned 16 villages (i.e., Djt = 0 in wave 1 and Djt = 1
in wave 5) and the 32 villages (i.e., Djt = 1 in both wave 1 and wave 5) did not aect the key implications obtained
in this study, either.15 Furthermore, by focusing on a comparison of consumption between widows and others (which
implies triple dierence), this study eliminates the inuence of time-varying unobserved village-level characteristics
that aected these villages over time in a dierent manner.
While the KHDS is a panel survey, the above empirical approach exploits the data as if it were pooled cross-
sectional data sourced from two dierent points in time (i.e., wave 1 or wave 5). This approach is identical to that
adopted in Kudo (2015). This strategy allows the current study to exploit data variations fully while avoiding the
unnecessary selection of the sample as well as the associated potential \bias." To facilitate an interpretation of the
identication strategy, more detailed discussion is provided in Section S.2 in the supplemental appendix.
3.2.2 Institutional change and fertility
In its analysis of fertility, this study exploits data on reproductive-age women whose husbands are household heads,
because fertility-related information available in the data consists only of the number of a head's (biological) co-
resident children fijt. The model presented in Section 2 implicitly assumes that a clan of husbands having \wives of
reproductive age" chooses the number of children. Thus, the selection of this female sample as a unit of observation
is still consistent with the theoretical framework, which encourages to estimate the following empirical model
fijt = 1 +
X
k
k2 Djt  okijt +
X
k
k3  okijt + 4xijt + vjt + uijt; (8)
where okijt is an indicator that equals one if the respondent belongs to age group k and zero otherwise. The reference
group is the oldest group, i.e., those aged 41 to 50. Assuming that the disappearance of levirate marriage is associated
with fertility decisions, this institutional mobility may have a more evident correlation with the number of children
born to young (thus, fecund) females. Interacting Djt with o
k
ijt enables this study to examine this prediction while
14Regarding the two villages reporting Djt = 1 in wave 1 and Djt = 0 in wave 5, its pattern is somewhat dicult to interpret given the
declining tendency of levirate marriage. Once these two villages are excluded, 32 of 33 villages were recorded as Djt = 1 in both wave 1
and wave 5. Therefore, this separation is likely to have limited impacts on the current analysis.
15The relevant results are available upon request.
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again allowing controlling for time trends specic to the original KHDS villages. As before, the k2 should be interpreted
as a correlation driven by either HIV/AIDS, female empowerment, or their combination.
4 Data
The World Bank launched the KHDS in Kagera, a rural region in northwest Tanzania, as a part of a research project
on adult mortality and morbidity in 1991. The KHDS is a long-term household panel survey that includes six waves,
as of now. This survey provides a range of information related to households, as well as their members and community,
thus enabling the current study to construct unbalanced panel data at the individual level (although as discussed in
Section 3, the empirical strategy exploited in this study utilizes the data as if it were pooled cross-sectional). The rst
four waves were carried out six to seven months apart between 1991 and 1994, with the remaining two waves taking
place in 2004 and 2010, respectively. Since this project used a standardized survey questionnaire, highly comparable
information is available across the waves. This study uses the data drawn from the rst ve waves. This is because a
community survey was not implemented in wave 6 and, therefore, the data set in the nal wave has no information
on local customary practices.
With stratications based on geography and mortality, the initial 912 households were randomly selected from the
1988 Tanzanian Census. In wave 5, approximately 91% of these baseline households were re-contacted. Owing to the
long-term nature of the project, a signicant proportion of the family members surveyed earlier had moved out of their
original households/villages between wave 1 and wave 5. One of the many contributions of this longitudinal survey
was the survey team's success in tracing new households. This strenuous eort resulted in 2,719 household interviews
in wave 5, including those done with the original households. Consequently, this survey shows a signicantly low rate
of sample attrition at both the individual and household levels. Excluding individuals that died, approximately 82%
of the 5,394 original respondents who were interviewed in the rst four waves were successfully re-contacted in wave
5 (Beegle et al., 2011). The analysis in this study uses data pertaining to only panel respondents originating from
all of the 51 KHDS villages. This sample includes those who resided in dierent places from their original villages in
wave 5 (i.e., migrants). As explained in Section S.2 in the supplemental appendix, inclusion of the migrants would
not invalidate the analysis. Information on new respondents in the wave 5 survey is not exploited. Table 3 provides
a description of several variables pertaining to the sample females of reproductive age. In this table, group A refers
to villages that made the traditional safety net less prevalent during the sample periods (16 villages), with group B
consisting of all the remaining villages, and the equality of the mean between these two groups was checked.
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By controlling for the village-specic linear time trend, the key identication assumption underlying the triple-
dierence approach is that in the absence of the deterioration of levirate marriage, a dierence in the consumption
levels between widows and the remaining females within the same village would have followed parallel trends (both
before and during the institutional change) between the two groups A and B. A similar assumption is also needed in
estimating fertility when comparing the outcome of the young cohort with that of the elderly one.
Unfortunately, as the data prior to wave 1 is not available, it is dicult to ascertain the parallel trends during the
pre-survey periods. However, it is still possible to examine the relevant welfare outcomes of respondents in wave 1
across dierent age cohorts. As revealed from the estimation result of consumption in column (a) in Table S.1 in the
supplemental appendix, a coecient on the tripe-interaction term between the group A indicator, a widow dummy,
and age (years) is insignicantly dierent from zero. While it is only possible to estimate the DID specication for
fertility, the interaction term between the group A indicator and age yielded an insignicant coecient in column (c).
These ndings are robust to the inclusion of the squared age terms, as shown in the remaining columns.
This study also assessed whether changes from wave 1 to wave 5 in the mean value of variables reported in
Table 3 were statistically equal between the two groups, and the DID estimates are demonstrated in Table S.2 in the
supplemental appendix. The DID estimates revealed few signicant dierences in the changes of all reported variables.
While these checks undoubtedly fall short of providing strong evidence in support of the parallel trend assumption,
the yielded ndings may still oer some comfort to the triple-dierence approach exploited in this study.
[Here, Table 3 ]
5 Empirical ndings
5.1 Widows' welfare
The estimation results of consumption are presented in Table 4. For each outcome reported in this table (and Table
5), the analysis in the rst column controls for time-varying characteristics that aected the KHDS villages over time
in a \similar" manner, in addition to xed eects of the (original) KHDS villages. The estimations in the second
column additionally include regressors for age, years of living in a village, and gender of the person responsible for
providing information on customary practices in community surveys. These controls are expected to mitigate concerns
over the potential noise in the measurements of levirate marriage. In the remaining columns, the village-xed eects
and region-wise time trend exploited in the rst two columns are replaced by a village-specic linear time trend. The
inuence of changes in general marriage (and/or other) market conditions, population, and any other factors (e.g.,
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economic hardship, religiosity, raising awareness, legal framework) operating at the village level can be absorbed by
this time trend.
The estimated correlation between the disappearance of levirate marriage and widows' welfare displays a relatively
stable pattern across the columns in Table 4. First, based on the results in columns (a) to (c), on average, the
deterioration of the traditional safety net had a negative correlation with widows' per capita consumption, but the
correlation is insignicantly dierent from zero. Applying the methodology proposed by Collier et al. (1986) (pp. 70
?73) for Tanzania, this study also estimates consumption per adult equivalent as well as that per adjusted adult
equivalent, the results of which are presented in columns (d) to (f) and (g) to (i), respectively. The former measure
reects nutritional requirements that vary by gender and age of typical individuals, whereas the latter additionally
takes into account the eects of economies of scale attributed to household size. The results suggest that widows'
consumption declined in step with the dissolution of levirate marriage.
While the statistical signicance is not always strong, the estimations in Table 4 reveal the negative relationships
between widows' consumption and the deterioration of levirate marriage. As will be discussed more carefully in Section
6, this nding highlights the role of HIV/AIDS as a factor facilitating this institutional change. If this infectious disease
indeed plays a signicant role, this correlation is expected to be more pronounced for young females having prime-age
husbands. This is because HIV/AIDS primarily increased prime-age adult mortality in Kagera (Beegle, 2005; Beegle
et al., 2008). Based on a population-based follow-up survey that Killewo et al. (1993) conducted in Kagera in 1988,
for example, among males aged above 15 years, incidence of HIV infection was highest in the age group of 25 to 34.
To explore this possibility, this study re-estimated equation (7). While data on female respondents aged 15 to 50
were exploited in the previous estimations, the analysis here utilized dierent female samples by varying the upper
bound of respondents' age. The estimated 2 and its 95% condence interval are graphically reported in Figure 2 (see
Table S.4 in the supplemental appendix for the precise estimates).16 In this gure, the estimate corresponding to age
m in the horizontal axis stems from the regression using data pertaining to females aged 15 to m  1 years.
As the gure shows, when the upper bound on age is less than 21 years (m  21), the estimates appear to be
imprecise. This could reect the fact that only a few females are widowed in this age cohort. For example, in the
estimation using 805 females aged 15 to 20, only four respondents are widowed. However, as the estimated sample
includes females in their late-20s and early-30s (and more widows), the deterioration of levirate marriage comes to have
increasingly negative correlations with widows' consumption at conventional levels of statistical signicance. Moreover,
if data relevant to much older females are exploited in the analysis, then the estimates gradually tend toward zero.
16Instead of age-cohort dummies, these estimations exploited age and age squared as regressors.
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This nding suggests that the disappearance of levirate marriage relates to a decline in welfare obtained by widows
belonging to young age cohorts.17
[Here, Table 4 and Figure 2 ]
5.2 Fertility
Table 5 reports the estimation results of equation (8). Based on the results in columns (a) to (d), females aged 21 to
40 increased their number of children compared to those aged 41 to 50 (reference group) in association with loss of
the informal safety net. Owing to this signicant association, pooling all those aged below 41 years into one category
and estimating the same equation still yielded a signicantly positive correlation between the institutional change
and fertility in column (e). Utilizing the continuous measure of age (years) in column (f) also conrmed the positive
correlation between the deterioration of levirate marriage and fertility of young wives.
The correlation evidently observed in that 21?40 age cohort is quite reasonable because female respondents aged
21 to 40 in wave 5 were aged 8 to 27 years in wave 1, and were likely to show higher fecundity during the sample
periods than those in any other cohorts. On the other hand, females aged below 15 (resp., aged 41 to 50 years) in
wave 5 might have been too young (old) to adjust their number of children during the investigation period in parallel
with the dissolution of levirate marriage.
Despite the plausible empirical ndings, several concerns should be addressed. First, as the estimated outcome is
the number of children born to a household's head, the estimation results may also be consistent with the view that in
villages where the practice of levirate marriage became less common, young females who lost a husband entered into
polygynous relationships with male heads having multiple wives and thus many children. Second, the estimated number
of children does not include children residing elsewhere. As parents grow older, co-residence with their children is less
likely because most adult children leave their natal home to form their own family. Consequently, the elder cohorts
of wives tend to have a smaller number of co-resident children. Third, given the presumed non-normal distribution of
the fertility outcome, the OLS estimations might not provide adequate implications. Robustness checks conducted in
Section S.3 in the supplemental appendix may mitigate these concerns (while if any, providing statistically stronger
evidence for the positive correlation between the disappearance of levirate marriage and young women's fertility).
Thus far, this study has demonstrated that the deterioration of levirate marriage is negatively associated with young
widows' consumption, while being positively correlated with the fertility of young wives (aged 21 to 40). The nding
17Figure S.4 and Figure S.5 in the supplemental appendix also report correlation of the institutional change with widows' consumptions
per adult equivalent and per adjusted adult equivalent, respectively (see Table S.4 in the supplemental appendix for the precise estimates).
The implications remain unchanged.
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that the estimated correlations are more pronounced for the young cohort is plausible, presuming that HIV/AIDS
primarily aected the young population and that young respondents show higher fecundity; therefore, it may mitigate
the concern that the identied correlations are entirely attributed to confounding factors unrelated to the theoretical
mechanisms that this study focuses on. In addition, note that the R-squared values shown in the previous estimations
of consumption and fertility are relatively large. This may suggest that there is little variation of the outcomes left
to \bias" the coecients of interest (Oster, forthcoming). Nevertheless, several threats to the nding are carefully
discussed in Section S.4 in the supplemental appendix.
[Here, Table 5 ]
6 HIV/AIDS as an agent of institutional change
The main nding of this study is compatible with the proposition 5 in Section 2; HIV/AIDS reduced widows' reservation
utility as well as established their de facto property rights, while also discouraging a husband's clan from providing this
traditional safety net. It should also be recalled that based on the KHDS data, this centuries-long practice has started
to disappear only during the past 20 years in the area studied. As argued in subsection 2.3, this swift transformation
may be consistent with the inuence of HIV/AIDS, especially considering that in Tanzania, the rst case of AIDS
was reported in Kagera in 1983 (e.g., Ainsworth et al., 1998; Lugalla et al., 1999), and the primary purpose of the
KHDS was to examine the economic impact of prime-age adult deaths on surviving household members owing to
the high HIV infection rates in this region (e.g., Beegle, 2005; Beegle et al., 2008). Nevertheless, the aforementioned
interpretation of the estimation results requires more careful discussion, as demonstrated in this section.
6.1 Anecdotal support for the inuence of HIV/AIDS
A non-negligible amount of case studies support the claim that HIV/AIDS has contributed to the disappearance of
levirate marriage in Africa, as studied in Kenya (e.g., Luke, 2002; Perry et al., 2014), Uganda (e.g., Berger, 1994;
Mukiza-Gapere and Ntozi, 1995; Ntozi, 1997), and Zambia (e.g., Malungo, 2001). Consistent with the assumption of
the theoretical model in Section 2, this institutional change is taking place because both the inheritors and widows fear
infection with HIV/AIDS stemming from practicing this customary marriage (and the associated sexual cleansing). For
instance, I, specically for the purpose of this research, conducted an original (cross-sectional) household survey (810
respondents) relevant to the Luo's customary practices in Rorya, a district in the Mara region of northeast Tanzania
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in November?December 2015 using a structured questionnaire.18 The Luo is an ethnic group that has received much
publicity for its practice of levirate marriage. In this survey, 80% (resp., 83%) of the interviewed females and 84%
(90%) of their husbands \strongly agreed" (or \agreed") to the view that levirate marriage increased the risk of
people being infected with HIV, respectively. Similarly, according to 4,500 interviews that Doosuur and Arome (2013)
conducted in Benue state of Nigeria, men more than women perceived the practice of levirate marriage as a mode of
HIV transmission. In Zambia, a lobby group asked for legislation banning sex cleansing typically followed by levirate
marriage because of the fear of spreading HIV/AIDS (Kunda, 1995). The chiefs in Chikankata Hospital catchment
area of Zambia also enacted a law to abolish sexual cleansing in the early 1990s for a similar reason (Malungo, 2001).
It appears that the socioeconomic consequences of the break down of levirate marriage triggered by HIV/AIDS
vary across societies and/or widowhood cases within a society. For example, some Luo widows in Kenya refused
levirate marriage and moved to the urban center to look for a new means of livelihood (Luke, 2002). According to a
case study of widowhood rites in Slaya district in Kenya, young widows who refrained from observing sexual cleansing,
also migrated to towns and to make ends meet, engaged in petty trade and sometimes secret sexual liaisons (Ambasa-
Shisanya, 2007). Based on the focus-group discussion facilitated by Ntozi (1997), widows' migration to other parts of
the country was also observed in Uganda. Recalling the theoretical model in Section 2, this sort of relocation of widows
may be seen as a strategy l accompanied by their reservation utility r, which was possibly lowered by HIV/AIDS.
As Mukiza-Gapere and Ntozi (1995) found in Uganda, another scenario also emerged, whereby property was
increasingly left to wives and children of the deceased, even though clan members of the deceased used to take over
the property from the widows in the past. Similarly, in present-day Zambia, family members of the deceased are
sometimes expected to provide nancial, material, and social support for the remaining widow and children, as the
practice of levirate marriage is no longer oered to the widow (Malungo, 2001). This necessary care of the remaining
household members generated a long policy debate in this country, which resulted in the enactment of the 1989
Intestate Succession Act, which allowed widows (resp., children) to inherit 20% (50%) of property left by the deceased.
While this act may not be strictly enforced at the grassroots level in a society, these social movements suggest that
HIV/AIDS could possibly establish widows' (whether de jure or de facto) property rights (i.e., an increase in k), which
may enable them to aord many children and thus, explain why a positive correlation between the disappearance of
18The target population of this survey was young married females who may be inherited by male relatives of their husbands in the future
as well as their husbands who may inherit widowed relatives in the future (or who have inherited widowed relatives). To reach a random
sample of this population, from July to September 2015, I rst attempted to make a list of married females aged 20 to 40 residing in all the
villages in Rorya. This work encouraged the survey team to actually visit 82 villages (approximately 93% of the total villages in Rorya)
based on Tanzania Population and Housing Census 2012, while enabling the team to list 9,900 eligible females in total. In each of the 82
villages, barring one village used for training the survey enumerators, ve females and their husbands were randomly selected from the list,
yielding 405 couples individually interviewed in the household survey in the end. Before starting this survey, I obtained a research permit
from Tanzania Commission for Science and Technology (COSTECH) in July 2015.
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levirate marriage and fertility was observed in the preceding empirical analyses.19
6.2 Analyses exploiting data on HIV/AIDS
To provide further evidence of the inuence of HIV/AIDS as a factor driving the deterioration of levirate marriage, in
this subsection, additional exercises are conducted based on HIV/AIDS-related information available to this study. In
each wave of the KHDS, the survey team asked a group of village leaders about the health situation in a community. The
number of villages that referred to HIV/AIDS as the most or second-most important health problem in a community
increased from 18 in wave 1 to 32 in wave 5, with the corresponding in-between gures summarized as 25, 24, and 35
in wave 2, 3, and 4, respectively.
While the available data is highly limited, this study also attempted to collect estimates of the biomarker-based
prevalence of HIV/AIDS from the following two information sources: 2003?04 Tanzania HIV/AIDS Indicator Survey
(2003?04 THIS) and Killewo et al. (1990). The THIS is the rst population-based comprehensive survey carried out
on HIV/AIDS in Tanzania from December 2003 to March 2004 (see Section S.5 in the supplemental appendix for more
details), whereas Killewo et al. (1990) estimated the district-level infection rate based on a population-based survey
conducted in Kagera in 1987. Owing to the diculty in estimating HIV/AIDS prevalence in general, however, the
estimates provided by two \independent" data sources may not be temporally comparable. In addition, Killewo et al.
(1990)'s estimates, which vary only by the number of districts (six districts), also have little data variation to allow
for a rigorous empirical analysis.
Nevertheless, these estimates are still useful in reecting the disease situation across space at each point in time
and thus, in assessing the accuracy of the aforementioned HIV/AIDS-related information collected in the respective
waves of the KHDS. As reported in Section S.5 in the supplemental appendix, the above subjective information in
wave 5 (resp., wave 1 to wave 4) was consistent with the estimated disease prevalence based on the THIS (Killewo
et al., 1990). This nding facilitates utilization of this subjective information in the empirical analysis that follows.20
In the current context, one way to proceed with this community-level information on HIV/AIDS collected in the
KHDS is to regress the village-level prevalence of levirate marriage (i.e., Djt) on the indicator for the villages that
identied HIV/AIDS as the most or second-most important health problem in a community.21 However, it is dicult
19In addition, the socioeconomic consequences of the HIV/AIDS-induced deterioration of levirate marriage also include development of
alternative cleansing methods that do not involve sexual intercourse (e.g., Malungo, 2001), although such alternative cleansing may not
always be accepted. Moreover, in some societies, clan members of the deceased are refusing to cleanse and inherit widows, instead handing
over the task to some professional people (e.g., Ambasa-Shisanya, 2007; Luke, 2002; Nyanzi et al., 2009). It is also argued that these
professional cleansers/inheritors are spreading HIV/AIDS, as they are quite likely to be HIV positive specically owing to this business.
20The estimates provided by the THIS and Killewo et al. (1990) may also not necessarily have an advantage over this subjective
information in accurately estimating the prevalence of the disease. For example, a measurement concern still arises, because the infection
rate among those that did not test for HIV is unknown in the THIS.
21The DID estimation exploiting the village-level 102 observations (i.e., 102 = 51  2) in waves 1 and 5 as well as controlling for the
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to interpret this estimate in a causal manner, because the practice of levirate marriage is often blamed for facilitating
the sexual transmission of HIV/AIDS (e.g., Malungo, 2001; Okeyo and Allen, 1994).22
6.2.1 HIV/AIDS-related heterogeneity of the correlation
Alternatively, if levirate marriage has disappeared largely because of the inuence of HIV/AIDS, the previously
identied correlations between the institutional change and welfare outcomes might have been more pronounced in
communities where this communicable disease had increasingly deteriorated the local health during the sample periods.
This prediction was checked for consumption and fertility in Table 6. Of the 51 KHDS communities, 17 did not
refer to HIV/AIDS as the most or second-most important health problem in wave 1 but did so in wave 5.2324 Of
the remaining 34 (= 51-17) communities, 31 communities did not identify HIV/AIDS as the most or second-most
important health problem in both wave 1 and wave 5, whereas the other three communities did so only in wave 1.
For each outcome and specication demonstrated in Table 6, the estimation results exploiting data relevant to the
17 communities are reported in the rst column, whereas those in the second column are relevant to the remaining
34 communities. First, the estimation results of consumption per capita, per adult equivalent, and per adjusted adult
equivalent are reported in columns (a) to (f) for females of reproductive age. As seen from the results in columns (a)
and (c), the negative correlation between the deterioration of levirate marriage and widows' welfare are more clearly
observed in villages more severely aected by HIV/AIDS from 1991 (wave 1) to 2004 (wave 5). As Figure 2 showed,
such a negative correlation is statistically the most distinct, if the analysis was limited to data pertaining to female
respondents aged 15 to 28. In columns (k) to (p) in Table 6, the corresponding sub-sample is exploited. Compared
with the estimation results using the full-sample in columns (a) to (f), the estimation results based on this sub-sample
reveal that institutional change had a larger and statistically more pronounced negative correlation with widows'
consumption in villages, whereby HIV/AIDS increasingly produced unfavorable consequences for the residents' health
during the sample periods.
The relevant estimation results for fertility are reported in columns (g) to (j) in Table 6. In columns (g) and (i), the
reduced sample size might have made the relevant estimates somewhat imprecise in the disease-stricken areas, as seen
region-wise time trend and village-xed eects yielded an insignicant estimate (-0.052 with std. 0.171).
22However, there is also another view that the practice of levirate marriage impedes the spread of HIV/AIDS, because the infected widow
is attached to a single inheritor and therefore, this practice contains the spread of the disease within an extended family of the deceased
(Agot, 2001; Agot et al., 2010; Luke, 2002).
23It was also possible to construct an indicator for villages that referred to HIV/AIDS as the most important health problem in a
community. While this number was 6, 13, 8, 22, and 4 in wave 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, respectively, the decline in the number from wave 1 to wave
5 is somewhat dicult to interpret, given the likely inuence of HIV/AIDS in Kagera (e.g., Beegle, 2005; Beegle et al., 2008). Therefore, in
the analysis that follows, importance is given to the indicator for villages that identied HIV/AIDS as the most or second-most important
health problem in a community.
24Note that the analysis in Table 6 is less likely to suer from the aforementioned reverse causality from the practice of levirate marriage
to the spread of HIV/AIDS, because it implicitly uses these pieces of information together as regressors.
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from the increases in the associated standard errors. In particular, of the 374 observations exploited in the estimation
of columns (g) and (i), only 9 (resp., 18) females were aged 15 to 20 in wave 1 (wave 5). This small sample size might
by chance have made the correlation between institutional change and fertility statistically signicant in this youngest
cohort, as such a signicant correlation was not observed in this cohort in the main estimation results presented
in Table 5. Admitting this limitation, nevertheless, the magnitude of the positive correlation between institutional
change and fertility in the cohorts aged 21 to 40 is greater in the HIV/AIDS-aected 17 communities than that in the
remaining communities.
[Here, Table 6 ]
6.2.2 Reduced-form impact of HIV/AIDS on widows' welfare and fertility
If HIV/AIDS indeed brought about the deterioration of levirate marriage while establishing widows' de facto property
rights, it is expected that this infectious disease causally reduced widows' welfare while increasing the number of
children, as indicated in the proposition 5 in Section 2.
Accordingly, after replacing the Djt in equation (7) and (8) with an indicator for the villages that referred to
HIV/AIDS as the most or second-most important health problem in a community in the respective period, the impacts
of HIV/AIDS on widows' welfare and parental fertility decisions are also investigated and the relevant estimation results
are reported in Table 7. This impact, obtained using the triple-dierence approach, may be seen as reduced-form eects
of HIV/AIDS, as indicated in the theoretical model in Section 2. Unlike the information on Djt that was recalled by
a group of village leaders in the wave 5 survey, the community-level information relevant to HIV/AIDS was available
in every wave of the KHDS. Therefore, in the estimations performed in Table 7, the relevant observations recorded in
all the ve waves were exploited. This treatment is expected to increase the precision of the estimates and power of
the associated statistical test by increasing the sample size.
As the results in columns (a) to (c) show, HIV/AIDS reduced the per capita consumption of widows aged 15 to
50. However, the statistical signicance is not always strong. As recalled from the analyses conducted in subsection
5.1, the negative welfare consequence of HIV/AIDS might have been more evident for widows belonging to a young
age cohort. Taking a similar approach to that for the estimations performed in Figure 2, the impact of HIV/AIDS on
consumption was estimated for females aged 15 to m 1 (m  16), and the relevant estimates are reported in Figure 3
with 95% condence intervals (see Table S.7 in the supplemental appendix for the precise estimates).25 As the results
show, HIV/AIDS reduced the consumption of young widows, and the magnitude and statistical signicance of the
25Similar to the estimations reported in Figure 2, age and age squared are exploited as regressors in these estimations, instead of
age-cohort dummies.
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impact was more pronounced for widows aged 15 to 28. This nding is consistent with the fact that the negative
correlation between institutional change and widows' welfare is more clearly observed for widows belonging to this
particular age cohort, as seen in Figure 2.26
The impacts of HIV/AIDS on fertility are reported in columns (d) through (f) in Table 7 and the result suggests
that females aged 21 to 40 increased their number of children during the sample periods as a result of this infectious
disease than those aged 41 to 50 (reference group) did. Compared with those belonging to any other cohorts, females
aged 21 to 40 in wave 5 were aged 8 to 27 years in wave 1 and thus, must have revealed great fecundity during the
investigation period. Accordingly, the marked fertility response of this age cohort is quite reasonable. Moreover, this
age cohort is exactly the same as the cohort in which the statistically signicant positive correlation between the
deterioration of levirate marriage and fertility were more pronouncedly observed in Table 5.27
Strictly speaking, the above estimates may be attenuated. For example, if relatively wealthy wives (whose hus-
bands are active in the dating market or engage in polygyny) lost their husbands to HIV/AIDS in the disease-stricken
areas, the aforementioned negative impact on widow's welfare would be biased upward. In addition, young women
might have lost prime-age husbands (that were active in the dating market) in the HIV/AIDS-aected areas. Since the
analysis of fertility limits attention to data on females whose husbands are alive and household heads, this study might
have underestimated the number of children born to young, fecund wives in the disease-prone areas, while underes-
timating the positive fertility eects of HIV/AIDS in the young cohort. Additional exercises performed to evaluate
the importance of omitted variables (required to explain the above HIV/AIDS impacts) based on Oster (forthcoming)
supported the view of the possible attenuation and thus, kept the interpretation that HIV/AIDS decreased widows'
consumption and encouraged the fertility of young wives.28
[Here, Table 7 and Figure 3]
26With 95% condence intervals, Figure S.7 and Figure S.8 in the supplemental appendix also present the estimated eects of HIV/AIDS
on consumption per adult equivalent and per adjusted adult equivalent, respectively (see Table S.7 in the supplemental appendix for the
precise estimates). The implications are similar to those provided by Figure 3.
27Remember that the community-level prevalence of levirate marriage in wave 1 (i.e., Djt) was estimated based on recall information
provided by the wave 5 survey, whereas information on the measured prevalence of HIV/AIDS (i.e., indicator) was collected in all the
waves of the KHDS. As detailed in Section S.5 in the supplemental appendix, the HIV/AIDS-relevant information in wave 1 was consistent
with objective infection rates sourced from Killewo et al. (1990). Therefore, the remarkably similar heterogeneity based on respondents'
age between Figure 2 and Figure 3 (for consumption) as well as between Table 5 and column (d) through (f) in Table 7 (for fertility) may
mitigate a concern over measurement noise pertaining to the recalled prevalence of levirate marriage in wave 1.
28Following Oster (forthcoming), this study estimated a coecient of proportionality on selection assumptions, as denoted as , for the
signicant coecients on the interaction term between an indicator for widows [column (c) in Table 7] or a cohort aged 21 to 40 [column
(f) in Table 7] and an indicator for HIV/AIDS-aected communities. Assuming that all the controls are proportional to unobservables, the
estimated  values for the column (c) was -1.548 when it is assumed that Rmax = 1:3 ~R, as heuristically suggested in Oster (forthcoming),
and -0.492 when Rmax = 1; whereby Rmax refers to the value of R-squared obtained from a hypothetical regression of the outcome on
the treatment, observed, and unobserved controls, whereas ~R is the value of R-squared resulting from a regression on the treatment and
observed controls. The corresponding values for the column (f) was -9.342 and -7.618, respectively. The negative  values indicate that
the aforementioned HIV/AIDS impacts appear to be attenuated if any (causality) bias exists.
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6.3 Alternative interpretation
Each of the main ndings of this study, i.e., negative (resp., positive) association of the disappearance of levirate
marriage with young widows' welfare (young wives' fertility), may make sense on its own, if the causal interpretation
is given to such relationships. First, widows might actually have lost welfare owing to the deterioration of the informal
safety net that had beneted them previously. Second, considering the ndings that an investment in childbearing
may be an important strategy for young women to protect them in their old age in agrarian societies (e.g., Hoddinott,
1992; Jensen, 1990; Nugent, 1985), this institutional change might have encouraged a young woman to have more
children, given the possibility that female (reproductive) rights are not entirely suppressed within a family. This is
because children may protect her in the future instead of the traditional safety net.
However, if women had indeed previously gained from the practice of levirate marriage, it is necessary to explain
why they agreed to stop this practice. One possibility is that since women found a better way to make a livelihood
outside this customary marriage, they lost an interest in welfare services provided by levirate marriage. In this case,
however, there is no theoretical reason to expect that young women attempt to increase the number of children. The
aforementioned empirical ndings also provide no support for such welfare improvement.
Alternatively, women could not resist the loss of the safety net, because they did not have a powerful voice in any
matter to do with their husbands' families. In this case, it is less likely that married women had strong bargaining
power over fertility decisions and that the positive fertility eect resulted from their behavioral response to protect
their widowhood.
To increase the number of children, it may still be possible that married women reduced their use of concealable
contraception in response to institutional change (e.g., Ashraf et al., 2014). Despite considerable increases in the use
of injectables and pills for the period of 1991?2004, however, the respective prevalence rates were just 8.3% and 5.9%
among married women in 2004?2005 (National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) [Tanzania] and ORC Macro, 2005, p. 74),
and access to family planning was still limited, particularly in rural areas.2930
Nevertheless, in subsection S.1.4 in the supplemental appendix, it was also attempted to interpret a woman's motive
to substitute own children for levirate marriage in an extended theoretical model, whereby women expend fertility
eort unobserved by a clan. As indicated in the discussion pertaining to the proposition S.7, if an increase in women's
intrinsic motive for such substitution, which may be interpreted as a decline in an (extrinsic) incentive cost needed for
29The corresponding rate of male condom use was approximately 2.0% (resp., 3.0%) among the currently married women (all women).
30Related to this concern, additional exercises conducted in Table S.8 in the supplemental appendix provided no evidence suggesting that
married women's bargaining power increased as a result of institutional change. In these exercises, this study replaced fijt in equation (8)
with a proportion of mother-related expenditures relative to a household's total expenditures and estimated the equation with or without
additional control of the total expenditures. Three dierent types of mother-related expenditures were attempted, namely just jewelry and
perfume, additionally expenditures on fabric, clothing, and shoes, and further, expenditures on children's education.
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a clan to elicit women's fertility eort, takes places together with the spread of HIV/AIDS, the equilibrium number of
children may increase due to women's fertility eort even if HIV/AIDS does \not" improve widows' property rights;
nonetheless, this fertility increase is, along with a decline in widows' welfare, still consistent with the disappearance
of levirate marriage driven by HIV/AIDS.
7 Conclusion
To better understand the mechanisms that facilitate cultural change, this study examines why levirate marriage is
disappearing in sub-Saharan Africa, which has, thus far, not been a subject of economic research despite its popu-
larity and economic signicance. To address this question, this study rst developed a simple theoretical model that
explained the mechanisms maintaining levirate marriage based on the ndings provided by relevant anthropological
and ethnographic studies as well as my eld surveys in the Kagera and Mara regions in Tanzania. In an empirical
analysis, it exploited one novel setting observed in the survey data collected in rural Tanzania for 1991?2004; during
this period, this customary marriage practice became less common in several communities.
Since widows' engagement in levirate marriage is not observed at the individual level in the survey data, the current
study attempted to infer the mechanisms underlying its deterioration by testing multiple theoretical predictions.3132
Notably, this study has reasoned the mechanisms by a sort of syllogism. As the HIV/AIDS reduced (resp., encouraged)
young widows' consumption (young wives' fertility), which is associated with the community-level disappearance of
levirate marriage, it is likely that HIV/AIDS deteriorated levirate marriage.
To refute this interpretation, alternative hypotheses would have to simultaneously explain why the dissolution of
levirate marriage had a negative correlation with young widows' consumption; why this institutional change positively
correlated with fertility of young wives (aged 21 to 40); why these correlations are more pronounced in HIV/AIDS-
aected communities; why HIV/AIDS reduced young widows' consumption; why HIV/AIDS encouraged the fertility
of young wives (aged 21 to 40); and most importantly, why levirate marriage is fast disappearing. While the fertility
response to HIV/AIDS might have resulted from other channels not considered in this study (see Section S.6 in the
supplemental appendix for the relevant literature), these channels do not necessarily explain the positive relationship
31Even if such individual-level information had been available, it might also have been dicult to identify the relevant causal eects,
given the possible impact of levirate marriage on the spread of HIV/AIDS (Agot, 2001; Agot et al., 2010; Luke, 2002; Malungo, 2001;
Okeyo and Allen, 1994) as well as diculty in nding an appropriate instrumental variable.
32Developing the relevant testing strategy despite the lack of such crucial information may be seen as one contribution of the present
paper, given that there is little empirical evidence of this marriage practice. Indeed, exploitation of the data drawn from the KHDS
makes the empirical analyses and ndings presented in this study invaluable. This is because empirical research of the kind presented here
requires not only a setting, where the practice of levirate marriage is deteriorating, but also panel data that \records" the institutional
transformation in the \long term." Collecting information on levirate marriage is extremely unusual (even if it is at the community-level)
in standard household surveys, much less in the long term.
30
between the disappearance of levirate marriage and fertility. Moreover, the empirical exploration of widows' welfare is
still helpful in interpreting mechanisms responsible for the deterioration of levirate marriage, because likely, a husband's
clan always attempts to keep a widow's equilibrium payo at the minimum. In the absence of strong candidates for
an alternate hypothesis, all the relevant results demonstrated in this study may collectively provide support for the
claim that a primary factor responsible for the deterioration of levirate marriage is HIV/AIDS, at least in the studied
area. This claim is also consistent with the ndings of prior case studies conducted in other areas.
The implication of the present investigation serves as an important caution for those who propose an outright
ban on an anti-social practice that is seen as violating women's human rights and who interpret the disappearance of
levirate marriage as a sign of female empowerment. As a result of HIV/AIDS, young widows may need a form of social
protection (e.g., formal insurance, access to income-generating opportunities). As indicated in the theoretical model
presented in Section 2 (see also Table 1), providing such protection (i.e., an increase in r > ) may also improve the
total welfare enjoyed by a clan and by widows. Owing to the absence of solid data, however, further empirical research
is still required to prove or disprove the plausibility of the asserted mechanisms in a strict sense. Since this study's
assertion comes from the examination of one particular setting, its external validity also needs to be conrmed. Along
with the relevant future studies, the current research must improve the general understanding of the mechanisms
responsible for the transformation of cultural institutions that have been rooted in societies.
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Table 1: Summary of the propositions
Proposition Strategy prole Fertility A clan's payos A widow's payos
at equilibrium at equilibrium at equilibrium at equilibrium
1. Levirate marriage (n; c(n); a) n u(n)  c(n) r0 = 0
2. Female empowerment (k ") (n1; c(n1); a) or (n1; 0; z) n1 > n u(n1)  c(n1) r0 = 0
3. Female empowerment (r ")
  r1 (n; c(n) + r1; a) n u(n)  c(n)  r1 r1 > 0
 < r1 (n
; 0; l) n u(n)  c(n)   r1 > 0
4. HIV/AIDS
   (n0; 0; z) n0  n u(n0)  c(n0) r0 = 0
 <  (n; 0; l) n u(n)  c(n)   r0 = 0
5. HIV/AIDS-induced (n3; 0; z) n3 > n
 u(n3)  c(n3)  r2 r2 < 0
female empowerment (k " & r #)
Note:   u(n)  c(n)  u(n0) + c(n0).
Table 2: Relationship with the deterioration of levirate marriage
A change in a widow's A change in fertility Underlying mechanisms
payos at equilibrium at equilibrium (proposition)
vw > 0 n > 0 Not possible
n = 0 3. Female empowerment (r ")
n < 0 Not possible
vw = 0 n > 0 2. Female empowerment (k ")
n = 0 4. HIV/AIDS ( <  &   )
n < 0 4. HIV/AIDS (  )
vw < 0 n > 0 5. HIV/AIDS-induced female empowerment (k " & r #)
n = 0 Not possible
n < 0 Not possible
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Table 3: Summary statistics (females aged 15 to 50 years)
Group A Group B
Mean Std. No. of Mean Std. No. of
obs. obs.
(1) Wave 1
Per capita consumption (TSH) 53517.16 45253.82 400 52812.96 35915.54 800
No. of biological children 2.63** 2.66 402 2.28 2.23 802
No. of biological sons 1.28** 1.37 402 1.11 1.32 802
No. of biological daughters 1.35* 1.76 402 1.16 1.34 802
Education (years) 4.55** 3.31 394 5.05 3.06 786
Widow (dummy) 0.08 0.28 402 0.10 0.30 802
Age (years) 27.07 9.80 402 27.46 10.42 802
Head's age (years) 46.10* 16.03 402 47.90 16.16 802
Head male (dummy) 0.78* 0.41 402 0.73 0.43 802
HH size 7.70 5.14 400 7.33 3.07 800
HH land (acre) 6.67*** 6.70 388 5.19 4.78 793
(2) Wave 5
Per capita consumption (TSH) 48143.06*** 39185.11 526 58488.40 54943.67 1190
No. of biological children 2.32*** 2.22 526 1.82 1.72 1190
No. of biological sons 1.15*** 1.37 526 0.88 1.06 1190
No. of biological daughters 1.17*** 1.41 526 0.94 1.14 1190
Education (years) 5.18*** 3.37 524 5.89 3.14 1171
Widow (dummy) 0.05 0.22 524 0.05 0.22 1189
Age (years) 27.89** 9.20 526 26.80 8.56 1190
Head's age (years) 41.67 14.99 525 42.35 15.48 1180
Head male (dummy) 0.80*** 0.40 525 0.69 0.45 1180
HH size 5.97*** 3.59 526 5.39 2.63 1190
HH land (acre) 4.50** 4.63 468 3.86 4.12 1008
Notes: (1) Group A refers to villages that made levirate marriage less customary during the sample periods, with group B consisting of all
the remaining villages. (2) In each wave, the equality of means between the group A and group B is examined. *** denotes signicance at
1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%.
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Table 4: Institutional change and widows' welfare (OLS)
Dependent variables: Log of consumption per Log of consumption per Log of consumption per
capita (TSH) adult equivalent (TSH) adjusted adult equivalent (TSH)
Sample: Females aged 15 to 50 Females aged 15 to 50 Females aged 15 to 50
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i)
No levirate marriage
 Widow -0.054 -0.066 -0.044 -0.116 -0.129 -0.102 -0.187 -0.202* -0.195*
(0.095) (0.093) (0.075) (0.094) (0.092) (0.074) (0.118) (0.116) (0.106)
No levirate marriage -0.020 -0.023 - -0.031 -0.041 - -0.026 -0.046 -
(0.082) (0.077) (0.082) (0.078) (0.097) (0.092)
Widow -0.075 -0.062 -0.090 -0.024 -0.011 -0.043 0.096 0.107 0.103
(0.089) (0.088) (0.071) (0.087) (0.086) (0.068) (0.102) (0.100) (0.086)
Aged 15 to 20 -0.134*** -0.137*** -0.147*** -0.114*** -0.117*** -0.125*** -0.151*** -0.151*** -0.164***
(0.037) (0.038) (0.037) (0.036) (0.036) (0.035) (0.039) (0.039) (0.040)
Aged 21 to 30 -0.183*** -0.187*** -0.204*** -0.054 -0.058 -0.076* 0.039 0.035 0.012
(0.041) (0.041) (0.042) (0.038) (0.038) (0.039) (0.037) (0.037) (0.040)
Aged 31 to 40 -0.160*** -0.167*** -0.164*** -0.081** -0.087** -0.087** 0.084* 0.078* 0.065
(0.038) (0.037) (0.037) (0.038) (0.037) (0.037) (0.044) (0.043) (0.044)
Education (years) 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.036*** 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.032*** 0.023*** 0.022*** 0.023***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Head's age (years) -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.002** -0.002** -0.002* -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Head male 0.105*** 0.106*** 0.105*** 0.112*** 0.115*** 0.113*** 0.027 0.027 0.032
(0.033) (0.034) (0.034) (0.036) (0.036) (0.037) (0.045) (0.046) (0.045)
HH size -0.056*** -0.055*** -0.055*** -0.047*** -0.047*** -0.047*** -0.131*** -0.130*** -0.132***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013)
HH land (acre) 0.023*** 0.022*** 0.023*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.013*** 0.011*** 0.011**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Head's ethnicity YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Head's religion YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Village leader char. NO YES NO NO YES NO NO YES NO
Village FE YES YES NO YES YES NO YES YES NO
Region-time trend YES YES NO YES YES NO YES YES NO
Village-time trend NO NO YES NO NO YES NO NO YES
R-squared 0.330 0.335 0.370 0.315 0.320 0.357 0.462 0.466 0.489
No. of obs. 2616 2564 2616 2616 2564 2616 2616 2564 2616
Notes: (1) Figures ( ) are standard errors. *** denotes signicance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. (2) Standard errors are robust to
heteroskedasticity and clustered residuals within each village. (3) A head's ethnicity is classied into seven groups, i.e., Hangaza, Haya,
Nyambo, Shubi, Subi, Zinza, and other. (4) A head's religion is categorized into six groups, i.e., Muslim, Catholic, Protestant, other
Christian, traditional, and other.
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Table 5: Institutional change and fertility (OLS)
Dependent variable: No. of children
Sample: Head's wives aged 15 to 50
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
No levirate marriage
 Aged 15 to 20 0.002 -0.052 0.052 0.056 - -
(0.322) (0.331) (0.351) (0.350)
 Aged 21 to 30 0.524** 0.469* 0.444 - - -
(0.246) (0.265) (0.273)
 Aged 31 to 40 0.642* 0.607* 0.719* - - -
(0.323) (0.337) (0.368)
 Aged 21 to 40 - - - 0.561* - -
(0.293)
 Aged 15 to 40 - - - - 0.482* -
(0.277)
 Age - - - - - 0.247**
(0.107)
 Age squared - - - - - -0.004**
(0.002)
No levirate marriage -0.479* -0.452 - - - -
(0.270) (0.279)
Aged 15 to 20 -0.380 -0.375 -0.416 -0.419 -0.743** -
(0.351) (0.358) (0.382) (0.382) (0.348)
Aged 21 to 30 0.299 0.314 0.342 0.245 0.311 -
(0.242) (0.250) (0.268) (0.294) (0.281)
Aged 31 to 40 0.605** 0.607* 0.479 0.604** 0.665** -
(0.295) (0.312) (0.356) (0.292) (0.279)
Age (years) - - - - - 0.289***
(0.097)
Age squared - - - - - -0.004***
(0.001)
Education (years) -0.004 -0.004 -0.001 -0.001 0.002 -0.013
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Head's age (years) -0.010 -0.011* -0.010* -0.010* -0.010* -0.014**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Head male -0.444 -0.472 -0.352 -0.342 -0.301 -0.332
(0.435) (0.468) (0.542) (0.533) (0.586) (0.415)
HH size 0.553*** 0.552*** 0.554*** 0.554*** 0.554*** 0.536***
(0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.030)
HH land (acre) 0.001 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.000
(0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013)
Head's ethnicity YES YES YES YES YES YES
Head's religion YES YES YES YES YES YES
Village leader char. NO YES NO NO NO NO
Village FE YES YES NO NO NO NO
Region time-trend YES YES NO NO NO NO
Village time-trend NO NO YES YES YES YES
R-squared 0.716 0.722 0.730 0.730 0.729 0.745
No. of obs. 1217 1191 1217 1217 1217 1217
Notes: (1) Figures ( ) are standard errors. *** denotes signicance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. (2) Standard errors are robust to
heteroskedasticity and clustered residuals within each village. (3) A head's ethnicity is classied into seven groups, i.e., Hangaza, Haya,
Nyambo, Shubi, Subi, Zinza, and other. (4) A head's religion is categorized into six groups, i.e., Muslim, Catholic, Protestant, other
Christian, traditional, and other.
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Table 6: HIV/AIDS-related heterogeneity: Institutional change and welfare outcomes (OLS)
Dependent variables: Log of consumption (TSH) per No. of children
capita adult equivalent adusted adult equivalent
Sample: Females aged 15 to 50 Females aged 15 to 50 Females aged 15 to 50 Head's wives aged 15 to 50
Did HIV/AIDS become a YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO
more important health
problem from wave 1 to 5?
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j)
No levirate marriage
 widow -0.201** 0.026 -0.194** -0.059 -0.102 -0.220 - - - -
(0.083) (0.091) (0.079) (0.093) (0.165) (0.131)
 Aged 15 to 20 - - - - - - 1.662* -0.298 1.658* -0.297
(0.925) (0.344) (0.918) (0.343)
 Aged 21 to 30 - - - - - - 0.720 0.329 - -
(1.006) (0.278)
 Aged 31 to 40 - - - - - - 1.182 0.607 - -
(1.281) (0.362)
 Aged 21 to 40 - - - - - - - - 0.950 0.438
(1.090) (0.287)
R-squared 0.310 0.402 0.299 0.389 0.460 0.507 0.701 0.745 0.700 0.744
No. of obs. 867 1749 867 1749 867 1749 374 843 374 843
Sample: Females aged 15 to 28 Females aged 15 to 28 Females aged 15 to 28
Did HIV/AIDS become a YES NO YES NO YES NO
more important health
problem from wave 1 to 5?
(k) (l) (m) (n) (o) (p)
No levirate marriage
 widow -1.135*** -0.213 -1.285*** -0.210 -1.894*** -0.171
(0.249) (0.147) (0.226) (0.149) (0.258) (0.222)
R-squared 0.355 0.417 0.355 0.405 0.507 0.537
No. of obs. 520 1033 520 1033 520 1033
Individual controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Village-time trend YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: (1) Figures ( ) are standard errors. *** denotes signicance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. (2) Standard errors are robust to
heteroskedasticity and clustered residuals within each village. (3) Individual controls include all regressors used in the analysis in Table 4
and Table 5, but the corresponding estimates are not reported here.
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Table 7: Reduced-form impacts of HIV/AIDS on widows' welfare and fertility (OLS)
Dependent variables: Log of consumption (TSH) per No. of children
capita adult equivalent adjusted adult
equivalent
Sample: Females Females Females Head's wives aged 15 o 50
aged 15 to 50 aged 15 to 50 aged 15 to 50
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
One if HIV/AIDS is the most or second most important health problem in a community
 Widow -0.040 -0.048 -0.148* - - -
(0.055) (0.054) (0.079)
 Aged 15 to 20 - - - -0.155 -0.150 -
(0.363) (0.363)
 Aged 21 to 30 - - - 0.348* - -
(0.183)
 Aged 31 to 40 - - - 0.518** - -
(0.223)
 Aged 21 to 40 - - - - 0.425** 0.476***
(0.192) (0.149)
Widow -0.145*** -0.142*** 0.001 - - -
(0.046) (0.046) (0.058)
Aged 15 to 20 -0.175*** -0.159*** -0.167*** -0.534* -0.539* -0.605**
(0.026) (0.025) (0.031) (0.308) (0.308) (0.270)
Aged 21 to 30 -0.209*** -0.101*** 0.010 0.407** 0.367** 0.344**
(0.033) (0.031) (0.034) (0.166) (0.166) (0.157)
Aged 31 to 40 -0.176*** -0.111*** 0.065* 0.807*** 0.851*** 0.829***
(0.031) (0.029) (0.036) (0.186) (0.180) (0.163)
Education (years) 0.038*** 0.035*** 0.024*** 0.009 0.009 0.009
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Head's age (years) 0.001 -0.001 -0.006*** -0.014** -0.014** -0.014**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Head male 0.131*** 0.116*** 0.018 -0.616 -0.637 -0.606
(0.033) (0.034) (0.042) (0.445) (0.457) (0.462)
HH size -0.047*** -0.041*** -0.116*** 0.531*** 0.530*** 0.530***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.010) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
HH land (acre) 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Head's ethnicity YES YES YES YES YES YES
Head's religion YES YES YES YES YES YES
Village-time trend YES YES YES YES YES YES
R-squared 0.365 0.357 0.514 0.731 0.731 0.731
No. of obs. 5688 5688 5688 2327 2327 2327
Notes: (1) Figures ( ) are standard errors. *** denotes signicance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. (2) Standard errors are robust to
heteroskedasticity and clustered residuals within each village. (3) A head's ethnicity is classied into seven groups, i.e., Hangaza, Haya,
Nyambo, Shubi, Subi, Zinza, and other. (4) A head's religion is categorized into six groups, i.e., Muslim, Catholic, Protestant, other
Christian, traditional, and other.
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vc(n; s; a) = u(n)  s
vw(n; s; a) = s  c(n)
vc(n; s; k) = u(n)  k
vw(n; s; k) = k   c(n)
vc(n; s; l) = u(n)  c(n)  
vw(n; s; l) = r
c Choose the number of children (n)
c
w
Choose an amount of livelihood support s  0 under levirate marriage
s > 0: oer levirate marriage.
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Figure 2: Age heterogeneity: Institutional change and widows' welfare (consumption per capita) (OLS)
Notes: (1) This gure reports the estimated 2 in equation (7) with 95% condence intervals by changing the exploited sample by the
respondents' age. (2) Age m in the horizontal axis means that the estimation uses data pertaining to female respondents aged 15 to m  1.
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Figure 3: Age heterogeneity: Reduced-form impacts of HIV/AIDS on widows' welfare (consumption per capita) (OLS)
Notes: (1) After replacing Djt in equation (7) with an indicator for villages that referred to HIV/AIDS as the most or second most
important health problem in a community in each wave, this gure reports the estimated impacts of HIV/AIDS on widows' consumption
with 95% condence intervals by changing the exploited sample by the respondents' age. (2) Age m in the horizontal axis means that the
estimation uses data pertaining to female respondents aged 15 to m  1. (3) The estimates and statistical signicance are reported in more




S.1 Robustness to model extension
In this section, an attempt is made to ensure that the key theoretical implications are robust to several model
extensions.
S.1.1 Relocation cost and punishment
In the real world, several additional costs aect players' payos, which can easily be considered in the model. For
example, it is possible to include the cost that may be imposed by community members on widows not following the
traditional custom. Similarly, a widow's relocation cost associated with the action l can also be analyzed in the model.
However, inclusion of these additional costs would not change the model predictions, because these costs only reduce
widows' reservation utility.
S.1.2 A widow's option to leave with her own children
In this subsection, a widow's choice to leave with her own children is additionally included in her action set, namely,
a widow may leave alone (m = action l1) or leave with her own children (m = action l2). Presuming that a widow
taking the action l2 (or her parents) usually has to return bridewealth payments (given at the time of marriage from
a groom to a bride's family) to the clan, the relevant payo proles can be summarized as
vc(n; s; a) = u(n)  s; (S.1.1)
vw(n; s; a) = s  c(n); (S.1.2)
vc(n; s; l1) = u(n)  c(n)  ; (S.1.3)
vw(n; s; l1) = r   g; (S.1.4)
vc(n; s; l2) = b; (S.1.5)
vw(n; s; l2) = r   c(n)  b; (S.1.6)
vc(n; s; z) = u(n)  k; (S.1.7)
vw(n; s; z) = k   c(n); (S.1.8)
whereby b  0 is bridewealth payments and g  0 is the cost borne by widows leaving alone (e.g., emotional cost
arising from separation from children), both of which are assumed to be exogenously determined.33 As seen from the
33As the amount of bride price is agreed on at the time of marriage, it is pre-determined when this extensive-form game begins.
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payo proles, when a widow leaves with her own children, she has to repay bride prices to the clan, which benets a
clan but is detrimental to the widow. In addition, when a widow leaves alone, she bears the separation cost. To allow
for the case that a widow prefers to leave with her children to leaving alone, it is assumed that the separation cost is
reasonably large, i.e., g  b.
However, note that when widows' independent livelihood means are limited (i.e., r  0) (and given k  0), a
widow never chooses the action l2. This is because a widow prefers to exploit her husband's property bequeathed to
her, rather than starting a new life with children taken away from a husband's family (i.e., r   c(n)  b < k   c(n)).
Therefore, this observation makes the theoretical analysis of the present concern fundamentally the same as that
considered in the benchmark model.
Consequently, when widows have limited independent livelihood means so that r = r0 = 0 and k = k^0  c(n)  g,
it turns out that
Proposition S.1 When r = r0 = 0 and k = k^0  c(n)  g, the strategy prole (n; c(n)  g; a) is subgame perfect,
along with the equilibrium number of children n and a widow's payo r0   g =  g.
In addition, assume that HIV/AIDS strikes a society sustaining the traditional marriage practice, while establishing
widows' de facto property rights k = k^1 > c(n
)   g as well as reducing r to the level of r2 < 0. Now, vc(n; s; a) =
u(n)  s  hc and vw(n; s; a) = s  c(n)  hw. Then, the following proposition holds:
Proposition S.2 When r = r2 < 0, k = k^1 > c(n
)  g, and the disease cost is high enough such that    r2 + g <
hw + hc, the strategy prole (n^1; 0; z) is subgame perfect, along with the equilibrium number of children n^1 > n
 and
a widow's payo r2   g <  g.
Here, n^1 satises k^1   c(n^1) = r2   g.
In the case of HIV/AIDS-induced female empowerment, the deterioration of levirate marriage is associated with
an increase in the number of children (i.e., n^1 > n
) as well as a decline in widows' welfare (i.e., r2   g <  g), which
is a similar nding to that obtained from analyses of the benchmark model.
S.1.3 Uncertainty about a couple's death
While it was presumed in the benchmark model that a husband surely dies before a wife does, this assumption is
relaxed in this subsection, as it is possible that this is not the case in the real world. Dening a probability that a
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husband's dies rst as p 2 (0; 1), the agents' expected payos can be characterized as
vc(n; s; a) = u(n)  ps  (1  p)(c(n) + ); (S.1.9)
vw(n; s; a) = p(s  c(n)); (S.1.10)
vc(n; s; l) = u(n)  c(n)  ; (S.1.11)
vw(n; s; l) = pr; (S.1.12)
vc(n; s; z) = u(n)  pk   (1  p)(c(n) + ); (S.1.13)
vw(n; s; z) = p(k   c(n)); (S.1.14)
whereby it is assumed that when a wife dies rst, a husband's clan will take care of the children left behind.
First, consider a case that widows have limited independent livelihood means so that r = r0 = 0 and k = k0 
c(n). Then, it is easy to show that
Proposition S.3 When r = r0 = 0 and k = k0  c(n), the strategy prole (n; c(n); a) is subgame perfect, along
with the equilibrium number of children n and a widow's payo pr0 = 0.
Next, assume that HIV/AIDS hits a society that practices levirate marriage, while establishing widows' de facto
property rights k = k1 > c(n
) as well as reducing r to the level of r2 < 0. Now, vc(n; s; a) = u(n) ps  (1 p)(c(n)+
)  phc and vw(n; s; a) = p(s  c(n)  hw). Then, the following proposition holds:
Proposition S.4 Assume that r = r2 < 0, k = k1 > c(n
), and the disease cost is high enough such that    r2 <
hw + hc. Then,
1. When k1  c(np) + r2 (in this case, n < n3  np), the strategy prole (n3; 0; z) is subgame perfect, along with
the equilibrium number of children n3 > n
 and a widow's payo pr2 < 0 (Case 1).
2. When c(np) + r2 < k1 < c(np) (in this case, n
  np < n3), the strategy prole (np; 0; z) is subgame perfect,
along with the equilibrium number of children np  n and a widow's payo p(k1   c(np)) < 0 (Case 2).
3. When k1  c(np) (in this case, n  np < n3), the strategy prole (np; 0; z) is subgame perfect, along with the
equilibrium number of children np  n and a widow's a payo p(k1   c(np))  0 (Case 3).
Here, np satises u
0(np) = (1  p)c0(np).
When there is a possibility that a wife dies rst, the disappearance of levirate marriage coincides with an increase
in the number of children (i.e., n3 > n
 or np  n) as well as \either" a decrease or increase in widows' welfare.
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The possible increase in widows' welfare (i.e., Case 3) is a prediction that was not provided in the benchmark model.
Several points deserve highlighting.
First, as the likelihood that a husband dies rst goes up, np increases.
34 Then, given the values of r0 (= 0), r2,
and k1, Case 1 (i.e., c(n
) < k1  c(np) + r2) is more likely to occur, as p increases. Consequently, when the value
of p is large, the strategy prole (n3; 0; z) would arise at equilibrium. In fact, this is exactly the equilibrium strategy
prole achieved when a husband surely dies rst, as seen from proposition 5.
Second, as discussed in subsection 2.2.1, an increase in the amount of a husband's property bequeathed to widows
provides a clan with an incentive to increase the number of ospring, because widows can now aord many children
when choosing action z. However, when the probability that a husband dies rst decreases (i.e., small p), which tends
to result in Case 2 or Case 3 because of the decreasing np (i.e., k1 > c(np)+r2),
35 a clan's expected cost of taking care
of children left by a wife (that dies rst) would increase. Owing to this increase in the expected child-rearing cost, a
clan would hesitate to increase the number of children to the level of n3 and eventually choose np < n3. In this case,
it is possible that widows' welfare increases (i.e., Case 3) as a result of HIV/AIDS, if they can inherit a signicant
amount of a husband's property (i.e., k1  c(np)). Otherwise (i.e., k1 < c(np)), widows' welfare decreases (i.e., Case
2).
Third, even if uncertainty exists about a couple's death, widows' welfare would still decline and the number of
children would increase, as long as a husband is more likely to die rst (i.e., Case 1) and the amount of bequest
provided for widows is not remarkably large (i.e., Case 2), both of which seem to be the case in reality.
S.1.4 Female fertility control: Moral hazard
In the benchmark model, a husband's clan had a deterministic inuence on the number of children. However, it may
be more realistic to assume that married women can also inuence their fertility, which is what is considered in this
subsection.
Now, assume that during her married life, a woman can either expend eort e, which is unobserved by a husband's
clan, to produce children or not. If such eort is expended (e = e), n children would be produced with certainty,
otherwise (e = e) with probability q 2 (0; 1), where the cost of fertility eort is denoted as d > 0.36 The strategy
prole now includes women's fertility eort, as characterized by (n; s;m; e). Then, a clan's and a widow's payos can
34This means that if p1 > p2, n1p > n
2
p, whereby u
0(n1p) = (1   p1)c0(n1p) and u0(n2p) = (1   p2)c0(n2p). This can be proved as follows;
suppose n1p  n2p when p1 > p2, c0(n1p)  c0(n2p), which results in (1  p1)c0(n1p)  (1  p1)c0(n2p) < (1  p2)c0(n2p) and so, u0(n1p) < u0(n2p).
This implies that n1p > n
2
p, which is a contradiction of n
1
p  n2p.
35For example, when p  0, n  np and so, c(np) + r2  c(n) + r2 < c(n) < k1.
36Thus, the analysis of female fertility control enables this study to consider the case that married women eventually produce no children,
which is sometimes observed in reality.
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be written as
vc(n; s; a; e) = u(n)  s; (S.1.15)
vc(n; s; a; e) = q(u(n)  s); (S.1.16)
vw(n; s; a; e) = s  c(n)  d; (S.1.17)
vw(n; s; a; e) = q(s  c(n)) + (1  q)r; (S.1.18)
vc(n; s; l; e) = u(n)  c(n)  ; (S.1.19)
vc(n; s; l; e) = q(u(n)  c(n)  ); (S.1.20)
vw(n; s; l; e) = r   d; (S.1.21)
vw(n; s; l; e) = r; (S.1.22)
vc(n; s; z; e) = u(n)  k; (S.1.23)
vc(n; s; z; e) = q(u(n)  k); (S.1.24)
vw(n; s; z; e) = k   c(n)  d; (S.1.25)
vw(n; s; z; e) = q(k   c(n)) + (1  q)r: (S.1.26)
Here, it is assumed that when a woman does not expend eort and produces no children, she has to leave her husband's
home when he dies. In addition, note that when a woman takes action l, she always prefers not to expend eort. This
is because doing so results in utility r   d, which is lower than utility r achieved with no eort expended.
First, consider a case where widows have limited independent means to support themselves such that r = r0 = 0
and k = k0 c(n). Then, it can be shown that
Proposition S.5 When r = r0 = 0, k = k0  c(n), and (1 q)(u(n) c(n))  d1 q , the strategy prole (n; c(n)+
d
1 q ; a; e) is subgame perfect, along with the equilibrium number of children n
 and a widow's payo qd1 q . When
r = r0 = 0, k = k0  c(n), and (1  q)(u(n)  c(n)) < d1 q , the strategy prole (n; c(n); a; e) is subgame perfect,
along with the equilibrium number of children n and a widow's payo r0 = 0.
Note that d1 q is an incentive cost needed for a clan to encourage a woman's fertility eort. As this incentive cost
increases, the \no-eort equilibrium" (n; c(n); a; e) tends to arise at equilibrium. The large eort cost d increases this
incentive cost. This incentive cost also becomes larger as a woman's power to control fertility becomes more limited
(i.e., large q), because her limited power enables a clan to achieve its desired fertility without inducing a marked
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fertility eort. Notably, when a clan decides to prompt a woman's fertility eort, she obtains a payo greater than
her reservation utility by an amount of (net) information rent, qd1 q =
d
1 q   d.
Next, consider the case where HIV/AIDS became a serious health problem in a society. Owing to its inuence,
widows' de facto property rights are established as k = k1 > c(n
) and their reservation utility is reduced such that
r = r2 < 0. Now, a clan and a widow obtain the following utility vc(n; s; a; e) = u(n)   s   hc and vw(n; s; a; e) =
s  c(n)  d  hw, along with vc(n; s; a; e) = q(u(n)  s  hc) and vw(n; s; a; e) = q(s  c(n)  hw) + (1  q)r. Then,
the following proposition holds:
Proposition S.6 Assume that r = r2 < 0, k = k1 > c(n
), and the disease cost is high enough such that    r2 <
hc + hw  1. Then,
1. When k1   c(n) < k1 < d1 q + r2 (in this case, n6 < 0 < n < n8), the strategy prole (n8; 0; z; e) is subgame
perfect, along with the equilibrium number of children n8 > n
 and a widow's payo r2 < 0 < qd1 q (Case 1).
2. When k1   c(n)  d1 q + r2  k1 (in this case, 0  n6  n < n8)
(a) and u(n8)  k1  u(n8) u(n6)1 q , the strategy prole (n8; 0; z; e) is subgame perfect, along with the equilibrium
number of children n8 > n
 and a widow's payo r2 < 0 < qd1 q (Case 2).
(b) and u(n8)  k1 > u(n8) u(n6)1 q , the strategy prole (n6; 0; z; e) is subgame perfect, along with the equilibrium
number of children n6  n and a widow's payo r2 + qd1 q = r2 + d1 q   d < qd1 q (Case 3).
3. When d1 q + r2 < k1   c(n) < k1 (in this case, 0 < n < n6 < n8)
(a) and u(n8)  k1  u(n8) u(n6)1 q , the strategy prole (n8; 0; z; e) is subgame perfect, along with the equilibrium
number of children n8 > n
 and a widow's payo r2 < 0 < qd1 q (Case 4).
(b) and u(n8)  k1 > u(n8) u(n6)1 q , the strategy prole (n6; 0; z; e) is subgame perfect, along with the equilibrium
number of children n6 > n
 and a widow's payo r2 + qd1 q = r2 +
d
1 q   d < qd1 q (Case 5).
Here, n6 and n8 satisfy k1   c(n6) = d1 q + r2 and k1   c(n8) = r2.
The proposition S.6 suggests that as a result of HIV/AIDS, levirate marriage disappears and a widow makes a
living with her children by inheriting her husband's property. Note that in this example, an incentive cost needed for
a clan to induce a woman's fertility eort is d1 q + r2.
When this incentive cost is very large (i.e., k1 <
d
1 q + r2), a clan does not encourage a woman's fertility eort and
attempts to raise the number of children to the level of n8 > n
 in response to the increasing amount of a husband's
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property bequeathed to her (i.e., Case 1). As this incentive cost decreases (i.e., k1  d1 q + r2), a clan has some
incentive to elicit a woman's fertility eort. If a clan eventually decides not to induce such eort, it encourages her
to increase fertility to the level of n8 > n
, because a clan believes that she does not incur the cost of eort and thus,
can aord many children by exploiting a husband's bequest (i.e., Case 2 and Case 4). In all these cases, HIV/AIDS
would raise the equilibrium number of children while decreasing widows' welfare. This prediction follows that implied
by the proposition 5.
On the other hand, when a clan decides to encourage a woman to make a fertility eort, whether or not the
equilibrium number of children increases depends upon the amount of her husband's property bequeathed to her. If
the amount is remarkably large (i.e., k1   c(n) > d1 q + r2), a clan encourages fertility to the level of n6 > n (i.e.,
Case 5). In contrast, if the amount of bequest is small (i.e., k1   c(n)  d1 q + r2), the clan decides to reduce the
number of children to the level of n6  n (i.e., Case 3).
In Case 3 and Case 5, a widow obtains reservation utility plus (net) information rent (i.e., r2 +
qd
1 q ) because of
a clan's compensation for her fertility eort. However, whether her welfare increases or not depends upon her payo
realized in the previous levirate marriage equilibrium. If a woman expended marked fertility eort before, her utility
surely declines from qd1 q to r2 +
qd





1 q   d. When r2 + d1 q < d (i.e., very low incentive cost), widows' welfare decreases. When r2 + d1 q  d,
widows' welfare may improve. This welfare improvement is possible despite the induced fertility eort, owing to the
signicant amount of the husband's property inherited by her (i.e., k1  r2 + d1 q ) and particularly in Case 3, the
reduced child-rearing cost.
In sum, when a wife has power over fertility by altering her eort unobserved by a clan, the equilibrium number of
children may decrease in Case 3 and widows' welfare may improve in particular cases of Case 3 and Case 5. In all the
remaining cases, the predictions remained unchanged from those provided by the benchmark analysis. Importantly,
in traditional agrarian societies, women are still expected to have limited power to control fertility (i.e., large q).
In addition, recall from subsection 6.3 that women's access to family planning methods was also limited during the
investigation periods (i.e., large d). Both these factors result in a large incentive cost expended by a clan to encourage a
woman's fertility eort. In this case, the strategy proles (n; c(n); a; e) and (n8; 0; z; e) (more precisely, Case 1) tend
to arise before and after the deterioration of levirate marriage induced by HIV/AIDS. Consequently, the equilibrium
number of children would increase and widows' welfare would decline.37 Therefore, the equilibrium prediction in the
37More precisely, under the \no-eort equilibrium," the equilibrium number of children that a clan desires may dier from the actual
number of children. However, the expected number of children would still increase from qn to qn8 when the equilibrium shifts from the
prole (n; c(n); a; e) to (n8; 0; z; e). In empirical analyses focusing on \average," changes in the number of children explored in data
would correspond to changes in this expected number.
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benchmark model is still robust to consideration of a woman's limited power to control fertility.
Finally, as discussed in subsection 6.3, a woman may respond to the disappearance of levirate marriage by making
more eort to produce children because they may protect her widowhood in the absence of the traditional safety
net. In the current model, it may be possible to interpret this increase in women's intrinsic motive to substitute
own children for levirate marriage as a reduction in an (extrinsic) incentive cost d1 q + r2 needed for a clan to induce
women's fertility eort (more precisely, d1 q given r2). If making fertility eort and having more children may allow a
woman to claim access to the deceased's property (see the relevant discussion in subsection S.1.5), the disappearance
of levirate marriage may decrease her perceived cost of fertility eort d relative to its benets. Or, a woman may
interpret the deterioration of levirate marriage as an increase in the probability that she has to leave her husband's
home when her husband dies (i.e., decrease in q). Both the decreases in the values of d and q perceived by women
would reduce a clan's incentive cost. If the reduction in this incentive cost takes place together with the spread of
HIV/AIDS, it is possible to demonstrate that women's more fertility eort results in an increase in actual fertility in
the present framework. In other words, when the incentive cost is small in a society hit by HIV/AIDS, as a corollary
of Case 4 and Case 5 in the proposition S.6, it can be shown that
Proposition S.7 Assume that r = r2 < 0, k = k0  c(n), and the disease cost is high enough such that    r2 <
hc + hw  1. Then, when d1 q + r2 < k0   c(n)  0 (in this case, n < n9 < n11)
1. and u(n11)   k0  u(n11) u(n9)1 q , the strategy prole (n11; 0; z; e) is subgame perfect, along with the equilibrium
number of children n11 > n
 and a widow's payo r2 < 0 < qd1 q (Case 4b).
2. and u(n11)   k0 > u(n11) u(n9)1 q , the strategy prole (n9; 0; z; e) is subgame perfect, along with the equilibrium
number of children n9 > n
 and a widow's payo r2 + qd1 q = r2 +
d
1 q   d < qd1 q (Case 5b).
Here, n9 and n11 satisfy k0   c(n9) = d1 q + r2 and k0   c(n11) = r2.
Notably, the small d1 q makes
d
1 q + r2 < k0   c(n) more likely as well as raises the levels of n9 and n11 (by
construction), thereby making u(n11)   u(n9) small owing to concavity of a clan's utility function. Since this small
dierence between u(n11) and u(n9) makes the case of u(n11)   k0 > u(n11) u(n9)1 q more likely, it is expected that a
woman makes fertility eort at equilibrium (i.e., Case 5b); as a result, the equilibrium number of children increases
from n to n9 even if widows' property rights do not improve (i.e., k0  c(n)). When widows' property rights improve
as a result of HIV/AIDS (i.e., k1 > c(n
)), Case 5 in the proposition S.6 applies for a similar reasoning. In Case 5
and Case 5b, widows' welfare unambiguously declines from the previous levirate-marriage equilibrium when a clan's
incentive cost r2 +
d
1 q decreases due to HIV/AIDS so that r2 +
d
1 q < d. Therefore, once again, both the decline in
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widows' welfare and the increase in women's fertility are consistent with the disappearance of levirate marriage driven
by HIV/AIDS.
S.1.5 A widow's rights tied to her children's rights and the timing of a husband's death
Based on a customary rule in Africa, a widow's rights are often tied to her children's rights. Namely, having children (in
particular, sons) allows her to remain a member of her husband's clan, and therefore to claim access to the deceased's
property (Rwebangira, 1996). In 2012, I conducted a short questionnaire-based survey about local marital practices
in Karagwe, a district in the Kagera region, with support from one supervisor of the KHDS project (wave 5) (Kudo,
2015). Based on my eld interviews (made with rural females aged 30 to 40 years), the locals were prone to believe
that widows could have access to a husband's property if they had children. This nding suggests that the de facto
amount of k bequeathed to widows tends to be large for those having old children when they are widowed. Analyses
in this subsection attempt to consider this perspective explicitly.
Assume that a woman loses her husband early with a probability  2 (0; 1) = 0 and late with the remaining
probability. Before the spread of HIV/AIDS, the value of 0 is assumed to be small in the sense that n > n1, whereby
n satises u
0(n) = 0c0(n).38 The amount of bequest provided for a woman is k = k0  c(n) when she loses her
husband early (because her children are young) and otherwise, k = k1 > c(n
) (because her children are adults). Now,
the strategy prole can be written as (n; (sy;my); (so;mo)), whereby sy (resp., so) is the amount of livelihood support
provided for a widow who loses her husband early (late) in the form of levirate marriage, along with my 2 (ay; zy; ly)
(mo 2 (ao; zo; lo)) referring to choices made by the widow. Below, a payo enjoyed by a woman who loses her husband
early (resp., late) is denoted as vyw (v
o
w).
Then, it can be shown that
Proposition S.8 Assume that  = 0, r = r0 = 0, and k = k0  c(n) (resp., k = k1 > c(n)) for a woman who
loses her husband early (late). Then,
1. When u(n1) u(n0)  0(c(n1) c(n0)), the strategy proles (n1; (c(n1); ay); (0; zo)) and (n1; (c(n1); ay); (c(n1); ao))




w = r0 = 0
(Case 1).
2. When u(n1)  u(n0) < 0(c(n1)  c(n0)), the strategy proles (n0; (0; zy); (0; zo)), (n0; (c(n0); ay); (0; zo)),








0(n1) and u0(n2) = 20c
0(n2). This can
be proved as follows; suppose n1  n2 when 10 > 20, c0(n1)  c0(n2), which results in 10c0(n1) > 20c0(n2) and so, u0(n1) > u0(n2). This
implies that n1 < n
2




(n0; (0; zy); (c(n1); ao)), and (n0; (c(n0); ay); (c(n1); ao)) are subgame perfect, along with the equilibrium number
of children n0 and a widow's payos v
y
w = r0 = 0 and v
o
w = c(n1)  c(n0) > 0 (Case 2).
To encourage a widow to accept levirate marriage, the amount of livelihood support must be equal to or greater
than the amount of bequest, which inuences the number of children she can aord. Thus, when a woman is less likely
to lose her husband early (i.e., small 0, so u(n1)   u(n0)  0(c(n1)   c(n0))), the amount k1 (= c(n1)) primarily
determines the number of children and otherwise, k0 (= c(n0)) does. Note that, in the former equilibrium (i.e., Case
1), a widow can choose either zo or ao after she loses her husband late. On the other hand, a widow strictly prefers
ay to zy when she loses her husband early because choosing zy would reduce her utility from r0 = 0 to k0   c(n1)
< 0. In my eld survey in Rorya (see footnote 6 for the details), a widow tended to reject levirate marriage when
her children were old, because adult children who inherit a clan's property can provide her with livelihood support.
Similarly, elderly widows in Uganda also often seek protection from their adult children, rather than entering into a
relationship of levirate marriage (Ntozi, 1997). These ndings may indicate that the former equilibrium, which arises
along with a small 0, is often the case in reality.
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As before, (whether a woman loses her husband early or late) HIV/AIDS makes the practice of levirate marriage
costly due to the infection risk (i.e., hc and hw) and reduces widows' reservation utility to the level of r2 while
establishing their de facto property rights (i.e., always k = k1). In addition, since HIV/AIDS primarily aected
prime-age males in Kagera (e.g., Killewo et al., 1993), the probability of losing husbands early may also increase from
0 to 1. Then,
Proposition S.9 Assume that  = 1 > 0, r = r2 < 0, k = k1 > c(n
) for a widow, whether early or late, who loses
her husband, and the disease cost is high enough such that  r2 < hw+hc. Then, the strategy prole (n3; (0; zy); (0; zo))






Compare the proposition S.9 with (particularly Case 1 of) the proposition S.8. When levirate marriage is commonly
practiced prior to the spread of HIV/AIDS, a widow's welfare declines and the equilibrium number of children increases
in step with the deterioration of this practice.
On the other hand, a husband may die of HIV/AIDS before he produces the optimal number of children n3. For
example, it can be presumed that the couple produces children at the (exogenous) level of n = n < n3 when a woman
loses her husband early. In this case,
39Note that the proposition 2 corresponds to Case 1 of the proposition S.8 when  = 0.
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Proposition S.10 Assume that  = 1 > 0, r = r2 < 0, k = k1 > c(n
) for a widow, whether early or late, who
loses her husband, and the disease cost is high enough such that    r2 < hw + hc. Also, n = n < n3 when a woman
loses her husband early. Then, the strategy prole (n3; (0; zy); (0; zo)) is subgame perfect. In this case, the equilibrium
number of children and a widow's payo are n and vyw = c(n1)  c(n) when a woman loses her husband early, whereas
the corresponding values are n3 > n1 > n0 and v
o
w = r2 < 0 when a woman loses her husband late.
The disappearance of levirate marriage unambiguously coincides with a decline in a widow's welfare and an increase
in the number of children when she loses her husband late. For a woman who loses her husband early, this nding
holds true when n > n1.
40 On the one hand, the value of n can be small when a woman loses her husband early. On
the other hand, a clan's incentive to increase the number of children to the level of n3 may also raise the value of n.
Consequently, the resulting number of children is a priori ambiguous. Nevertheless, the empirical ndings on widows'
welfare and fertility are still consistent with the case of n > n1 and thus, highlight the signicance of HIV/AIDS. In
addition, when childbirths frequently occur during the immediate years following marriage (i.e., a woman loses her
husband early but not early enough to fail to achieve n3), the situation n > n1 may be plausible even if a woman loses
her husband early.
S.2 Detailed explanation on the identication strategy
To facilitate an interpretation of the identication strategy explained in subsection 3.2.1, Figure S.3 provides a graphical
representation of the data structure. While the KHDS is a panel survey, the empirical approach adopted in this study
exploits the data as if it were pooled cross-sectional data sourced from two dierent points in time (i.e., wave 1 or
wave 5). This approach is identical to that adopted in Kudo (2015). This strategy allows the current study to exploit
data variations fully while avoiding the unnecessary selection of the sample as well as the associated potential \bias."
As the gure shows, in wave 1, all female respondents resided in the KHDS villages and some of them were widowed.
On the other hand, as explained in more detail in Section 4, the wave 5 sample includes panel respondents who had
moved out of the KHDS villages between wave 1 and wave 5 as well as those that remained, each of whom consisted
of widows and other females. Dening ybefore as the dierence in consumption between widows and the remaining
females in wave 1 and yafter as the corresponding dierence between \all" widows and \all" other females in wave 5
(here, \all" means both the migrants and non-migrants), the specication (7) compares yafter  ybefore between
the villages that made the practice of levirate marriage less common during the sample periods and the remaining
40Assuming that the previous levirare marriage equilibrium is Case 1 in the proposition S.8 and that the size of the relevant population




villages (or triple dierence).
Widows that were already in a levirate marriage in wave 1 are unlikely to have lost this traditional safety net
during the sample periods. Given this presumption, therefore, the meaningful 2 cannot be identied if no female
respondents became widowed between wave 1 and wave 5. Of the reproductive-age female respondents in wave 5 who
were in marital relationships in wave 1, approximately 15% were widowed by wave 5, which makes this concern less
critical.
In addition, the estimations performed in this study include migrants in wave 5. Exploiting migrants in the
estimations does not necessarily invalidate the analysis. For instance, a woman who has lost her husband during the
sample periods might have left a KHDS village because his clan members did not oer levirate marriage to her. In this
example, the widow is included in the group of migrants in wave 5 and should be considered in the empirical analysis
because her welfare is greatly associated with the institutional change in the KHDS village. On the other hand, some
migrants might have moved out of their original villages for reasons unrelated to the practice of levirate marriage.41
Even in this case, the estimated 2 can still be interpreted as the lower bound of the correlation of interest. Including
migrants in the estimations can avoid any potential \bias" that may result from analyzing only the data pertaining
to the non-migrants in wave 5. This migration issue will also be discussed more thoroughly in subsection S.4.1.
Partially related to the point of the lower bound estimate, it should also be noted that the measured institutional
change based on group discussions with village leaders does not necessarily mean that all local households or individuals
immediately avoided levirate marriage. Rather, it should be interpreted as reecting an average tendency to stop the
practice at the village level. In addition, by interacting Djt with wijt, the specication (7) implicitly assumes that
all widows in villages commonly practicing (resp., not practicing) levirate marriage are (are not) in this customary
marriage-type of relationship. However, owing to the average nature of village rule, it is certainly possible that
this is not the case. Thus, the assumption made here actually allows for exibility in widows' engagement in this
traditional safety net within each village which, however, is not strong enough to render the identication strategy
invalid. Furthermore, in this study, it was also dicult to exactly identify the timing of the institutional change that
occurred between wave 1 and wave 5. All these perspectives highlight the fact that the empirical approach exploited
in this study tends to attenuate the correlation that the current investigation aims at identifying.
41Table S.3 reports the reasons for migration during the sample periods (in the wave 5 survey) by panel respondents aged 15 to 50.
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S.3 Fertility: Robustness checks
Despite the plausible empirical ndings reported in Table 5 and explained in subsection 5.2, several concerns should be
addressed. First, as the estimated outcome is the number of children born to a household's head, the estimation results
may also be consistent with the view that in villages where the practice of levirate marriage became less common,
young females who lost a husband entered into polygynous relationships with male heads having multiple wives
and thus many children. This is possible if the traditional safety net no longer provided appropriate life protection
for widows. Of the female sample included in the estimations in Table 5, approximately 15% (resp., 4%) were in
polygynous marriages in wave 1 (wave 5). However, additionally controlling for the total number of a head's wives
and its interaction with a measure of levirate marriage in column (a) in Table S.5 did not aect the previous ndings.
Another concern is that the estimated number of children does not include children residing elsewhere. As parents
grow older, co-residence with their children is less likely because most adult children leave their natal home to form
their own family. Consequently, the elder cohorts of wives tend to have a smaller number of co-resident children. The
level eects from ages of a head and wives that are already included in regressors are expected to, at least partly,
control for this possibility. However, the previously identied correlation between fertility and the deterioration of
levirate marriage may still be attributed to this issue, provided that decisions relevant to children's separation from
their parents systematically dier between villages that made the practice of levirate marriage less customary during
the investigation period and all the other villages (although this study has diculty in enumerating the factors that
encourage such a possibility).
To test the possibility that the previous estimation results are not entirely driven by this concern, this study
attempted to utilize the number of co-resident children plus children living elsewhere as a dependent variable. However,
the latter information was available only in the rst four waves of the KHDS. Therefore, alternatively, cash and in-kind
gifts that a household either received from or sent to non-household members (including children residing elsewhere)
in the last 12 months and its interactions with a measure of levirate marriage were included as regressors in the
estimations performed in column (b) in Table S.5. Admittedly, this approach is not perfect enough to control for the
inuence of children living separately. Nevertheless, the key ndings are robust to the inclusion of these additional
controls.
Finally, given the presumed non-normal distribution of the fertility outcome (see Figure S.6 for a histogram of
the number of children relevant to the observations considered in the estimations in Table 5), the OLS estimations
might not provide adequate implications. In an economic analysis of fertility, examining the spacing of births based
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on a survival model is one traditional technique. However, the current research cannot take this approach owing to
the lack of relevant information. Alternatively, this study estimated an ordered probit model in columns (c) to (f) in
Table S.5, which is often seen in the literature of demography. Estimating this alternative model yields results similar
to those obtained from the OLS estimations. Strictly speaking, it is not straightforward to interpret the coecients
reported in these columns because they are not marginal eects. However, positive (resp., negative) coecients in the
ordered probit model indicate that the variables reduce (increase) the likelihood of having no children, while raising
(decreasing) the probability of having many children. In other words, the variables characterized by the positive (resp.,
negative) coecients shift the distribution of the fertility toward the right (left). Based on these estimation results, it
is likely that the disappearance of levirate marriage positively correlates with an increase in the expected number of
children born to young females, particularly those aged 21 to 40 in wave 5.42
S.4 Threats to identication
In this study, an attempt was made to estimate the correlation between the deterioration of levirate marriage and
welfare outcomes driven by the theoretical mechanisms presented in Section 2. While a triple-dierence approach
was taken to identify such a correlation, several empirical concerns might still have prevented the current study from
achieving the objective. In this section, several identication issues are discussed.
Given the ndings provided in Figure 2 (see Table S.4 for the precise estimates), the analytical results of consump-
tion reported in this section (i.e., Table S.9 and Table S.10) are based on data pertaining to young female respondents
aged 15 to 28 that enable this study to provide the most distinct empirical ndings in a statistical sense. However,
the relevant estimation results exploiting the full-sample do not alter the implications of the analyses performed in
this section, and are also available upon request.
S.4.1 Migration
Analyses performed in Table 4 and Table 5 used data pertaining to panel respondents who stayed in their original
villages throughout the sample periods (i.e., non-migrants) as well as those who left between wave 1 and wave 5 (i.e.,
migrants). As described in Section S.2, exploiting the migrants in the estimations does not necessarily make the
analysis invalid. For example, a woman who became widowed during the sample periods might have left a KHDS
42The gender-based breakdown of the relationship between fertility and institutional change is also reported in Table S.6, whereby the
number of sons and daughters are separately estimated in columns (a) to (d), respectively. The analysis shows a similar magnitude for the
relevant positive correlation between the groups, although it might have lost some statistical power owing to less variation in outcomes,
compared with cases estimating the total number of children in Table 5.
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village because she did not have the traditional safety net precisely because of the dissolution of levirate marriage in
that village. In this case, such migrants should be included in the estimated sample.
Nevertheless, Table S.3 reports the reasons for migrations undertaken during the sample periods (in the wave 5
survey) by panel respondents aged 15 to 50. As the results show, almost half of female migration in this group was
driven by marriage. Indeed, owing to traditional rules characterized by clan exogamy and patrilocality, a woman in
Kagera typically leaves her kin to reside with her husband and thus lives outside her natal village when she marries
(Kudo, 2015). Accordingly, it is possible that the institutional change occurring in the KHDS villages might have had
no relationship with the welfare and decision-making of females who married outside their natal village between wave
1 and wave 5.
To control for this issue, this study created an indicator for those who left KHDS villages during the sample periods
(notably, this indicator is set to a value of zero for all the observations in wave 1). As seen from the estimation results
in columns (a) and (e) in Table S.9, including this indicator and its interaction with a measure of levirate marriage
in the regressors yielded similar implications to those obtained previously. Furthermore, this study also modied the
indicator so that it would take the value of one even in wave 1 for the observations relevant to those who migrated out
of KHDS villages between wave 1 and wave 5. Controlling for this alternative indicator and its interaction with Djt
leaves the implications almost entirely unaected. The corresponding estimation results are available from the author
upon request.
S.4.2 Attrition
While the rate of sample attrition in the KHDS is not so high, potential \bias" resulting from this possibility still
exists. To mitigate this concern, two exercises were performed. First, this study additionally controlled for a dummy
variable for those who dropped out of the sample between wave 1 and wave 5 (notably, this indicator takes the value of
zero for all the observations in wave 5) and its interaction with Djt, and the relevant estimation results were reported
in columns (b) and (f) in Table S.9. These additional controls did not aect the previously obtained implications.
Second, this study also exploited the insight obtained from Lee (2009) that under the monotonicity assumption,
trimming the sample observed only under the treated condition helps identify the bounds of the treatment eects on
the sub-population that would always be observed regardless of the treatment assignment.
In wave 5, 36.63% of the female respondents aged 15 to 28 years in wave 1 were not observed in villages that made
levirate marriage less customary during the sample periods (group A), along with the corresponding rate of 30.79% in
all the remaining villages (group B). Then, focusing on the same age cohort, this study excluded the wave 5 respondents
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belonging to group A as well as to the top or bottom 16 percentiles ( 36.63% 30.79%36.63% ) of the consumption distribution
among the group A respondents in wave 5, and estimated equation (7). Similarly, 31.76% of the reproductive-age
women in wave 1 whose husbands are household heads were missing in group A in wave 5, along with the corresponding
rate of 22.26% in group B. This study also removed the wave 5 respondents who originated from group A villages
and reported the number of children belonging to the top or bottom 30 percentiles ( 31.76% 22.26%31.76% ) of the fertility
distribution among group A respondents in wave 5, and estimated equation (8).
Admittedly, these exercises do not necessarily provide the bounds (of the examined correlation) in Lee (2009)'s
original sense, because this study is interested in the correlations between the deterioration of levirate marriage and
consumption of \widows" or fertility of \young" wives, rather than the correlations between institutional change and
consumption or fertility of the total population. Nevertheless, it is still useful to assess the sensitivity of the estimates
based on this approach. The relevant estimation results reported in Table S.10 still provided evidence indicating a
negative correlation between the dissolution of levirate marriage and young widows' consumption as well as a positive
correlation between this institutional change and young wives' fertility.
S.4.3 Selective mortality
Like the attrition issue, selective mortality is another concern. The traditional safety net's disappearance might have
contributed to the deaths of many relatively poor widows in the villages that made levirate marriage less customary.
As a result, in the reform villages in wave 5, the sample used for the estimation of (7) may include a greater proportion
of widows who are wealthy, compared to those living in all the remaining villages, biasing the estimated 2 upward.
The data set contained information on the number of people who died in the past 12 months in each KHDS village,
which enabled this study to calculate a mortality rate (percentage) by dividing this number by the village population.43
Exploiting such information (interacted with wijt and o
k
ijt) in the estimations in columns (c) and (g) in Table S.9
yielded similar ndings to those obtained previously. In addition, if such selective mortality does indeed \bias" the
estimates, the supposed correlation between the deterioration of levirate marriage and widows' welfare would be more
negative.
43In wave 1 (resp., wave 5), one village (12 villages) did not report this number. Similarly, information on the total population was




In Kagera, the most signicant events that occurred during the sample periods were great inuxes of refugees from
Burundi (1993) and Rwanda (1994) (e.g., Alix-Garcia and Saah, 2010; Baez, 2011; Jean-Francois and Verwimp,
2014; Whitaker, 2002). It is possible that the previous analysis was aected by resulting relevant factors such as
massive population displacement, development of aid projects (e.g., establishment of refugee camps, food rationing,
improvement of healthcare facilities), and the associated price changes in both commodity and labor markets (although
the village-specic time trend may, in part, control for the respective inuences).
The analysis in columns (d) and (h) in Table S.9 control for the number of refugee camps established within a 25
km radius from each KHDS village during the relevant time frames.44 While this number of camps is time-invariant,
it is still possible to include the number interacted with wijt and o
k
ijt. Inclusion of these additional controls did not
change the implications derived from the previous analysis.
S.4.5 Potential noise of the measured marital status
Another important concern is the possibility that female marital status may be subject to noise. Specically, it is not
clearly discerned from the dataset based on the standard survey module whether the survey enumerators identied
the status of females who lost their husband and entered into a levirate marriage as \widowed" or \married" (Luke,
2006). If the enumerators tend to view females engaging in levirate marriage as \married," the current concern could
possibly \bias" the estimated 2 downward because the enumerators are more likely to identify as \widowed" those
who are wealthy and therefore avoid levirate marriage as well as stay independent. In other words, poor widows who
engaged in this traditional marriage might have been included in the \married" group in wave 1. However, in villages
where the practice of levirate marriage became less customary, similarly poor widows might have belonged to the
\widowed" group in wave 5.
However, note that if this concern is true (i.e., while the enumerators called marital status of poor widows engaging
in levirate marriage \married" before, similarly poor widows come to be included in a group of \widowed" because
of the disappearance of the practice), the proportion of females whom the enumerators regard as \widowed" is likely
to increase in villages where the customary practices became less common. However, as described in Section 4 (see
also Table S.2), the simple DID estimate did not reject the null hypothesis that the likelihood of widowhood was not
aected by the institutional change.
44In that time frame, 13 refugee camps were established: Benaco, Burigi, Chabalisa, Kagenyi, Keza, Kitalli, Lukole A, Lukole B, Mbuba,
Musuhura, Mwisa, Omukariro, and Rubwera. Information on a village's distance to these camps is available from http://www.edi-africa.
com/research/khds/introduction.htm owing to a contribution made by Jean-Francois Maystadt.
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Moreover, if the enumerators indeed regard an inherited widow as \married," they are less likely to identify
her as \a household head" compared to a widow who refused levirate marriage. Then, the correlation between
being a household head and being widowed is likely to increase in villages where the customary practice became less
conventional compared to that found in all the remaining villages. The exercises performed to check this correlation
in Table S.11 provided no evidence supporting this possibility.
Overall, my view on this measurement issue is that the enumerators still identied widows inherited by other
male relatives as \widowed" in the survey because levirate marriage (also called widow inheritance) is seen as being
dierent from standard marriage. It should also be noted that an inherited widow does not typically live together
with her inheritor, who resides with his wife and children at his homestead. In addition, an inherited widow does not
share a household budget with her inheritor's family when purchasing food and other items. In the KHDS, household
members are dened as including \all people who normally sleep and eat their meals together in the household during
at least three of the twelve months preceding the interview."
S.4.6 Within-village trend between widows' and other women's consumption
Consumption enjoyed by \Other" females shown in Figure S.3 might have declined in villages where the practice of
levirate marriage became less common, provided that the disappearance of this practice coincided with an increase in
the investment (e.g., fertility) made by currently married females (who are, thus, included in the \Other" group). In
turn, this means that the current empirical approach comparing widows' consumption with that of \Other" females
within the same village might have underestimated the negative correlation between the institutional change and
widows' consumption.
S.4.7 Selected sample of a head's wife
In the analysis of fertility, limiting attention to data on females whose husbands are household heads potentially
generates \bias," if they have particular preferences for fertility that are correlated with the village-level prevalence
of levirate marriage. To alleviate this concern, this study replaced fijt in equation (8) with an indicator for a head's
wife, and estimated the equation for all females aged 15 to 50. The results reported in Table S.12, where the exploited
controls in columns (a) to (f) correspond to those used in columns (a) to (f) in Table 5, provided no evidence indicating
signicant eects of the institutional change on the probability of being a head's wife.
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S.5 Assessing the subjective measure of HIV prevalence in the KHDS
In each wave of the KHDS, the survey team asked a group of village leaders about the health-relevant situation in a
community. The number of villages that referred to HIV/AIDS as the most or second-most important health problem
in a community increased from 18 in wave 1 to 32 in wave 5, with the corresponding in-between gures summarized
as 25, 24, and 35 in wave 2, 3, and 4, respectively.
An attempt was made to assess the extent to which this information is useful for an empirical analysis. First,
the wave 5 (i.e., 2004) information was rst evaluated based on data sourced from the 2003?04 Tanzania HIV/AIDS
Indicator Survey (2003?04 THIS), which is the rst population-based comprehensive survey carried out on this
infectious disease in Tanzania. With the technical assistance provided by the MEASURE DHS program, this survey
was conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) in cooperation with the Tanzania Commission for AIDS
(TACAIDS) and the National AIDS Control Program (NACP) from December 2003 to March 2004.45 In this survey,
the respondents' blood was collected for HIV testing if they volunteered for the test.
By taking the following three steps, the quality of the wave 5 information was checked. First, a proportion of
HIV-positive respondents among those that went for the testing was calculated for each THIS community. Second,
two proxies for HIV prevalence in a KHDS community at the time of the wave 5 survey (i.e., 2004) were constructed
based on the calculated proportion, namely (1) the proportion in a THIS community in closest proximity to a KHDS
community and (2) an average of the corresponding proportion among the THIS communities situated within a 40-km
radius from a KHDS community (see Figure S.9 for the position of the KHDS and THIS communities).46 Third, an
indicator for the KHDS villages that referred to HIV/AIDS as the most or second-most important health problem in
wave 5 was regressed on these biomarker-based measures of HIV/AIDS prevalence.
Approximately 50% (resp., 80%) of the 51 KHDS communities corresponded with the nearest THIS community
situated less than 10 km (18 km) away, with the KHDS community having a maximum distance of approximately
34 km to the nearest THIS community. Among the 51 communities, the mean infection rate based on the HIV-
positive population in the nearest THIS communities is 0.049, with the minimum rate of zero that is recorded in
14 communities as well as the maximum gure of 0.138. The mean of the average infected proportion in the THIS
communities surrounding a KHDS community is 0.041, with the minimum (resp., maximum) gure of zero (0.081).
Based on this measure, no HIV-positive case was identied in nine communities.
45See Tanzania Commission for AIDS (TACAIDS), National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), and ORC Macro (2005) for the details. The
data and relevant documents are available from https://dhsprogram.com/what-we-do/survey/survey-display-234.cfm.
46The positional information of the KHDS communities was obtained from the survey team under my agreement relevant to the con-
dentiality of the surveyed communities.
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The estimated infection rate of the KHDS communities seems plausible, compared with that provided by several
studies that date back to the late 1980s. As seen from Figure 5-3 (p. 147) in Ainsworth et al. (1998), for example,
the estimated HIV prevalence among sexually active adults in 1989 is the greatest in Kagera among all the regions
of Tanzania, with the infected population estimated at more than 10% in the urban and more than 3% in the rural
areas.
Regressing the KHDS-based indicator pertaining to the prevalence of HIV/AIDS in wave 5 on these objective
measures yielded the results reported in Table S.13. In columns (a) and (b), the prevalence of HIV/AIDS in the
nearest THIS community was used as an explanatory variable, with or without the control of a KHDS community's
distance (km) to the nearest THIS community. In analyses in columns (c) and (d), a continuous measure of the
prevalence exploited in columns (a) and (b) was replaced by an indicator, equal to one if the prevalence was positive
and zero otherwise. The mean of the average HIV-positive proportion in the THIS communities in the vicinity of a
KHDS community was utilized in the estimations reported in columns (e) and (f), whereby a continuous measure of
the prevalence was used in the former, with the latter exploiting an indicator that takes one if the prevalence was
positive and zero otherwise.
As the results show, all the estimated coecients of interest are positive and particularly in the estimations
exploiting the indicators, the statistical signicance is more evident. These ndings suggest that the HIV/AIDS-
relevant information collected in wave 5 of the KHDS is consistent with the biomarker-based prevalence of HIV/AIDS
and thus is still helpful in measuring the signicance that this communicable disease had on the surveyed communities.
For the quality assessment of the information in waves 1?4 (i.e., 1991?1994), the district-level values of the
infection rate reported in Killewo et al. (1990) were assigned to each KHDS community. Killewo et al. (1990) conducted
a population-based survey in Kagera in 1987 and estimated that the overall prevalence of HIV-1 infection among adults
aged 15?54 was 9.6%, with a higher prevalence in the Bukoba Urban district (24.2%) compared with rural areas of
the region (10.0% for the Bukoba Rural and Muleba districts, 4.5% for the Karagwe district, and 0.4% for the Ngara
and Biharamulo districts).
As shown in columns (g) (for wave 1) and (h) (for all the earlier four waves) in Table S.13, regressing an indicator
for the KHDS villages that referred to HIV/AIDS as the most or second-most important health problem with respect
to this district-level prevalence also yielded statistically signicant positive coecients. This statistical signicance is
obtained at the conventional levels even if the standard errors are adjusted for clustering on a district. The information
pertaining to HIV-prevalence collected in the earlier four waves in the KHDS also appears consistent with the actual
prevalence.
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S.6 Literature review: Fertility response to HIV/AIDS
Evidence on the fertility response to HIV/AIDS is mixed. In addition to the possible physiological eects, negative
fertility response is possible owing to several behavioral reasons. According to Young (2005), for instance, HIV/AIDS
reduces fertility, because people may hesitate to engage in unprotected sex to avoid contracting this communicable
disease and/or the spread of HIV/AIDS may increase the perceived value of women in labor markets by contributing to
the scarcity of labor force. The behavioral response to avoid risky sexual intercourse may also be aected by people's
life expectancy unrelated to HIV/AIDS (Oster, 2012) and/or knowledge of their sero-status (Gong, 2015; Thornton,
2008). The perceived risk of HIV/AIDS may also alter the relational type of sexual partners (casual or committed)
while aecting the likelihood of early fertility (Duo et al., 2015). In addition, HIV-positive parents may also dislike
having sero-positive babies that would die in early infancy (Grieser et al., 2001) as well as (if they are altruistic) avoid
leaving many children orphaned.
On the other hand, an increasing risk of mortality may encourage parents to have more children for a precautionary
purpose and/or owing to a quantity-quality trade-o of childbearing (e.g., Kalemli-Ozcan, 2003; Soares, 2005), for
example. Furthermore, it is also possible that any fertility response arises from people's beliefs about the relationship
between childbirth and AIDS that may not necessarily be correct (e.g., Yeatman, 2011).
S.7 Proof
In this section, all the propositions claimed in this paper are proved. The basic strategy for the proof is as follows.
First, for a certain range of n, a strategy prole that enables a clan to obtain maximum utility when a widow rejects
levirate marriage is explored. Second, for the same range of n, a strategy prole that enables a clan to encourage her to
accept levirate marriage and to obtain maximum utility is explored. Third, of all these strategy proles, the strategy
prole that enables a clan to receive the greatest utility is selected as a pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium.
Proof of proposition 1:
Find n0 satisfying k0   c(n0) = r0 = 0. Since k0  c(n) by assumption, it is the case that c(n0)  c(n), i.e., n0
 n (see also Figure S.2 for the graphical interpretation of n and n0).
First, consider the case of n  n0. In this case, k0   c(n)  k0   c(n0) = r0 = 0. So, a widow chooses action z
when she rejects levirate marriage. Given the action z taken by a widow, a clan obtains utility u(n)   k0. A clan
can maximize this utility by selecting n = n0 (i.e., maximum in the domain of n  n0), yielding vc = u(n0)   k0 =
u(n0)  c(n0) as well as vw = k0   c(n0) = r0 = 0. To encourage a widow to accept levirate marriage for n  n0, it
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must be the case that s   c(n)  k0   c(n). Then, a clan chooses s = k0 and obtains utility u(n)   k0. A clan can
maximize this utility by selecting n = n0 (i.e., maximum in the domain of n  n0), which results in vc = u(n0)  s =
u(n0)  k0 = u(n0)  c(n0) and vw = s  c(n0) = k0  c(n0) = r0 = 0. Consequently, for n  n0, the strategy proles
(n0; 0; z) and (n0; c(n0); a) provide a clan with maximum utility u(n0)  c(n0).
In case of n  n0 (i.e., k0   c(n)  r0 = 0), a widow chooses action l when she rejects levirate marriage. Given
the action l taken by a widow, a clan obtains utility u(n)  c(n)   . A clan can maximize this utility by selecting n
= n, yielding vc = u(n)  c(n)   and vw = r0 = 0. To encourage a widow to accept levirate marriage for n  n0,
it must be the case that s  c(n)  r0 = 0. Then, a clan chooses s = c(n) and obtains utility u(n)  c(n). A clan can
maximize this utility by selecting n = n, which results in vc = u(n)  c(n) and vw = r0 = 0. Since u(n)  c(n)
> u(n)  c(n)   , the strategy prole (n; c(n); a) provides a clan with maximum utility u(n)  c(n).
Since u(n)   c(n) > u(n0)   c(n0), the strategy prole (n; c(n); a) is subgame perfect. In this case, a widow
obtains utility r0 = 0.
Proof of proposition 2:
Find n1 satisfying k1   c(n1) = r0 = 0. Since k1 > c(n) by assumption, it is the case that c(n1) > c(n), i.e., n1 >
n (see also Figure S.2 for the graphical interpretation of n and n1).
First, consider the case of n  n1. In this case, k1   c(n)  k1   c(n1) = r0 = 0. So, a widow chooses action z
when she rejects levirate marriage. Given the action z taken by a widow, a clan obtains utility u(n)   k1. A clan
can maximize this utility by selecting n = n1 (i.e., maximum in the domain of n  n1), yielding vc = u(n1)   k1 =
u(n1)  c(n1) as well as vw = k1   c(n1) = r0 = 0. To encourage a widow to accept levirate marriage for n  n1, it
must be the case that s   c(n)  k1   c(n). Then, a clan chooses s = k1 and obtains utility u(n)   k1. A clan can
maximize this utility by selecting n = n1 (i.e., maximum in the domain of n  n1), which results in vc = u(n1)  s =
u(n1)  k1 = u(n1)  c(n1) and vw = s  c(n1) = k1  c(n1) = r0 = 0. Consequently, for n  n1, the strategy proles
(n1; 0; z) and (n1; c(n1); a) provide a clan with maximum utility u(n1)  c(n1).
In case of n  n1 (i.e., k1   c(n)  r0 = 0), a widow chooses action l when she rejects levirate marriage. Given
the action l taken by a widow, a clan obtains utility u(n)  c(n)   . A clan can maximize this utility subject to n 
n1 > n
. Then, a clan selects n = n1 (corner solution), yielding vc = u(n1)   c(n1)    as well as vw = r0 = 0. To
encourage a widow to choose levirate marriage for n  n1, it must be the case that s  c(n)  r0 = 0. Then, a clan
chooses s = c(n) and obtains utility u(n)   c(n). A clan can maximize this utility subject to n  n1 > n. Then, a
clan selects n = n1 (corner solution), which results in vc = u(n1)   c(n1) and vw = r0 = 0. Since u(n1)   c(n1) >
u(n1)  c(n1)   , the strategy prole (n1; c(n1); a) provides a clan with maximum utility u(n1)  c(n1) when n  n1.
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Consequently, both the strategy proles (n1; 0; z) and (n1; c(n1); a) are subgame perfect. In this case, a widow
obtains utility r0 = 0.
Proof of proposition 3:
Find n2 satisfying k0   c(n2) = r1. Since k0  c(n) by assumption, it is the case that c(n2) < c(n) (i.e., c(n2) =
k0  r1 < k0  c(n)), therefore n2 < n (see also Figure S.2 for the graphical interpretation of n and n2). Now, two
cases are considered, either r1  k0 or r1 < k0.
Case 1: r1  k0.
Note that for any value of n, a widow never chooses action z when she rejects levirate marriage, because k0   c(n)
 r1   c(n)  r1. Then, given the action l taken by a widow, a clan obtains utility u(n)   c(n)    . A clan can
maximize this utility by selecting n = n, yielding vc = u(n)  c(n)   as well as vw = r1. To encourage a widow
to accept levirate marriage for any value of n, it must be the case that s   c(n)  r1. Then, a clan chooses s =
c(n)+ r1 and obtains utility u(n)  c(n)  r1. A clan can maximize this utility by selecting n = n, which results in vc
= u(n)  c(n)  r1 and vw = s  c(n) = r1. Thus, when r1 >  , the strategy prole (n; 0; l) provides a clan with
maximum utility u(n)  c(n)   . Otherwise, the strategy prole (n; c(n) + r1; a) provides a clan with maximum
utility u(n)  c(n)  r1.
Case 2: r1 < k0
First, consider the case of n  n2. In this case, k0   c(n)  k0   c(n2) = r1. So, a widow chooses action z when she
rejects levirate marriage. Given the action z taken by a widow, a clan obtains utility u(n)  k0. A clan can maximize
this utility by selecting n = n2 (i.e., maximum in the domain of n  n2), yielding vc = u(n2) k0 = u(n2)  c(n2)  r1
as well as vw = k0   c(n2) = r1. To encourage a widow to accept levirate marriage for n  n2, it must be the case
that s   c(n)  k0   c(n). Then, a clan chooses s = k0 and obtains utility u(n)   k0. A clan can maximize this
utility by selecting n = n2 (i.e., maximum in the domain of n  n2), which results in vc = u(n2)  s = u(n2)  k0 =
u(n2)  c(n2)  r1 and vw = s  c(n2) = k0  c(n2) = r1. Consequently, for n  n2, the strategy proles (n2; 0; z) and
(n2; c(n2) + r1; a) provide a clan with maximum utility u(n2)  c(n2)  r1.
In case of n  n2 (i.e., k0   c(n)  r1), a widow chooses action l when she rejects levirate marriage. Given the
action l taken by a widow, a clan obtains utility u(n)   c(n)    . A clan can maximize this utility by selecting n =
n, yielding vc = u(n)  c(n)   as well as vw = r1. To encourage a widow to accept levirate marriage for n  n2,
it must be the case that s   c(n)  r1. Then, a clan chooses s = c(n) + r1 and obtains utility u(n)   c(n)   r1. A
clan can maximize this utility by selecting n = n, which results in vc = u(n)  c(n)  r1 and vw = s  c(n) = r1.
Consequently, for n  n2, the strategy prole (n; 0; l) provides a clan with maximum utility u(n)  c(n)   when
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r1 >  . Otherwise, the strategy prole (n
; c(n) + r1; a) provides a clan with maximum utility u(n)   c(n)   r1.
Here, note that when r1 >  , it is the case that u(n
)   c(n)    > u(n)   c(n)   r1 > u(n2)   c(n2)   r1. In
addition, it is always the case that u(n)  c(n)  r1 > u(n2)  c(n2)  r1.
Considering both the cases of r1  k0 and r1 < k0, when r1 >  , the strategy prole (n; 0; l) is subgame perfect.
Otherwise, the strategy prole (n; c(n) + r1; a) is subgame perfect. In both cases, a widow obtains utility r1.
Proof of proposition 4:
First, consider the case of n  n0. In this case, k0 c(n)  k0 c(n0) = r0 = 0. So, a widow chooses action z when she
rejects levirate marriage. Given the action z taken by a widow, a clan obtains utility u(n)  k0. A clan can maximize
this utility by selecting n = n0 (i.e., maximum in the domain of n  n0), yielding vc = u(n0)   k0 = u(n0)   c(n0)
as well as vw = k0   c(n0) = r0 = 0. To encourage a widow to accept levirate marriage for n  n0, it must be the
case that s   c(n)   hw  k0   c(n). Then, a clan chooses s = k0 + hw and obtains utility u(n)   k0   hw   hc. A
clan can maximize this utility by selecting n = n0 (i.e., maximum in the domain of n  n0), which results in vc =
u(n0)  s  hc = u(n0)  k0   hw   hc = u(n0)  c(n0)  hw   hc and vw = s  c(n0)  hw = k0 + hw   c(n0)  hw
= k0   c(n0) = r0 = 0. Consequently, for n  n0, the strategy prole (n0; 0; z) provides a clan with maximum utility
u(n0)  c(n0).
In case of n  n0 (i.e., k0   c(n)  r0), a widow chooses action l when she rejects levirate marriage. Given the
action l taken by a widow, a clan obtains utility u(n)   c(n)    . A clan can maximize this utility by selecting n =
n, yielding vc = u(n)   c(n)    as well as vw = r0 = 0. To encourage a widow to accept levirate marriage for
n  n0, it must be the case that s   c(n)   hw  r0 = 0. Then, a clan chooses s = c(n) + hw and obtains utility
u(n) c(n) hw hc. A clan can maximize this utility by selecting n = n, which results in vc = u(n) c(n) hw hc
and vw = s c(n) hw = r0 = 0. Consequently, for n  n0, the strategy prole (n; 0; l) provides a clan with maximum
utility u(n)  c(n)   .
Now, compare u(n0)  c(n0) with u(n)  c(n)   . When     u(n)  c(n) u(n0)+ c(n0), it becomes that
u(n0)  c(n0)  u(n)  c(n)   . Then, the strategy prole (n0; 0; z) is subgame perfect. Otherwise, u(n0)  c(n0)
< u(n)  c(n)   and thus, the strategy prole (n; 0; l) is subgame perfect. In both cases, a widow obtains utility
r0 = 0.
Proof of proposition 5:
Find n3 satisfying k1   c(n3) = r2. Since k1 > c(n) > c(n) + r2 by assumption, it is the case that c(n3) > c(n),
i.e., n3 > n
 (see also Figure S.2 for the graphical interpretation of n and n3).
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First, consider the case of n  n3. In this case, k1  c(n)  k1  c(n3) = r2. So, a widow chooses action z when she
rejects levirate marriage. Given the action z taken by a widow, a clan obtains utility u(n)  k1. A clan can maximize
this utility by selecting n = n3 (i.e., maximum in the domain of n  n3), yielding vc = u(n3) k1 = u(n3)  c(n3)  r2
as well as vw = k1   c(n3) = r2. To encourage a widow to accept levirate marriage n  n3, it must be the case that
s   c(n)   hw  k1   c(n). Then, a clan chooses s = k1 + hw and obtains utility u(n)   k1   hw   hc. A clan can
maximize this utility by selecting n = n3 (i.e., maximum in the domain of n  n3), which results in vc = u(n3) s hc
= u(n3)   k1   hw   hc = u(n3)   c(n3)   r2   hw   hc and vw = s   c(n3)   hw = k1 + hw   c(n3)   hw = r2.
Consequently, for n  n3, the strategy prole (n3; 0; z) provides a clan with maximum utility u(n3)  c(n3)  r2.
In case of n  n3 (i.e., k1   c(n)  r2), a widow chooses action l when she rejects levirate marriage. Given the
action l taken by a widow, a clan obtains utility u(n)  c(n)   . A clan can maximize this utility subject to n  n3
> n. Then, a clan selects n = n3 (corner solution), yielding vc = u(n3)  c(n3)   as well as vw = r2. To encourage
a widow to accept levirate marriage for n  n3, it must be the case that s  c(n)  hw  r2. Then, a clan chooses s
= c(n) + r2+ hw and obtains utility u(n)  c(n)  r2  hw   hc. A clan can maximize this utility subject to n  n3 >
n. Then, a clan selects n = n3 (corner solution), which results in vc = u(n3)  s  hc = u(n3)  c(n3)  r2  hw   hc
and vw = s  c(n3)  hw = r2. Consequently, for n  n3, the strategy prole (n3; 0; l) provides a clan with maximum
utility u(n3)  c(n3)   .
Since u(n3)  c(n3) r2 > u(n3)  c(n3)   , the strategy prole (n3; 0; z) is subgame perfect. In this case, a widow
obtains utility r2.
Proof of proposition S.1:
Find n^0 satisfying k^0   c(n^0) =  g. Since k^0  c(n)  g by assumption, it is the case that c(n^0)  c(n), i.e., n^0 
n. Also, note that a widow never chooses the action l2 because  c(n)  b < k^0   c(n). Then, consider two cases of n
 n^0 and n  n^0. Following similar steps taken when proving the proposition 1 yields proposition S.1.
Proof of proposition S.2:
Find n^1 satisfying k^1   c(n^1) = r2   g. Since k^1 > c(n)   g > c(n) + r2   g by assumption, it is the case that
c(n^1) > c(n
), i.e., n^1 > n. Also, note that a widow never chooses the action l2 because r2   c(n)   b < k^1   c(n).
Then, consider two cases of n  n^1 and n  n^1. Following similar steps taken when proving the proposition 5 yields
proposition S.2.
Proof of proposition S.3:
Recall n0 satisfying k0   c(n0) = r0 = 0. Since k0  c(n) by assumption, it is the case that c(n0)  c(n), i.e., n0 
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n. Also, nd np satisfying u0(np) = (1  p)c0(np). Note that n  np, which can be proved as follows; suppose n >
np, u
0(np) > u0(n) = c0(n) > c0(np), which is a contradiction to u0(np) = (1  p)c0(np). Therefor, it becomes n0 
n  np.
First, consider the case of n  n0. In this case, p(k0   c(n))  p(k0   c(n0)) = pr0 = 0. So, a widow chooses
action z when she rejects levirate marriage. Given the action z taken by a widow, a clan obtains utility u(n)  pk0  
(1  p)c(n)  (1  p) . A clan can maximize this utility by selecting n = n0 (i.e., maximum in the domain of n  n0),
yielding vc = u(n0)  pk0   (1  p)c(n0)  (1  p) = u(n0)  c(n0)  (1  p) as well as vw = p(k0   c(n0)) = 0. To
encourage a widow to accept levirate marriage for n  n0, it must be the case that p(s  c(n))  p(k0   c(n)). Then,
a clan chooses s = k0 and obtains utility u(n)   pk0   (1   p)c(n)   (1   p) . A clan can maximize this utility by
selecting n = n0 (i.e., maximum in the domain of n  n0), which results in vc = u(n0)  pk0  (1  p)c(n0)  (1  p)
= u(n0)  c(n0)  (1  p) and vw = p(s  c(n0)) = p(k0  c(n0)) = 0. Consequently, for n  n0, the strategy proles
(n0; 0; z) and (n0; c(n0); a) provide a clan with maximum utility u(n0)  c(n0)  (1  p) .
In case of n  n0 (i.e., p(k0  c(n))  pr0 = 0), a widow chooses action l when she rejects levirate marriage. Given
the action l taken by a widow, a clan obtains utility u(n)  c(n)   . A clan can maximize this utility by selecting n =
n, yielding vc = u(n)  c(n)   as well as vw = 0. To encourage a widow to accept levirate marriage for n  n0, it
must be the case that p(s  c(n))  pr0 = 0. Then, a clan chooses s = c(n) and obtains utility u(n)  c(n)  (1  p) .
A clan can maximize this utility by selecting n = n, which results in vc = u(n)   c(n)   (1   p) and vw =
p(s   c(n)) = 0. Consequently, for n  n0, the strategy prole (n; c(n); a) provides a clan with maximum utility
u(n)  c(n)  (1  p) .
Since u(n)  c(n)  (1  p) > u(n0)  c(n0)  (1  p) , the strategy prole (n; c(n); a) is subgame perfect. In
this case, a widow obtains utility pr0 = 0.
Proof of proposition S.4:
Recall n3 satisfying k1   c(n3) = r2. Since k1 > c(n) > c(n) + r2 by assumption, it is the case that c(n3) > c(n),
i.e., n3 > n
. Also, recall np satisfying u0(np) = (1 p)c0(np), whereby n  np. Now, two cases are considered, either
k1  c(np) + r2 (i.e., c(n) < k1  c(np) + r2) or k1 > c(np) + r2 (including both the cases of k1 > c(n) > c(np) + r2
and k1 > c(np) + r2 > c(n
)).
Case 1: k1  c(np) + r2.
Since c(n3) = k1   r2  c(np), it is the case that n3  np. Consequently, n < n3  np.
First, consider the case of n  n3. In this case, p(k1 c(n))  p(k1 c(n3)) = pr2. So, a widow chooses action z when
she rejects levirate marriage. Given the action z taken by a widow, a clan obtains utility u(n) pk1 (1 p)c(n) (1 p) .
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A clan can maximize this utility by selecting n = n3 (corner solution), yielding vc = u(n3) pk1 (1 p)c(n3) (1 p)
= u(n3) c(n3) pr2  (1 p) as well as vw = p(k1 c(n3)) = pr2. To encourage a widow to accept levirate marriage
for n  n3, it must be the case that p(s c(n) hw)  p(k1 c(n)). Then, a clan chooses s = k1+hw and obtains utility
u(n) pk1 phw phc  (1 p)c(n)  (1 p) . A clan can maximize this utility by selecting n = n3 (corner solution),
which results in vc = u(n3)  pk1   phw   phc   (1  p)c(n3)  (1  p) = u(n3)  c(n3)  pr2   (1  p)   phw   phc
and vw = p(s  c(n3)  hw) = p(k1 + hw   c(n3)  hw) = pr2. Consequently, for n  n3, the strategy prole (n3; 0; z)
provides a clan with maximum utility u(n3)  c(n3)  pr2   (1  p) .
In case of n  n3 (i.e., p(k1   c(n))  pr2), a widow chooses action l when she rejects levirate marriage. Given
the action l taken by a widow, a clan obtains utility u(n)   c(n)    . A clan can maximize this utility subject to
n  n3 > n. Then, a clan selects n = n3 (corner solution), yielding vc = u(n3)   c(n3)    as well as vw = pr2.
To encourage a widow to accept levirate marriage for n  n3, it must be the case that p(s   c(n)   hw)  pr2.
Then, a clan chooses s = c(n) + r2 + hw and obtains utility u(n)   c(n)   pr2   phw   phc   (1   p) . A clan can
maximize this utility subject to n  n3 > n. Then, a clan selects n = n3 (corner solution), which results in vc =
u(n3)  c(n3)  pr2   phw   phc   (1  p) and vw = p(s  c(n3)  hw) = pr2. Consequently, for n  n3, the strategy
prole (n3; 0; l) provides a clan with maximum utility u(n3)  c(n3)   .
Since u(n3)  c(n3)  pr2   (1  p) > u(n3)  c(n3)  (1  p) > u(n3)  c(n3)   , the strategy prole (n3; 0; z)
is subgame perfect. In this case, a widow obtains utility pr2.
Case 2: k1 > c(np) + r2.
Since k1 > c(np) + r2, c(n3) = k1   r2 > c(np), so n3 > np. Consequently, n  np < n3.
First, consider the case of n  n3. In this case, p(k1 c(n))  p(k1 c(n3)) = pr2. So, a widow chooses action z when
she rejects levirate marriage. Given the action z taken by a widow, a clan obtains utility u(n) pk1 (1 p)c(n) (1 p) .
A clan can maximize this utility by selecting n = np, yielding vc = u(np) pk1 (1 p)c(np) (1 p) = u(np) pc(n3) 
(1 p)c(np) pr2 (1 p) as well as vw = p(k1 c(np)) = pr2+pc(n3) pc(np). To encourage a widow to accept levirate
marriage for n  n3, it must be the case that p(s  c(n)  hw)  p(k1   c(n)). Then, a clan chooses s = k1 + hw and
obtains utility u(n) pk1 phw phc (1 p)c(n) (1 p) . A clan can maximize this utility by selecting n = np, which
results in vc = u(np) pk1 phw phc (1 p)c(np) (1 p) = u(np) pc(n3) (1 p)c(np) pr2 phw phc (1 p)
and vw = p(s  c(np)  hw) = pr2 + pc(n3)  pc(np). Consequently, for n  n3, the strategy prole (np; 0; z) provides
a clan with maximum utility u(np)  pc(n3)  (1  p)c(np)  pr2   (1  p) .
In case of n  n3 (i.e., p(k1   c(n))  pr2), a widow choose action l when she rejects levirate marriage. Given the
action l taken by a widow, a clan obtains utility u(n)  c(n)   . A clan can maximize this utility subject to n  n3 >
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n. Then, a clan selects n = n3 (corner solution), yielding vc = u(n3)  c(n3)   as well as vw = pr2. To encourage a
widow to accept levirate marriage for n  n3, it must be the case that s  c(n)  hw  r2. Then, a clan chooses s =
c(n)+r2+hw and obtains utility u(n) c(n) pr2 phw phc (1 p) . A clan can maximize this utility subject to n
 n3 > n. Then, a clan selects n = n3 (corner solution), which results in vc = u(n3) c(n3) pr2 phw phc (1 p)
and vw = p(s  c(n3) hw) = pr2. Note that  < (1  p) + pr2+ phw+ phc because    r2 < hw+hc by assumption.
Consequently, for n  n3, the strategy prole (n3; 0; l) provides a clan with maximum utility u(n3)  c(n3)   .
Now, compare utility u(np) pc(n3) (1 p)c(np) pr2 (1 p) with u(n3) c(n3)  . Since u(np) (1 p)c(np) pr2
> u(np)  (1  p)c(np) > u(n3)  (1  p)c(n3), it becomes that u(np)  pc(n3)  (1  p)c(np)  pr2 > u(n3)  c(n3),
which indicates u(np)  pc(n3)  (1  p)c(np)  pr2  (1  p) > u(n3)  c(n3)   . Thus, the strategy prole (np; 0; z)
is subgame perfect. In this case, a widow obtains utility pr2 + pc(n3)  pc(np).
Note that pr2 + pc(n3)   pc(np) = pr2 + p(k1   r2   c(np)) = p(k1   c(np)). Thus, when k1  c(np), it becomes
that p(k1   c(np))  0. Otherwise, p(k1   c(np)) < 0.
Proof of proposition S.5:
Recall n0 satisfying k0   c(n0) = r0 = 0. Find n4 and n5 satisfying k0   c(n4) = d1 q and k0   c(n5) = d. Since d1 q
> d > 0, it is the case that n4 < n5 < n0. In addition, since c(n4) = k0   d1 q < k0 = c(n0)  c(n), it is the case
that c(n4) < c(n0)  c(n), i.e., n4 < n0  n. Since c(n5) = k0   d < k0 = c(n0)  c(n), it is the case that c(n5)
< c(n0)  c(n), i.e., n5 < n0  n. Consequently, it becomes that n4 < n5 < n0  n.
Also, note that, to prompt a woman's fertility eort when she chooses action z, it must be the case that k0 c(n) d
 q(k0   c(n)) + (1   q)r0, i.e., k0   c(n)  d1 q . Similarly, to prompt a woman's fertility eort when she chooses
action a, it must be the case that s   c(n)   d  q(s   c(n)) + (1   q)r0, i.e., s  c(n) + d1 q . Now, two cases are
considered, either k0  d1 q or k0 < d1 q .
Case 1: k0  d1 q .
First, consider the case of n  n4. In this case, a woman has an incentive to make fertility eort when she chooses
action z. Since k0   c(n)   d  k0   c(n4)   d > k0   c(n5)   d = 0, a widow chooses action z and makes fertility
eort when she rejects levirate marriage. Given the action z taken by a widow, a clan obtains utility u(n)   k0. A
clan can maximize this utility by selecting n = n4 (i.e., maximum in the domain of n  n4), yielding vc = u(n4)  k0
= u(n4)   c(n4)   d1 q as well as vw = k0   c(n4)   d = d1 q   d = qd1 q . To encourage a widow to accept levirate
marriage while making fertility eort for n  n4, it must be the case that s  c(n)  d  k0   c(n)  d (i.e., s  k0)
and s  c(n) + d1 q . Since k0   c(n)   d1 q = c(n4)   c(n)  0, the above conditions result in s  k0  c(n) + d1 q .
Then, a clan chooses s = k0 and obtains utility u(n)  k0. A clan can maximize this utility by selecting n = n4 (i.e.,
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maximum in the domain of n  n4), which results in vc = u(n4)   s = u(n4)   k0 = u(n4)   c(n4)   d1 q and vw =
s  c(n4) d = k0  c(n4) d = qd1 q . To encourage a widow to accept levirate marriage without making fertility eort
for n  n4, it must be the case that q(s  c(n))  k0  c(n)  d (i.e., s  k0q   dq   1 qq c(n)) and s  c(n)+ d1 q . Since
k0








k0   c(n)  d1 q

= 1q (c(n4)  c(n))  0, it is not possible to encourage
a widow to accept levirate marriage without making fertility eort. Consequently, for n  n4, the strategy proles
(n4; 0; z; e) and (n4; c(n4) +
d
1 q ; a; e) provide a clan with maximum utility u(n4)  c(n4)  d1 q .
Second, consider the case of n4  n  n0. In this case, a woman has no incentive to make fertility eort when
she chooses action z. Since q(k0   c(n))  q(k0   c(n0)) = 0, a widow chooses action z and makes no fertility eort
when she rejects levirate marriage. Given the action z taken by a widow, a clan obtains utility q(u(n)  k0). A clan
can maximize this utility by selecting n = n0 (i.e., maximum in the domain of n  n0), yielding vc = q(u(n0)  k0) =
q (u(n0)  c(n0)) as well as vw = q(k0   c(n0)) = 0. To encourage a widow to accept levirate marriage while making
fertility eort for n4  n  n0, it must be the case that s c(n) d  q(k0 c(n)) (i.e., s  q(k0 c(n))+c(n)+d) and






k0   c(n)  d1 q

= q(c(n4)  c(n))  0, the above
conditions result in s  c(n)+ d1 q  q(k0  c(n))+ c(n)+ d for all n4  n  n0. Then, a clan chooses s = c(n)+ d1 q
and obtains utility u(n)  c(n)  d1 q . In this case, a clan can maximize utility by selecting n = n0 (corner solution),
which results in vc = u(n0)   c(n0)   d1 q and vw = s   c(n0)   d = qd1 q . To encourage a widow to accept levirate
marriage without making fertility eort for n4  n  n0, it must be the case that q(s  c(n))  q(k0  c(n)) (i.e., s 




= c(n4) c(n)  0, the above conditions result in k0  s  c(n)+ d1 q .
Then, a clan chooses s = k0 and obtains utility q(u(n) k0). A clan can maximize this utility by selecting n = n0 (i.e.,
maximum in the domain of n  n0), which results in vc = q(u(n0)   s) = q(u(n0)   k0) = q (u(n0)  c(n0)) and vw
= q(s  c(n0)) = q(k0   c(n0)) = 0. Consequently, for n4  n  n0, either of q(u(n0)  c(n0)) or u(n0)  c(n0)  d1 q
provides a clan with maximum utility, depending upon the relevant functional forms and parameter values.
Third, consider the case of n  n0. In this case, a woman has no incentive to make fertility eort when she chooses
action z. Since q(k0   c(n))  q(k0   c(n0)) = 0, a widow chooses action l and makes no fertility eort when she
rejects levirate marriage. Given the action l taken by a widow, a clan obtains utility q(u(n)   c(n)   ). A clan can
maximize this utility by selecting n = n, yielding vc = q(u(n)   c(n)   ) as well as vw = 0. To encourage a
widow to accept levirate marriage while making fertility eort for n  n0, it must be the case that s   c(n)   d 
0 and s  c(n) + d1 q , namely s  c(n) + d1 q > c(n) + d. Then, a clan chooses s = c(n) + d1 q and obtains utility
u(n)   c(n)   d1 q . A clan can maximize this utility by selecting n = n, which results in vc = u(n)   c(n)   d1 q
and vw = s  c(n)  d = qd1 q . To encourage a widow to accept levirate marriage without making fertility eort for
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n  n0, it must be the case that q(s   c(n))  0 and s  c(n) + d1 q , namely c(n)  s  c(n) + d1 q . Then, a clan
chooses s = c(n) and obtains utility q (u(n)  c(n)). A clan can maximize this utility by selecting n = n, which
results in vc = q (u(n
)  c(n)) and vw = q(s   c(n)) = 0. Consequently, for n  n0, when (1   q)(u(n)   c(n))
 d1 q , it becomes that u(n)   c(n)   d1 q  q(u(n)   c(n)) > q(u(n)   c(n)   ). In this case, the strategy
prole (n; c(n) + d1 q ; a; e) provides a clan with maximum utility u(n
)  c(n)  d1 q . When (1  q)(u(n)  c(n))
< d1 q , it becomes q(u(n
)  c(n)) > u(n)  c(n)  d1 q and q(u(n)  c(n)) > q(u(n)  c(n)  ). In this case,
the strategy prole (n; c(n); a; e) provides a clan with maximum utility q(u(n)  c(n)).
Now, compare maximum utility across cases. Note that u(n4) c(n4)  d1 q < u(n) c(n)  d1 q ; q(u(n0) c(n0))
< q(u(n) c(n)); and u(n0) c(n0)  d1 q < u(n) c(n)  d1 q . Thus, when (1 q)(u(n) c(n))  d1 q , the strategy
prole (n; c(n)+ d1 q ; a; e) is subagme perfect. In this case, a widow obtains utility
qd
1 q . When (1 q)(u(n) c(n))
< d1 q , the strategy prole (n
; c(n); a; e) is subagme perfect. In this case, a widow obtains utility r0 = 0.
Case 2: k0 <
d
1 q .
In this case, a woman never makes fertility eort when she rejects levirate marriage. In this case, it is ne to consider
two cases of n  n0 and n  n0. Applying similar proof exploited in the Case 1 to these cases, it becomes that the
strategy prole (n; c(n) + d1 q ; a; e) is subagme perfect when (1   q)(u(n)   c(n))  d1 q . In this case, a widow
obtains utility qd1 q . When (1   q)(u(n)   c(n)) < d1 q , the strategy prole (n; c(n); a; e) is subagme perfect. In
this case, a widow obtains utility r0 =0.
Proof of proposition S.6:
Find n6, n7, and n8 satisfying k1   c(n6) = d1 q + r2, k1   c(n7) = r2 + d, and k1   c(n8) = r2. Since d1 q + r2 >
d+ r2 > r2, it is the case that n6 < n7 < n8. In addition, since c(n8) = k1  r2 > k1 > c(n), it is the case that c(n8)
> c(n), i.e., n8 > n.
Also, note that to prompt a woman's fertility eort when she chooses action z, it must be the case that k1 c(n) d
 q(k1  c(n)) + (1  q)r2, i.e., k1  c(n)  d1 q + r2. Similarly, to prompt a woman's fertility eort when she chooses
action a, it must be the case that s   c(n)   d   hw  q(s   c(n)   hw) + (1   q)r2, i.e., s  c(n) + d1 q + hw + r2.
Now, two cases are considered, either d1 q + r2 > 0 or
d
1 q + r2  0.
Case 1: d1 q + r2 > 0.




1 q + r2  k1  c(n) + d1 q + r2, and k1 > c(n) + d1 q + r2.





1 q +r2 < c(n
)+ d1 q +r2, it is the case that c(n6) = k1  d1 q  r2 < c(n), so n6 < n. Consequently, n6
< 0 < n < n8. Also, note that in this case, a woman never makes fertility eort when she rejects leviraet marriage.
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First, consider the case of 0  n  n8. In this case, a woman has no incentive to make fertility eort when she
choose action z. Since q(k1   c(n)) + (1   q)r2  q(k1   c(n8)) + (1   q)r2 = r2, a widow chooses action z when
she rejects levirate marriage. Given the action z taken by a widow, a clan obtains utility q(u(n)   k1). A clan can
maximize this utility by selecting n = n8 (i.e., maximum in the domain of n  n8), yielding vc = q(u(n8)   k1) =
q (u(n8)  c(n8)  r2) as well as vw = q(k1   c(n8)) + (1  q)r2 = r2.
To encourage a widow to accept levirate marriage while making fertility eort for 0  n  n8, it must be the case
that s c(n) d hw  q(k1 c(n))+(1 q)r2 (i.e., s  qk1+(1 q)c(n)+(1 q)r2+d+hw) and s  c(n)+ d1 q+hw+r2.
Since (qk1 + (1  q)c(n) + (1  q)r2 + d+ hw)  





k1   d1 q   r2   c(n)

< 0, the above
conditions result in s  c(n) + d1 q + hw + r2 > qk1 + (1   q)c(n) + (1   q)r2 + d + hw. Then, a clan chooses s =
c(n)+ d1 q +hw+ r2 and obtains utility u(n)  c(n)  d1 q   r2 hw hc. A clan can maximize this utility by selecting




To encourage a widow to accept levirate marriage without making fertility eort for 0  n  n8, it must be case
that q(s   c(n)   hw) + (1   q)r2  q(k1   c(n)) + (1   q)r2 (i.e., s  k1 + hw) and s  c(n) + d1 q + hw + r2.
Since k1 + hw  

c(n) + d1 q + hw + r2

= k1   d1 q   r2   c(n) < 0, the above conditions result in k1 + hw  s 
c(n)+ d1 q +hw+r2. Then, a clan chooses s = k1+hw and obtains utility q(u(n) k1 hw hc). A clan can maximize
this utility by selecting n = n8 (i.e., maximum in the domain of n  n8), which results in vc = q(u(n8) k1 hw hc)
= q (u(n8)  c(n8)  r2   hw   hc) and vw = q(s  c(n8)  hw) + (1  q)r2 = r2.
Since q (u(n8)  c(n8)  r2   hw   hc) < q (u(n8)  c(n8)  r2), the strategy prole (n8; c(n8)+r2+hw; a; e) is not
selected. Given an innitely large disease cost, it is also the case that q(u(n8)  c(n8)  r2) > u(n)  c(n)  d1 q  
r2   hw   hc. Consequently, for 0  n  n8, the strategy prole (n8; 0; z; e) provides a clan with maximum utility
q(u(n8)  c(n8)  r2).
Second, consider the case of n  n8. In this case, a woman has no incentive to make fertility eort when she choose
action z. Since q(k1   c(n)) + (1   q)r2  q(k1   c(n8)) + (1   q)r2 = r2, a widow chooses action l when she rejects
levirate marriage. Given the action l taken by a widow, a clan obtains utility q(u(n)  c(n)  ). A clan can maximize
this utility subject to n  n8 > n. Then, a clan selects n = n8 (corner solution), yielding vc = q(u(n8)  c(n8)  ) as
well as vw = r2. To encourage a widow to accept levirate marriage while making fertility eort for n  n8, it must be
the case that s c(n) d hw  r2 and s  c(n)+ d1 q +hw+r2, yielding s  c(n)+ d1 q +hw+r2  c(n)+d+hw+r2.
Then, a clan chooses s = c(n) + d1 q + hw + r2 and obtains utility u(n)   c(n)   d1 q   r2   hw   hc. A clan can
maximize this utility subject to n  n8 > n. Then, a clan selects n = n8 (corner solution), which results in vc =
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u(n8)  c(n8)  d1 q   r2   hw   hc and vw = s  c(n8)  d  hw = r2 + qd1 q . To encourage a widow to accept levirate
marriage without making fertility eort for n  n8, it must be the case that q(s  c(n) hw)+ (1  q)r2  r2 (i.e., s 
c(n)+ r2+hw) and s  c(n)+ d1 q +hw+ r2, yielding c(n)+ r2+hw  s  c(n)+ d1 q +hw+ r2. Then, a clan chooses
s = c(n) + r2 + hw and obtains utility q (u(n)  c(n)  r2   hw   hc). A clan can maximize this utility subject to n
 n8 > n. Then, a clan selects n = n8 (corner solution), which results in vc = q (u(n8)  c(n8)  r2   hw   hc) and
vw = q(s  c(n8)  hw) + (1  q)r2 = r2. Since q(u(n8)  c(n8)  ) > q (u(n8)  c(n8)  r2   hw   hc) due to    r2
< hw + hc and q(u(n8)  c(n8)  ) > u(n8)  c(n8)  d1 q   r2   hw   hc due to an innitely large disease cost, the
strategy proles (n8; c(n8) + r2 + hw; a; e) and (n8; c(n8) +
d
1 q + r2 + hw; a; e) are not selected. Consequently, for n
 n8, the strategy prole (n8; 0; l; e) provides a clan with maximum utility q(u(n8)  c(n8)  ).
Now, compare utility q(u(n8) c(n8) r2) and q(u(n8) c(n8) ). Since q(u(n8) c(n8) r2) > q(u(n8) c(n8) ),
the strategy prole (n8; 0; l; e) is not selected. As a result, the strategy prole (n8; 0; z; e) provides a clan with maximum
utility q(u(n8)  c(n8)  r2). In this case, a widow obtains utility r2.
Subcase 2: d1 q + r2  k1  c(n) + d1 q + r2.
Since k1  c(n) + d1 q + r2, it is the case that c(n6) = k1   d1 q   r2  c(n), so n6  n. Consequently, 0  n6 
n < n8.
First, consider the case of n  n6. In this case, a woman has an incentive to make fertility eort when she chooses
action z. Since k1  c(n)  d  k1  c(n6)  d > k1  c(n7)  d = r2. So, a widow chooses action z and makes fertility
eort when she rejects levirate marriage. Given the action z taken by a widow, a clan obtains utility u(n)   k1. A
clan can maximize this utility by selecting n = n6 (i.e., maximum in the domain of n  n6), yielding vc = u(n6)  k1
= u(n6)   c(n6)   d1 q   r2 as well as vw = k1   c(n6)   d = r2 + qd1 q . To encourage a widow to accept levirate
marriage while making fertility eort, it must be the case that s  c(n)  d  hw  k1   c(n)  d (i.e., s  k1 + hw)
and s  c(n) + d1 q + hw + r2. Since k1 + hw  

c(n) + d1 q + hw + r2

= k1   c(n)  d1 q   r2 = c(n6)  c(n)  0,
the above conditions result in s  k1 + hw  c(n) + d1 q + hw + r2. Then, a clan chooses s = k1 + hw and obtains
utility u(n)  k1 hw  hc. A clan can maximize this utility by selecting n = n6 (i.e., maximum in the domain of n 
n6), which results in vc = u(n6)  k1   hw   hc = u(n6)  c(n6)  d1 q   r2   hw   hc and vw = s  c(n6)  d  hw =
k1+hw  c(n6) d hw = r2+ qd1 q . To encourage a widow to accept levirate marriage without making fertility eort,
it must be the case that q(s  c(n) hw)+ (1  q)r2  k1  c(n)  d (i.e., s  k1q   dq   1 qq c(n)  1 qq r2+hw) and s 
c(n)+ d1 q +hw + r2. Since
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k1








k1   c(n)  d1 q   r2

= 1q (c(n6) c(n))  0 for all n  n6. Thus, it is not possible to encourage a widow to accept levirate marriage without
making fertility eort. Consequently, for n  n6, the strategy prole (n6; 0; z; e) provides a clan with maximum utility
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u(n6)  c(n6)  d1 q   r2.
Second, consider the case of n6  n  n8. In this case, a woman has no incentive to make fertility eort when
she choose action z. Since q(k1   c(n)) + (1  q)r2  q(k1   c(n8)) + (1  q)r2 = r2, a widow chooses action z when
she rejects levirate marriage. Given the action z taken by a widow, a clan obtains utility q(u(n)   k1). A clan can
maximize this utility by selecting n = n8 (i.e., maximum in the domain of n  n8), yielding vc = q(u(n8)   k1) =
q (u(n8)  c(n8)  r2) as well as vw = q(k1   c(n8)) + (1  q)r2 = r2.
To encourage a widow to accept levirate marriage while making fertility eort for n6  n  n8, it must be the case
that s c(n) d hw  q(k1 c(n))+(1 q)r2 (i.e., s  qk1+(1 q)c(n)+(1 q)r2+d+hw) and s  c(n)+ d1 q+hw+r2.
Since (qk1 + (1  q)c(n) + (1  q)r2 + d+ hw) 





k1   d1 q   r2   c(n)

= q(c(n6) c(n))
 0, the above conditions result in s  c(n)+ d1 q+hw+r2  qk1+(1 q)c(n)+(1 q)r2+d+hw. Then, a clan chooses
s = c(n) + d1 q + hw + r2 and obtains utility u(n)  c(n)  d1 q   r2   hw   hc. A clan can maximize this utility by




To encourage a widow to accept levirate marriage without making fertility eort for n6  n  n8, it must be
case that q(s   c(n)   hw) + (1   q)r2  q(k1   c(n)) + (1   q)r2 (i.e., s  k1 + hw) and s  c(n) + d1 q + hw + r2.
Since k1 + hw  

c(n) + d1 q + hw + r2

= k1   d1 q   r2   c(n) = c(n6)   c(n)  0, the above conditions result in
k1 + hw  s  c(n) + d1 q + hw + r2. Then, a clan chooses s = k1 + hw and obtains utility q(u(n)   k1   hw   hc).
A clan can maximize this utility by selecting n = n8 (i.e., maximum in the domain of n  n8), which results in vc =
q(u(n8)  k1   hw   hc) = q (u(n8)  c(n8)  r2   hw   hc) and vw = q(s  c(n8)  hw) + (1  q)r2 = r2.
Since q (u(n8)  c(n8)  r2   hw   hc) < q (u(n8)  c(n8)  r2), the strategy prole (n8; c(n8)+r2+hw; a; e) is not
selected. Given an innitely large disease cost, it is also the case that q(u(n8)  c(n8)  r2) > u(n)  c(n)  d1 q  
r2   hw   hc. Consequently, for n6  n  n8, the strategy prole (n8; 0; z; e) provides a clan with maximum utility
q(u(n8)  c(n8)  r2).
Third, consider the case of n  n8. In this case, a woman has no incentive to make fertility eort when she choose
action z. Since q(k1   c(n)) + (1   q)r2  q(k1   c(n8)) + (1   q)r2 = r2, a widow chooses action l when she rejects
levirate marriage. Given the action l taken by a widow, a clan obtains utility q(u(n)  c(n)  ). A clan can maximize
this utility subject to n  n8 > n. Then, a clan selects n = n8 (corner solution), yielding vc = q(u(n8)  c(n8)  ) as
well as vw = r2. To encourage a widow to accept levirate marriage while making fertility eort for n  n8, it must be
the case that s c(n) d hw  r2 and s  c(n)+ d1 q +hw+r2, yielding s  c(n)+ d1 q +hw+r2  c(n)+d+hw+r2.
Then, a clan chooses s = c(n) + d1 q + hw + r2 and obtains utility u(n)   c(n)   d1 q   r2   hw   hc. A clan can
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maximize this utility subject to n  n8 > n. Then, a clan selects n = n8 (corner solution), which results in vc =
u(n8)  c(n8)  d1 q   r2   hw   hc and vw = s  c(n8)  d  hw = r2 + qd1 q . To encourage a widow to accept levirate
marriage without making fertility eort for n  n8, it must be the case that q(s  c(n) hw)+ (1  q)r2  r2 (i.e., s 
c(n)+ r2+hw) and s  c(n)+ d1 q +hw+ r2, yielding c(n)+ r2+hw  s  c(n)+ d1 q +hw+ r2. Then, a clan chooses
s = c(n) + r2 + hw and obtains utility q (u(n)  c(n)  r2   hw   hc). A clan can maximize this utility subject to n
 n8 > n. Then, a clan selects n = n8 (corner solution), which results in vc = q (u(n8)  c(n8)  r2   hw   hc) and
vw = q(s  c(n8)  hw) + (1  q)r2 = r2. Since q(u(n8)  c(n8)  ) > q (u(n8)  c(n8)  r2   hw   hc) due to    r2
< hw + hc, the strategy prole (n8; c(n8) + r2 + hw; a; e) is not selected. Due to an innitely large disease cost, it is
also the case that q(u(n8)  c(n8)  ) > u(n8)  c(n8)  d1 q   r2   hw   hc. Consequently, for n  n8, the strategy
prole (n8; 0; l; e) provides a clan with maximum utility q(u(n8)  c(n8)  ).
Now, compare utility u(n6) c(n6)  d1 q r2, q(u(n8) c(n8) r2), and q(u(n8) c(n8) ). Since q(u(n8) c(n8) r2)
> q(u(n8)  c(n8)  ), the strategy prole (n8; 0; l; e) is not selected. Here, note that

u(n6)  c(n6)  d1 q   r2

 
q(u(n8)  c(n8)  r2) = (u(n6)  k1)  q(u(n8)  k1) = u(n6)  u(n8) + (1  q)(u(n8)  k1). Thus, when u(n8)  k1 >
u(n8) u(n6)
1 q , the strategy prole (n6; 0; z; e) is subgame perfect and a widow obtains utility r2 +
qd
1 q . Otherwise, the
strategy prole (n8; 0; z; e) is subgame perfect and a widow obtains utility r2.
Subcase 3: k1 > c(n
) + d1 q + r2
Since c(n6) = k1   d1 q   r2 > c(n), c(n6) > c(n), so n6 > n. Consequently, n < n6 < n8.
First, consider the case of n  n6. In this case, a woman has an incentive to make fertility eort when she chooses
action z. Since k1  c(n)  d  k1  c(n6)  d > k1  c(n7)  d = r2. So, a widow chooses action z and makes fertility
eort when she rejects levirate marriage. Given the action z taken by a widow, a clan obtains utility u(n)   k1. A
clan can maximize this utility by selecting n = n6 (i.e., maximum in the domain of n  n6), yielding vc = u(n6)  k1
= u(n6)   c(n6)   d1 q   r2 as well as vw = k1   c(n6)   d = r2 + qd1 q . To encourage a widow to accept levirate
marriage while making fertility eort, it must be the case that s  c(n)  d  hw  k1   c(n)  d (i.e., s  k1 + hw)
and s  c(n) + d1 q + hw + r2. Since k1 + hw  

c(n) + d1 q + hw + r2

= k1   c(n)  d1 q   r2 = c(n6)  c(n)  0,
the above conditions result in s  k1 + hw  c(n) + d1 q + hw + r2. Then, a clan chooses s = k1 + hw and obtains
utility u(n)  k1 hw  hc. A clan can maximize this utility by selecting n = n6 (i.e., maximum in the domain of n 
n6), which results in vc = u(n6)  k1   hw   hc = u(n6)  c(n6)  d1 q   r2   hw   hc and vw = s  c(n6)  d  hw =
k1+hw  c(n6) d hw = r2+ qd1 q . To encourage a widow to accept levirate marriage without making fertility eort,
it must be the case that q(s  c(n) hw)+ (1  q)r2  k1  c(n)  d (i.e., s  k1q   dq   1 qq c(n)  1 qq r2+hw) and s 
c(n)+ d1 q +hw + r2. Since

k1








k1   c(n)  d1 q   r2

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= 1q (c(n6) c(n))  0 for all n  n6. Thus, it is not possible to encourage a widow to accept levirate marriage without
making fertility eort. Consequently, for n  n6, the strategy prole (n6; 0; z; e) provides a clan with maximum utility
u(n6)  c(n6)  d1 q   r2.
Second, consider the case of n6  n  n8. In this case, a woman has no incentive to make fertility eort when
she choose action z. Since q(k1   c(n)) + (1  q)r2  q(k1   c(n8)) + (1  q)r2 = r2, a widow chooses action z when
she rejects levirate marriage. Given the action z taken by a widow, a clan obtains utility q(u(n)   k1). A clan can
maximize this utility by selecting n = n8 (i.e., maximum in the domain of n  n8), yielding vc = q(u(n8)   k1) =
q (u(n8)  c(n8)  r2) as well as vw = q(k1   c(n8)) + (1  q)r2 = r2.
To encourage a widow to accept levirate marriage while making fertility eort for n6  n  n8, it must be the case
that s c(n) d hw  q(k1 c(n))+(1 q)r2 (i.e., s  qk1+(1 q)c(n)+(1 q)r2+d+hw) and s  c(n)+ d1 q+hw+r2.
Since (qk1 + (1  q)c(n) + (1  q)r2 + d+ hw) 





k1   d1 q   r2   c(n)

= q(c(n6) c(n))
 0, the above conditions result in s  c(n) + d1 q + hw + r2  qk1 + (1   q)c(n) + (1   q)r2 + d + hw. Then, a
clan chooses s = c(n) + d1 q + hw + r2 and obtains utility u(n)   c(n)   d1 q   r2   hw   hc. A clan can maximize
this utility by selecting n = n6 (corner solution), which results in vc = u(n6)  c(n6)  d1 q   r2   hw   hc and vw =
c(n6) +
d
1 q + hw + r2   c(n6)  d  hw = r2 + qd1 q .
To encourage a widow to accept levirate marriage without making fertility eort for n6  n  n8, it must be
case that q(s   c(n)   hw) + (1   q)r2  q(k1   c(n)) + (1   q)r2 (i.e., s  k1 + hw) and s  c(n) + d1 q + hw + r2.
Since k1 + hw  

c(n) + d1 q + hw + r2

= k1   d1 q   r2   c(n) = c(n6)   c(n)  0, the above conditions result in
k1 + hw  s  c(n) + d1 q + hw + r2. Then, a clan chooses s = k1 + hw and obtains utility q(u(n)   k1   hw   hc).
A clan can maximize this utility by selecting n = n8 (i.e., maximum in the domain of n  n8), which results in vc =
q(u(n8)  k1   hw   hc) = q (u(n8)  c(n8)  r2   hw   hc) and vw = q(s  c(n8)  hw) + (1  q)r2 = r2.
Since q (u(n8)  c(n8)  r2   hw   hc) < q (u(n8)  c(n8)  r2), the strategy prole (n8; c(n8)+r2+hw; a; e) is not
selected. Given an innitely large disease cost, it is also the case that q(u(n8)  c(n8)  r2) > u(n6)  c(n6)  d1 q  
r2   hw   hc. Consequently, for n6  n  n8, the strategy prole (n8; 0; z; e) provides a clan with maximum utility
q(u(n8)  c(n8)  r2).
Third, consider the case of n  n8. In this case, a woman has no incentive to make fertility eort when she choose
action z. Since q(k1   c(n)) + (1   q)r2  q(k1   c(n8)) + (1   q)r2 = r2, a widow chooses action l when she rejects
levirate marriage. Given the action l taken by a widow, a clan obtains utility q(u(n)  c(n)  ). A clan can maximize
this utility subject to n  n8 > n. Then, a clan selects n = n8 (corner solution), yielding vc = q(u(n8)  c(n8)  ) as
well as vw = r2. To encourage a widow to accept levirate marriage while making fertility eort for n  n8, it must be
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the case that s c(n) d hw  r2 and s  c(n)+ d1 q +hw+r2, yielding s  c(n)+ d1 q +hw+r2  c(n)+d+hw+r2.
Then, a clan chooses s = c(n) + d1 q + hw + r2 and obtains utility u(n)   c(n)   d1 q   r2   hw   hc. A clan can
maximize this utility subject to n  n8 > n. Then, a clan selects n = n8 (corner solution), which results in vc =
u(n8)  c(n8)  d1 q   r2   hw   hc and vw = s  c(n8)  d  hw = r2 + qd1 q . To encourage a widow to accept levirate
marriage without making fertility eort for n  n8, it must be the case that q(s  c(n) hw)+ (1  q)r2  r2 (i.e., s 
c(n)+ r2+hw) and s  c(n)+ d1 q +hw+ r2, yielding c(n)+ r2+hw  s  c(n)+ d1 q +hw+ r2. Then, a clan chooses
s = c(n) + r2 + hw and obtains utility q (u(n)  c(n)  r2   hw   hc). A clan can maximize this utility subject to n
 n8 > n. Then, a clan selects n = n8 (corner solution), which results in vc = q (u(n8)  c(n8)  r2   hw   hc) and
vw = q(s  c(n8)  hw) + (1  q)r2 = r2. Since q(u(n8)  c(n8)  ) > q (u(n8)  c(n8)  r2   hw   hc) due to    r2
< hw + hc, the strategy prole (n8; c(n8) + r2 + hw; a; e) is not selected. Due to an innitely large disease cost, it is
also the case that q(u(n8)  c(n8)  ) > u(n8)  c(n8)  d1 q   r2   hw   hc. Consequently, for n  n8, the strategy
prole (n8; 0; l; e) provides a clan with maximum utility q(u(n8)  c(n8)  ).
Now, compare utility u(n6) c(n6)  d1 q r2, q(u(n8) c(n8) r2), and q(u(n8) c(n8) ). Since q(u(n8) c(n8) r2)
> q(u(n8)  c(n8)  ), the strategy prole (n8; 0; l; e) is not selected. Here, note that

u(n6)  c(n6)  d1 q   r2

 
q(u(n8)  c(n8)  r2) = (u(n6)  k1)  q(u(n8)  k1) = u(n6)  u(n8) + (1  q)(u(n8)  k1). Thus, when u(n8)  k1 >
u(n8) u(n6)
1 q , the strategy prole (n6; 0; z; e) is subgame perfect and a widow obtains utility r2 +
qd
1 q . Otherwise, the
strategy prole (n8; 0; z; e) is subgame perfect and a widow obtains utility r2.
Case 2: d1 q + r2  0.
In this case, k1 > c(n
)  c(n) + d1 q + r2. Then, consider the case that k1 > c(n) + d1 q + r2. Similar to the above
Subcase 3, when u(n8)   k1 > u(n8) c(n6)1 q , the strategy prole (n6; 0; z; e) is subgame perfect and a widow obtains
utility r2 +
qd
1 q . Otherwise, the strategy prole (n8; 0; z; e) is subgame perfect and a widow obtains utility r2.
Now, consider the Case 1 (including the Subcase 1 to Subcase 3) and Case 2 together. Then, assuming that r =
r2 < 0, k = k1 > c(n
), and the disease cost is high enough in the sense that    r2 < hc + hw  1, we get
1. When d1 q + r2 > 0
(a) and k1 <
d
1 q + r2 (in this case, n6 < 0 < n
 < n8), the strategy prole (n8; 0; z; e) is subgame perfect,
along with the equilibrium number of children n8 > n
 and a widow's payo r2 < 0 < qd1 q .
(b) and d1 q + r2  k1  c(n) + d1 q + r2 (in this case, 0  n6  n < n8)
i. and u(n8)  k1  u(n8) u(n6)1 q , the strategy prole (n8; 0; z; e) is subgame perfect, along with the equi-
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librium number of children n8 > n
 and a widow's payo r2 < 0 < qd1 q .
ii. and u(n8)  k1 > u(n8) u(n6)1 q , the strategy prole (n6; 0; z; e) is subgame perfect, along with the equi-
librium number of children n6  n and a widow's payo r2 + qd1 q < qd1 q .
(c) and k1 > c(n
) + d1 q + r2 (in this case, 0 < n
 < n6 < n8)
i. and u(n8)  k1  u(n8) u(n6)1 q , the strategy prole (n8; 0; z; e) is subgame perfect, along with the equi-
librium number of children n8 > n
 and a widow's payo r2 < 0 < qd1 q .
ii. and u(n8)  k1 > u(n8) u(n6)1 q , the strategy prole (n6; 0; z; e) is subgame perfect, along with the equi-
librium number of children n6 > n
 and a widow's payo r2 + qd1 q <
qd
1 q .
2. When d1 q + r2  0 and thus, k1 > c(n)  c(n) + d1 q + r2 (in this case, 0 < n < n6 < n8)
(a) and u(n8) k1  u(n8) u(n6)1 q , the strategy prole (n8; 0; z; e) is subgame perfect, along with the equilibrium
number of children n8 > n
 and a widow's payo r2 < 0 < qd1 q .
(b) and u(n8) k1 > u(n8) u(n6)1 q , the strategy prole (n6; 0; z; e) is subgame perfect, along with the equilibrium
number of children n6 > n
 and a widow's payo r2 + qd1 q = r2 +
d
1 q   d < 0 < qd1 q .
Summarizing these more succinctly yields proposition S.6.
Proof of proposition S.7:
Find n9, n10, and n11 satisfying k0   c(n9) = d1 q + r2, k0   c(n10) = r2 + d, and k0   c(n11) = r2. Since d1 q + r2
> d + r2 > r2, it is the case that n9 < n10 < n11. Since c(n9) = k0   d1 q   r2 > c(n), c(n9) > c(n), so n9 > n.
Consequently, n < n9 < n11.
Also, note that to prompt a woman's fertility eort when she chooses action z, it must be the case that k0 c(n) d
 q(k0  c(n)) + (1  q)r2, i.e., k0  c(n)  d1 q + r2. Similarly, to prompt a woman's fertility eort when she chooses
action a, it must be the case that s  c(n)  d  hw  q(s  c(n)  hw) + (1  q)r2, i.e., s  c(n) + d1 q + hw + r2.
First, consider the case of n  n9. In this case, a woman has an incentive to make fertility eort when she chooses
action z. Since k0  c(n)  d  k0  c(n9)  d > k0  c(n10)  d = r2. So, a widow chooses action z and makes fertility
eort when she rejects levirate marriage. Given the action z taken by a widow, a clan obtains utility u(n)   k0. A
clan can maximize this utility by selecting n = n9 (i.e., maximum in the domain of n  n9), yielding vc = u(n9)  k0
= u(n9)   c(n9)   d1 q   r2 as well as vw = k0   c(n9)   d = r2 + qd1 q . To encourage a widow to accept levirate
marriage while making fertility eort, it must be the case that s  c(n)  d  hw  k0   c(n)  d (i.e., s  k0 + hw)
and s  c(n) + d1 q + hw + r2. Since k0 + hw  

c(n) + d1 q + hw + r2

= k0   c(n)  d1 q   r2 = c(n9)  c(n)  0,
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the above conditions result in s  k0 + hw  c(n) + d1 q + hw + r2. Then, a clan chooses s = k0 + hw and obtains
utility u(n)  k0 hw  hc. A clan can maximize this utility by selecting n = n9 (i.e., maximum in the domain of n 
n9), which results in vc = u(n9)  k0   hw   hc = u(n9)  c(n9)  d1 q   r2   hw   hc and vw = s  c(n9)  d  hw =
k0+hw  c(n9) d hw = r2+ qd1 q . To encourage a widow to accept levirate marriage without making fertility eort,
it must be the case that q(s  c(n) hw)+ (1  q)r2  k0  c(n)  d (i.e., s  k0q   dq   1 qq c(n)  1 qq r2+hw) and s 
c(n)+ d1 q +hw + r2. Since

k0








k0   c(n)  d1 q   r2

= 1q (c(n9) c(n))  0 for all n  n9. Thus, it is not possible to encourage a widow to accept levirate marriage without
making fertility eort. Consequently, for n  n9, the strategy prole (n9; 0; z; e) provides a clan with maximum utility
u(n9)  c(n9)  d1 q   r2.
Second, consider the case of n9  n  n11. In this case, a woman has no incentive to make fertility eort when
she choose action z. Since q(k0   c(n)) + (1  q)r2  q(k0   c(n11)) + (1  q)r2 = r2, a widow chooses action z when
she rejects levirate marriage. Given the action z taken by a widow, a clan obtains utility q(u(n)   k0). A clan can
maximize this utility by selecting n = n11 (i.e., maximum in the domain of n  n11), yielding vc = q(u(n11)  k0) =
q (u(n11)  c(n11)  r2) as well as vw = q(k0   c(n11)) + (1  q)r2 = r2.
To encourage a widow to accept levirate marriage while making fertility eort for n9  n  n11, it must be the case
that s c(n) d hw  q(k0 c(n))+(1 q)r2 (i.e., s  qk0+(1 q)c(n)+(1 q)r2+d+hw) and s  c(n)+ d1 q+hw+r2.
Since (qk0 + (1  q)c(n) + (1  q)r2 + d+ hw) 





k0   d1 q   r2   c(n)

= q(c(n9) c(n))
 0, the above conditions result in s  c(n) + d1 q + hw + r2  qk0 + (1   q)c(n) + (1   q)r2 + d + hw. Then, a
clan chooses s = c(n) + d1 q + hw + r2 and obtains utility u(n)   c(n)   d1 q   r2   hw   hc. A clan can maximize
this utility by selecting n = n9 (corner solution), which results in vc = u(n9)  c(n9)  d1 q   r2   hw   hc and vw =
c(n9) +
d
1 q + hw + r2   c(n9)  d  hw = r2 + qd1 q .
To encourage a widow to accept levirate marriage without making fertility eort for n9  n  n11, it must be
case that q(s   c(n)   hw) + (1   q)r2  q(k0   c(n)) + (1   q)r2 (i.e., s  k0 + hw) and s  c(n) + d1 q + hw + r2.
Since k0 + hw  

c(n) + d1 q + hw + r2

= k0   d1 q   r2   c(n) = c(n9)   c(n)  0, the above conditions result in
k0 + hw  s  c(n) + d1 q + hw + r2. Then, a clan chooses s = k0 + hw and obtains utility q(u(n)  k0   hw   hc). A
clan can maximize this utility by selecting n = n11 (i.e., maximum in the domain of n  n11), which results in vc =
q(u(n11)  k0   hw   hc) = q (u(n11)  c(n11)  r2   hw   hc) and vw = q(s  c(n11)  hw) + (1  q)r2 = r2.
Since q (u(n11)  c(n11)  r2   hw   hc) < q (u(n11)  c(n11)  r2), the strategy prole (n11; c(n11)+ r2+hw; a; e)
is not selected. Given an innitely large disease cost, it is also the case that q(u(n11)  c(n11)  r2) > u(n9)  c(n9) 
d
1 q   r2   hw   hc. Consequently, for n9  n  n11, the strategy prole (n11; 0; z; e) provides a clan with maximum
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utility q(u(n11)  c(n11)  r2).
Third, consider the case of n  n11. In this case, a woman has no incentive to make fertility eort when she choose
action z. Since q(k0   c(n)) + (1  q)r2  q(k0   c(n11)) + (1  q)r2 = r2, a widow chooses action l when she rejects
levirate marriage. Given the action l taken by a widow, a clan obtains utility q(u(n)  c(n)  ). A clan can maximize
this utility subject to n  n11 > n. Then, a clan selects n = n11 (corner solution), yielding vc = q(u(n11) c(n11) )
as well as vw = r2. To encourage a widow to accept levirate marriage while making fertility eort for n  n11, it must
be the case that s c(n) d hw  r2 and s  c(n)+ d1 q+hw+r2, yielding s  c(n)+ d1 q+hw+r2  c(n)+d+hw+r2.
Then, a clan chooses s = c(n) + d1 q + hw + r2 and obtains utility u(n)   c(n)   d1 q   r2   hw   hc. A clan can
maximize this utility subject to n  n11 > n. Then, a clan selects n = n11 (corner solution), which results in vc =
u(n11)  c(n11)  d1 q   r2 hw hc and vw = s  c(n11) d hw = r2+ qd1 q . To encourage a widow to accept levirate
marriage without making fertility eort for n  n11, it must be the case that q(s c(n) hw)+(1 q)r2  r2 (i.e., s 
c(n)+ r2+hw) and s  c(n)+ d1 q +hw+ r2, yielding c(n)+ r2+hw  s  c(n)+ d1 q +hw+ r2. Then, a clan chooses
s = c(n) + r2 + hw and obtains utility q (u(n)  c(n)  r2   hw   hc). A clan can maximize this utility subject to n
 n11 > n. Then, a clan selects n = n11 (corner solution), which results in vc = q (u(n11)  c(n11)  r2   hw   hc)
and vw = q(s  c(n11)  hw) + (1  q)r2 = r2. Since q(u(n11)  c(n11)  ) > q (u(n11)  c(n11)  r2   hw   hc) due
to    r2 < hw + hc, the strategy prole (n11; c(n11) + r2 + hw; a; e) is not selected. Due to an innitely large disease
cost, it is also the case that q(u(n11)  c(n11)  ) > u(n11)  c(n11)  d1 q   r2 hw  hc. Consequently, for n  n11,
the strategy prole (n11; 0; l; e) provides a clan with maximum utility q(u(n11)  c(n11)  ).
Now, compare utility u(n9)   c(n9)   d1 q   r2, q(u(n11)   c(n11)   r2), and q(u(n11)   c(n11)   ). Since
q(u(n11)   c(n11)   r2) > q(u(n11)   c(n11)   ), the strategy prole (n11; 0; l; e) is not selected. Here, note that
u(n9)  c(n9)  d1 q   r2

 q(u(n11) c(n11) r2) = (u(n9) k0) q(u(n11) k0) = u(n9) u(n11)+(1 q)(u(n11) k0).
Thus, when u(n11)  k0 > u(n11) u(n9)1 q , the strategy prole (n9; 0; z; e) is subgame perfect and a widow obtains utility
r2 +
qd
1 q . Otherwise, the strategy prole (n11; 0; z; e) is subgame perfect and a widow obtains utility r2.
Proof of proposition S.8:
Recall n0 satisfying k0  c(n0) = r0 = 0 and n1 satisfying k1  c(n1) = r0 = 0, whereby n0  n < n1. Also, note that
n  n, which can be proved as follows; suppose n > n, u0(n) > u0(n) = c0(n) > c0(n) > 0c0(n), which is a
contradiction to u0(n) = 0c0(n). Since n > n1 by assumption, therefore, it becomes n0  n < n1 < n. Below,
denote a woman who loses her husband early and late as wy and wo, respectively.
First, consider the case of n  n0. In this case, k0   c(n)  k0   c(n0) = r0 = 0. Also, k1   c(n)  k1   c(n0) >
k1  c(n1) = r0 = 0. So, whether wy or wo, a widow chooses action z when she rejects levirate marriage. To encourage
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wy to accept levirate marriage for n  n0, it must be the case that sy   c(n)  k0   c(n). Then, a clan chooses sy =
k0. To encourage wo to accept levirate marriage for n  n0, it must be the case that so   c(n)  k1   c(n). Then, a
clan chooses so = k1.
Now, consider four subcases: (Case A) a clan never oers levirate marriage, (Case B) a clan oers levirate marriage
only to wy, (Case C) a clan oers levirate marriage only to wo, and (Case D) a clan oers levirate marriage to both
wy and wo. A clan obtains utility 0(u(n) k0)+(1 0)(u(n) k1) in all these cases and can maximize this utility by
selecting n = n0 (i.e., maximum in the domain of n  n0), which results in vc = u(n0) c(n0)+(1 0)(c(n0) c(n1)).
Consequently, for n  n0, the strategy proles (n0; (0; zy); (0; zo)), (n0; (c(n0); ay); (0; zo)), (n0; (0; zy); (c(n1); ao)), and
(n0; (c(n0); ay); (c(n1); ao)) provide a clan with maximum utility u(n0)  c(n0) + (1  0)(c(n0)  c(n1)).
Second, consider the case of n0 < n  n1. In this case, wy chooses action ly when she rejects levirate marriage,
because k0  c(n) < k0  c(n0) = r0 = 0. On the other hand, wo chooses action zo when she rejects levirate marriage,
because k1   c(n)  k1   c(n1) = r0 = 0. To encourage wy to accept levirate marriage when n0 < n  n1, it must be
the case that sy   c(n)  r0 = 0. Then, a clan chooses sy = c(n). To encourage wo to accept levirate marriage when
n0 < n  n1, it must be the case that so   c(n)  k1   c(n). Then, a clan chooses so = k1.
Again, consider a clan's utility obtained in the aforementioned four subcases, which becomes 0(u(n)  c(n)  )+
(1   0)(u(n)   k1) in Case A and Case C and 0(u(n)   c(n)) + (1   0)(u(n)   k1) in Case B and Case D. Since
0(u(n) c(n))+(1 0)(u(n) k1) > 0(u(n) c(n) )+(1 0)(u(n) k1), a clan prefers the latter two cases to the
former ones. In these cases, to maximizes utility 0(u(n)  c(n)) + (1  0)(u(n)  k1) subject to n  n1 < n, a clan
selects n = n1 (corner solution), which results in vc = u(n1)  c(n1). Consequently, when n0 < n  n1, the strategy
proles (n1; (c(n1); ay); (0; zo)) and (n1; (c(n1); ay); (c(n1); ao)) provide a clan with maximum utility u(n1)  c(n1).
Third, consider the case of n  n1. In this case, k0   c(n)  k0   c(n1) < k0   c(n0) = r0 = 0. Also, k1   c(n) 
k1  c(n1) = r0 = 0. So, whether wy or wo, a widow chooses action l when she rejects levirate marriage. To encourage
wy to accept levirate marriage for n  n1, it must be the case that sy   c(n)  r0 = 0. Then, a clan chooses sy =
c(n). To encourage wo to accept levirate marriage for n  n1, it must be the case that so   c(n)  r0 = 0. Then, a
clan chooses so = c(n).
As before, consider a clan's utility obtained in the aforementioned four subcases, which becomes u(n)   c(n)   
in Case A; 0(u(n)  c(n)) + (1  0)(u(n)  c(n)  ) in Case B; 0(u(n)  c(n)  ) + (1  0)(u(n)  c(n)) in Case
C; and u(n)  c(n) in Case D. Therefore, a clan prefers the Case D to the remaining cases. In Case D, to maximizes
utility u(n)  c(n) subject to n  n1 > n, a clan selects n = n1 (corner solution), which results in vc = u(n1)  c(n1).
Consequently, when n  n1, the strategy prole (n1; (c(n1); ay); (c(n1); ao)) provides a clan with maximum utility
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u(n1)  c(n1).
Now, compare utility u(n1)   c(n1) with u(n0)   c(n0) + (1   0)(c(n0)   c(n1)). When u(n1)   u(n0) 
0(c(n1)   c(n0)), u(n1)   c(n1)  u(n0)   c(n0) + (1   0)(c(n0)   c(n1)). In this case, the strategy proles




w = 0. Otherwise, the strategy
proles (n0; (0; zy); (0; zo)), (n0; (c(n0); ay); (0; zo)), (n0; (0; zy); (c(n1); ao)), and (n0; (c(n0); ay); (c(n1); ao)) are sub-
game perfect and vyw = r0 = 0 and v
o
w = c(n1)  c(n0) > 0.
Proof of proposition S.9:
Recall n3 satisfying k1   c(n3) = r2 < 0, whereby n3 > n1 > n because k1   c(n3) = r2 < k1   c(n1) = r0 and so,
c(n1) < c(n3). As before, denote a woman who loses her husband early and late as wy and wo, respectively. First,
consider the case of n  n3. In this case, k1   c(n)  k1   c(n3) = r2. So, whether wy or wo, a widow chooses action
z when she rejects levirate marriage. Whether wy or wo, to encourage a widow to accept levirate marriage for n 
n3, it must be the case that s  c(n)  hw  k1   c(n). Then, a clan chooses sy = so = k1 + hw.
Now, consider four subcases: (Case A) a clan never oers levirate marriage, (Case B) a clan oers levirate marriage
only to wy, (Case C) a clan oers levirate marriage only to wo, and (Case D) a clan oers levirate marriage to both
wy and wo. A clan obtains utility u(n)   k1 in Case A; 1(u(n)   k1   hw   hc) + (1   1)(u(n)   k1) in Case B;
1(u(n)  k1) + (1  1)(u(n)  k1   hw   hc) in Case C; and u(n)  k1   hw   hc in Case D. Therefore, a clan prefers
the Case A to the remaining cases. In Case A, a clan can maximize u(n)   k1 by selecting n = n3 (i.e., maximum
in the domain of n  n3), which results in vc = u(n3)   c(n3)   r2. Consequently, for n  n3, the strategy prole
(n3; (0; zy); (0; zo)) provides a clan with maximum utility u(n3)  c(n3)  r2.
Second, consider the case of n  n3. In this case, k1   c(n)  k1   c(n3) = r2. So, whether wy or wo, a widow
chooses action l when she rejects levirate marriage. Whether wy or wo, to encourage a widow to accept levirate
marriage for n  n3, it must be the case that s  c(n)  hw  r2. Then, a clan chooses sy = so = c(n) + r2 + hw.
Again, consider a clan's utility obtained in the aforementioned four subcases, which becomes u(n) c(n)  in Case
A; 1(u(n) c(n) r2 hw hc)+(1 1)(u(n) c(n) ) in Case B; 1(u(n) c(n) )+(1 1)(u(n) c(n) r2 hw hc)
in Case C; and u(n)   c(n)   r2   hw   hc in Case D. Since    r2 < hw + hc, therefore, a clan prefers the Case A
to the remaining cases. In Case A, a clan maximizes utility u(n)  c(n)   subject to n  n3 > n and then, selects
n = n3 (corner solution), which results in vc = u(n3)   c(n3)    . Consequently, when n  n3, the strategy prole
(n3; (0; ly); (0; lo)) provides a clan with maximum utility u(n3)  c(n3)   .
Since u(n3)  c(n3)  r2 > u(n3)  c(n3)   , the strategy prole (n3; (0; zy); (0; zo)) is subgame perfect and vyw =
vow = r2.
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Proof of proposition S.10:
Recall n3 satisfying k1   c(n3) = r2 < 0, whereby n3 > n1 > n because k1   c(n3) = r2 < k1   c(n1) = r0
and so, c(n1) < c(n3). As before, denote a woman who loses her husband early and late as wy and wo, respectively.
Since k1   c(n) > k1   c(n3) = r2 by assumption, wy always chooses action zy when she rejects levirate marriage. To
encourage wy to accept levirate marriage, it must be the case that sy   c(n)  hw  k1   c(n). Then, a clan chooses
sy = k1 + hw.
First, consider the case of n  n3. In this case, k1 c(n)  k1 c(n3) = r2. So, wo chooses action zo when she rejects
levirate marriage. To encourage wo to accept levirate marriage for n  n3, it must be the case that so   c(n)  hw 
k1   c(n). Then, a clan chooses so = k1 + hw.
Now, consider four subcases: (Case A) a clan never oers levirate marriage, (Case B) a clan oers levirate marriage
only to wy, (Case C) a clan oers levirate marriage only to wo, and (Case D) a clan oers levirate marriage to both wy
and wo. A clan obtains utility 1(u(n) k1)+(1 1)(u(n) k1) in Case A; 1(u(n) k1 hw hc)+(1 1)(u(n) k1)
in Case B; 1(u(n)   k1) + (1   1)(u(n)   k1   hw   hc) in Case C; and 1(u(n)   k1   hw   hc) + (1   1)(u(n)  
k1 hw  hc) in Case D. Therefore, a clan prefers the Case A to the remaining cases. In Case A, a clan can maximize
1(u(n)  k1) + (1  1)(u(n)  k1) by selecting n = n3 (i.e., maximum in the domain of n  n3), which results in vc
= 1u(n) + (1   1)u(n3)   c(n3)   r2. Consequently, for n  n3, the strategy prole (n3; (0; zy); (0; zo)) provides a
clan with maximum utility 1u(n) + (1  1)u(n3)  c(n3)  r2.
Second, consider the case of n  n3. In this case, k1   c(n)  k1   c(n3) = r2. So, wo chooses action lo when
she rejects levirate marriage. To encourage wo to accept levirate marriage for n  n3, it must be the case that
so   c(n)  hw  r2. Then, a clan chooses so = c(n) + r2 + hw.
Again, consider a clan's utility obtained in the aforementioned four subcases, which becomes 1(u(n)  k1) + (1 
1)(u(n)  c(n)  ) in Case A; 1(u(n)  k1   hw   hc) + (1  1)(u(n)  c(n)  ) in Case B; 1(u(n)  k1) + (1 
1)(u(n)  c(n)  r2  hw   hc) in Case C; and 1(u(n)  k1  hw   hc) + (1  1)(u(n)  c(n)  r2  hw   hc) in Case
D. Since    r2 < hw + hc, therefore, a clan prefers the Case A to the remaining cases. In Case A, a clan maximizes
utility 1(u(n)   k1) + (1   1)(u(n)   c(n)   ) subject to n  n3 > n and then, selects n = n3 (corner solution),
which results in vc = 1u(n) + (1   1)u(n3)   c(n3)   1r2   (1   1) . Consequently, when n  n3, the strategy
prole (n3; (0; zy); (0; lo)) provides a clan with maximum utility 1u(n) + (1  1)u(n3)  c(n3)  1r2   (1  1) .
Since 1u(n) + (1  1)u(n3)  c(n3)  r2 > 1u(n) + (1  1)u(n3)  c(n3)  1r2   (1  1) , the strategy prole
(n3; (0; zy); (0; zo)) is subgame perfect, along with v
y
w = k1   c(n) = c(n1)  c(n) and vow = r2.
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Table S.1: Checking on parallel trends before wave 1 (OLS)
Dependent variables: Log of per capita No. of children
Sample (wave 1 only): consumption (TSH)
Females Head's wives
aged 15 to 50 aged 15 o 50
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Group A -0.014 0.026 - -
 Widow (0.015) (0.066)
 Age
Group A - -0.001 - -
 Widow (0.001)
 Age squared
Group A  Age 0.005 0.007 0.024 -0.113
(0.003) (0.019) (0.038) (0.205)
Group A  Age squared - -0.000 - 0.002
(0.000) (0.003)
Group A  Widow 0.377 -0.262 - -
(0.489) (1.055)
Widow  Age 0.010 -0.059 - -
(0.008) (0.046)
Widow  Age squared - 0.001 - -
(0.001)
Widow -0.509* 0.638 - -
(0.266) (0.779)
Age (years) 0.001 -0.011 0.034** 0.771***
(0.002) (0.013) (0.016) (0.097)
Age squared - 0.000 - -0.011***
(0.000) (0.001)
Village FE YES YES YES YES
R-squared 0.307 0.310 0.213 0.317
No. of obs. 1200 1200 444 444
Notes: (1) Figures ( ) are standard errors. *** denotes signicance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. (2) Standard errors are robust to
heteroskedasticity and clustered residuals within each village.
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Table S.2: Summary statistics (DID estimates)
Coecient Standard R-sqd. No. of
Dependent variables: errors obs.
Per capita consumption (TSH) -11049.539* (6487.507) 0.007 2916
No. of biological children 0.153 (0.265) 0.019 2920
No. of biological sons 0.102 (0.161) 0.014 2920
No. of biological daughters 0.051 (0.168) 0.011 2920
Education (years) -0.201 (0.233) 0.023 2875
Widow (dummy) 0.012 (0.025) 0.008 2917
Age (years) 1.483* (0.759) 0.002 2920
Head's age (years) 1.123 (1.638) 0.027 2909
Head male (dummy) 0.059 (0.043) 0.008 2909
HH size 0.213 (0.664) 0.074 2916
HH land (acre) -0.836 (1.100) 0.037 2657
Notes: (1) Figures ( ) are standard errors. *** denotes signicance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. (2) Standard errors are robust to
heteroskedasticity and clustered residuals within each village.
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Look for land 0.10 0.02




Death of parents 0.05 0.02
Inheritance 0.05 0.01
Illness of family members 0.00 0.00
Other 0.07 0.05
(4) Other 0.20 0.15
No. of migrants 500 839
Note: The gure is the proportion relative to the total number of migrants in each gender-category.
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Table S.4: Age heterogeneity: Institutional change and widows' welfare (OLS)
Log of consumption Log of consumption Log of consumption per
per capita (TSH) per adult equivalent (TSH) adjusted adult equivalent (TSH)
Sample Coecient Std. R-sqd. Coecient Std. R-sqd. Coecient Std. R-sqd. No. of obs.
Aged 15 1.136*** (0.279) 0.816 0.674*** (0.244) 0.818 -0.565** (0.248) 0.863 138
Aged 15 to 16 -0.273 (0.506) 0.642 -0.340 (0.374) 0.653 -0.134 (0.415) 0.725 276
Aged 15 to 17 1.417*** (0.505) 0.568 1.105** (0.541) 0.558 0.510 (0.604) 0.629 421
Aged 15 to 18 0.943** (0.366) 0.497 0.746** (0.356) 0.488 0.449 (0.361) 0.586 560
Aged 15 to 19 0.690* (0.393) 0.461 0.371 (0.394) 0.450 -0.074 (0.397) 0.549 683
Aged 15 to 20 0.765* (0.395) 0.435 0.504 (0.377) 0.421 0.119 (0.364) 0.524 805
Aged 15 to 21 0.001 (0.191) 0.433 -0.053 (0.185) 0.422 -0.333 (0.212) 0.530 894
Aged 15 to 22 -0.033 (0.164) 0.422 -0.041 (0.172) 0.410 -0.249 (0.221) 0.530 1002
Aged 15 to 23 0.063 (0.151) 0.417 0.129 (0.152) 0.404 0.068 (0.211) 0.532 1098
Aged 15 to 24 -0.098 (0.204) 0.408 -0.055 (0.196) 0.402 -0.158 (0.219) 0.536 1204
Aged 15 to 25 -0.230 (0.225) 0.400 -0.175 (0.213) 0.395 -0.140 (0.242) 0.537 1303
Aged 15 to 26 -0.394* (0.233) 0.404 -0.355 (0.228) 0.398 -0.424 (0.287) 0.538 1380
Aged 15 to 27 -0.440** (0.205) 0.391 -0.410** (0.196) 0.386 -0.461* (0.251) 0.536 1451
Aged 15 to 28 -0.458*** (0.159) 0.391 -0.459*** (0.153) 0.382 -0.530** (0.222) 0.528 1553
Aged 15 to 29 -0.257 (0.157) 0.382 -0.268* (0.152) 0.375 -0.340 (0.219) 0.526 1638
Aged 15 to 30 -0.164 (0.127) 0.379 -0.186 (0.124) 0.372 -0.304 (0.193) 0.524 1756
Aged 15 to 31 -0.173 (0.120) 0.376 -0.158 (0.111) 0.368 -0.195 (0.160) 0.518 1812
Aged 15 to 32 -0.214* (0.114) 0.376 -0.211** (0.102) 0.368 -0.231 (0.164) 0.513 1894
Aged 15 to 33 -0.158 (0.097) 0.375 -0.168* (0.085) 0.365 -0.169 (0.149) 0.505 1946
Aged 15 to 34 -0.151 (0.091) 0.375 -0.170** (0.081) 0.366 -0.201 (0.144) 0.507 1995
Aged 15 to 35 -0.129 (0.089) 0.378 -0.162** (0.080) 0.369 -0.210 (0.138) 0.509 2052
Aged 15 to 36 -0.101 (0.090) 0.379 -0.142* (0.084) 0.370 -0.239 (0.147) 0.503 2103
Aged 15 to 37 -0.130 (0.097) 0.376 -0.164* (0.088) 0.367 -0.246* (0.141) 0.500 2156
Aged 15 to 38 -0.091 (0.097) 0.374 -0.124 (0.089) 0.365 -0.196 (0.147) 0.498 2195
Aged 15 to 39 -0.086 (0.091) 0.370 -0.127 (0.085) 0.361 -0.208 (0.138) 0.495 2237
Aged 15 to 40 -0.070 (0.086) 0.373 -0.116 (0.081) 0.363 -0.208 (0.130) 0.495 2290
Aged 15 to 41 -0.053 (0.082) 0.371 -0.096 (0.075) 0.361 -0.196 (0.122) 0.494 2319
Aged 15 to 42 -0.053 (0.074) 0.373 -0.091 (0.070) 0.362 -0.195 (0.123) 0.494 2358
Aged 15 to 43 -0.049 (0.074) 0.375 -0.088 (0.070) 0.363 -0.189 (0.122) 0.494 2389
Aged 15 to 44 -0.068 (0.080) 0.376 -0.108 (0.075) 0.365 -0.203* (0.119) 0.495 2416
Aged 15 to 45 -0.100 (0.081) 0.373 -0.141* (0.076) 0.362 -0.214* (0.114) 0.493 2448
Aged 15 to 46 -0.066 (0.084) 0.373 -0.113 (0.077) 0.364 -0.186* (0.111) 0.494 2482
Aged 15 to 47 -0.045 (0.086) 0.372 -0.086 (0.081) 0.361 -0.149 (0.116) 0.494 2516
Aged 15 to 48 -0.047 (0.084) 0.376 -0.091 (0.080) 0.364 -0.163 (0.112) 0.494 2545
Aged 15 to 49 -0.052 (0.075) 0.374 -0.115 (0.075) 0.361 -0.199* (0.108) 0.492 2573
Aged 15 to 50 -0.049 (0.074) 0.370 -0.105 (0.074) 0.357 -0.197* (0.106) 0.490 2616
Notes: (1) This table reports the estimated 2 in equation (7) by changing the exploited sample by the respondents' age. (2) Figures (
) are standard errors. *** denotes signicance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. (3) Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and
clustered residuals within each village.
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Table S.5: Institutional change and fertility: Robustness checks
Dependent variable: No. of children
Sample: Head's wives aged 15 to 50
OLS OLS Ordered Ordered Ordered Ordered
probit probit probit probit
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
No levirate marriage
 Aged 15 to 20 0.044 -0.080 -0.102 -0.100 - -
(0.352) (0.366) (0.313) (0.313)
 Aged 21 to 30 0.436 0.371 0.403* - - -
(0.271) (0.279) (0.244)
 Aged 31 to 40 0.710* 0.692* 0.643** - - -
(0.384) (0.363) (0.299)
 Aged 21 to 40 - - - 0.504** - -
(0.253)
 Aged 15 to 40 - - - - 0.419* -
(0.238)
 Age - - - - - 0.251**
(0.101)
 Age squared - - - - - -0.004**
(0.002)
 No. of a head's wives 0.015 - - - - -
(0.490)
 HH's cash and in-kind gifts - 0.014*** - - - -
received (10 3) (0.004)
 HH's cash and in-kind gifts - -0.010** - - - -
sent (10 3) (0.004)
Aged 15 to 20 -0.400 -0.331 -0.450 -0.452 -0.838*** -
(0.380) (0.400) (0.335) (0.335) (0.299)
Aged 21 to 30 0.356 0.381 0.371 0.285 0.356 -
(0.265) (0.277) (0.231) (0.241) (0.229)
Aged 31 to 40 0.490 0.455 0.483* 0.592** 0.655*** -
(0.375) (0.352) (0.268) (0.233) (0.220)
Age (years) - - - - - 0.311***
(0.093)
Age squared - - - - - -0.005***
(0.001)
Education (years) -0.001 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.005 -0.010
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011)
Head's age (years) -0.010* -0.010 -0.009* -0.009* -0.009* -0.013**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Head male -0.361 -0.312 -0.177 -0.167 -0.128 -0.131
(0.550) (0.496) (0.715) (0.709) (0.754) (0.675)
HH size 0.556*** 0.560*** 0.506*** 0.505*** 0.504*** 0.500***
(0.034) (0.027) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.044)
HH land (acre) -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002
(0.013) (0.014) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
No. of a head's wives -0.040 - - - - -
(0.271)
HH's cash and in-kind gifts - -0.013*** - - - -
received (10 3) (0.004)
HH's cash and in-kind gifts - 0.006*** - - - -
sent (10 3) (0.002)
Head's ethnicity YES YES YES YES YES YES
Head's religion YES YES YES YES YES YES
Village time-trend YES YES YES YES YES YES
R-squared 0.730 0.732 0.290 0.289 0.288 0.303
No. of obs. 1217 1201 1217 1217 1217 1217
Notes: (1) Figures ( ) are standard errors. *** denotes signicance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. (2) Standard errors are robust to
heteroskedasticity and clustered residuals within each village. (3) A head's ethnicity is classied into seven groups, i.e., Hangaza, Haya,
Nyambo, Shubi, Subi, Zinza, and other. (4) A head's religion is categorized into six groups, i.e., Muslim, Catholic, Protestant, other
Christian, traditional, and other.
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Table S.6: Institutional change and fertility: Gender heterogeneity (OLS)
Dependent variables: No. of
Sons Sons daughters daughters
Sample: Head's Head's Head's Head's
wives aged wives aged wives aged wives aged
15 to 50 15 to 50 15 to 50 15 to 50
(a) (b) (c) (d)
No levirate marriage
 Aged 15 to 20 (a1) 0.086 - -0.034 -
(0.270) (0.269)
 Aged 21 to 30 (a2) 0.166 - 0.278 -
(0.236) (0.260)
 Aged 31 to 40 (a3) 0.278 - 0.441 -
(0.234) (0.267)
 Age - 0.145*** - 0.102
(0.050) (0.086)
 Age squared - -0.002*** - -0.002
(0.001) (0.001)
Aged 15 to 20 -0.700** - 0.284 -
(0.316) (0.303)
Aged 21 to 30 -0.098 - 0.440* -
(0.265) (0.257)
Aged 31 to 40 0.113 - 0.366 -
(0.245) (0.252)
Age (years) - 0.125*** - 0.164**
(0.046) (0.077)
Age squared - -0.002** - -0.003**
(0.001) (0.001)
Education (years) -0.000 -0.006 -0.001 -0.007
(0.011) (0.010) (0.012) (0.013)
Head's age (years) -0.012** -0.013** 0.002 -0.001
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Head male -0.568 -0.487 0.216 0.155
(0.412) (0.351) (0.177) (0.122)
HH size 0.253*** 0.245*** 0.301*** 0.292***
(0.030) (0.029) (0.016) (0.017)
HH land (acre) 0.010 0.011 -0.012 -0.011
(0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009)
Head's ethnicity YES YES YES YES
Head's religion YES YES YES YES
Village time-trend YES YES YES YES
Joint signicance (p-values)
a2+ a3 = 0 0.325 - 0.139 -
a1 + a2 + a3 = 0 0.440 - 0.314 -
R-squared 0.448 0.455 0.505 0.514
No. of obs. 1217 1217 1217 1217
Notes: (1) Figures ( ) are standard errors. *** denotes signicance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. (2) Standard errors are robust to
heteroskedasticity and clustered residuals within each village. (3) A head's ethnicity is classied into seven groups, i.e., Hangaza, Haya,
Nyambo, Shubi, Subi, Zinza, and other. (4) A head's religion is categorized into six groups, i.e., Muslim, Catholic, Protestant, other
Christian, traditional, and other.
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Table S.7: Age heterogeneity: Reduced-form impacts of HIV/AIDS on widows' welfare (OLS)
Log of consumption Log of consumption Log of consumption per
per capita (TSH) per adult equivalent (TSH) adjusted adult equivalent (TSH)
Sample Coecient Std. R-sqd. Coecient Std. R-sqd. Coecient Std. R-sqd. No. of obs.
Aged 15 -0.458 (0.697) 0.744 -0.991 (0.712) 0.746 -1.607* (0.906) 0.772 390
Aged 15 to 16 0.006 (0.760) 0.606 -0.021 (0.776) 0.610 0.662 (0.794) 0.686 723
Aged 15 to 17 0.697 (0.517) 0.543 0.402 (0.542) 0.535 -0.202 (0.560) 0.612 1040
Aged 15 to 18 0.526* (0.266) 0.477 0.286 (0.261) 0.466 -0.158 (0.277) 0.561 1392
Aged 15 to 19 0.144 (0.274) 0.461 -0.044 (0.222) 0.452 -0.227 (0.215) 0.549 1678
Aged 15 to 20 0.275 (0.235) 0.443 0.124 (0.208) 0.432 -0.129 (0.239) 0.531 1974
Aged 15 to 21 0.368* (0.214) 0.441 0.207 (0.210) 0.430 -0.151 (0.229) 0.532 2182
Aged 15 to 22 0.094 (0.230) 0.431 -0.015 (0.209) 0.421 -0.172 (0.207) 0.534 2388
Aged 15 to 23 -0.076 (0.176) 0.430 -0.137 (0.158) 0.421 -0.188 (0.181) 0.543 2582
Aged 15 to 24 -0.123 (0.167) 0.427 -0.179 (0.148) 0.422 -0.216 (0.186) 0.552 2766
Aged 15 to 25 -0.079 (0.164) 0.418 -0.109 (0.152) 0.416 -0.120 (0.213) 0.559 2944
Aged 15 to 26 -0.256 (0.159) 0.398 -0.258* (0.146) 0.397 -0.328 (0.210) 0.555 3106
Aged 15 to 27 -0.311** (0.135) 0.388 -0.321*** (0.116) 0.388 -0.374** (0.167) 0.557 3240
Aged 15 to 28 -0.338*** (0.118) 0.383 -0.353*** (0.102) 0.382 -0.450*** (0.155) 0.556 3404
Aged 15 to 29 -0.251** (0.111) 0.381 -0.276*** (0.099) 0.380 -0.364** (0.153) 0.556 3562
Aged 15 to 30 -0.143 (0.100) 0.381 -0.177* (0.093) 0.379 -0.339** (0.142) 0.555 3762
Aged 15 to 31 -0.122 (0.089) 0.381 -0.153* (0.083) 0.376 -0.244* (0.135) 0.552 3890
Aged 15 to 32 -0.022 (0.103) 0.378 -0.053 (0.104) 0.372 -0.181 (0.134) 0.546 4040
Aged 15 to 33 0.039 (0.108) 0.375 0.004 (0.111) 0.368 -0.167 (0.129) 0.540 4142
Aged 15 to 34 0.060 (0.103) 0.375 0.026 (0.107) 0.368 -0.166 (0.124) 0.538 4244
Aged 15 to 35 0.095 (0.097) 0.378 0.063 (0.101) 0.371 -0.082 (0.134) 0.538 4362
Aged 15 to 36 0.078 (0.094) 0.380 0.048 (0.099) 0.373 -0.082 (0.130) 0.532 4493
Aged 15 to 37 0.050 (0.095) 0.377 0.033 (0.098) 0.371 -0.086 (0.122) 0.529 4611
Aged 15 to 38 0.035 (0.091) 0.374 0.028 (0.095) 0.367 -0.082 (0.118) 0.527 4719
Aged 15 to 39 0.018 (0.084) 0.371 0.007 (0.088) 0.365 -0.116 (0.107) 0.523 4818
Aged 15 to 40 0.018 (0.080) 0.369 0.005 (0.083) 0.363 -0.104 (0.106) 0.520 4950
Aged 15 to 41 -0.007 (0.072) 0.367 -0.023 (0.072) 0.361 -0.120 (0.095) 0.519 5032
Aged 15 to 42 -0.010 (0.068) 0.366 -0.030 (0.068) 0.359 -0.148 (0.091) 0.518 5120
Aged 15 to 43 -0.009 (0.068) 0.368 -0.028 (0.068) 0.361 -0.149 (0.092) 0.518 5187
Aged 15 to 44 0.001 (0.066) 0.369 -0.016 (0.065) 0.362 -0.141 (0.088) 0.518 5250
Aged 15 to 45 -0.010 (0.063) 0.368 -0.023 (0.061) 0.360 -0.140 (0.085) 0.518 5319
Aged 15 to 46 -0.014 (0.063) 0.368 -0.025 (0.060) 0.361 -0.150* (0.084) 0.517 5397
Aged 15 to 47 -0.030 (0.060) 0.364 -0.037 (0.057) 0.358 -0.151* (0.081) 0.516 5463
Aged 15 to 48 -0.047 (0.058) 0.367 -0.050 (0.056) 0.360 -0.162** (0.081) 0.515 5531
Aged 15 to 49 -0.048 (0.057) 0.365 -0.054 (0.056) 0.357 -0.164** (0.079) 0.513 5602
Aged 15 to 50 -0.046 (0.054) 0.364 -0.049 (0.054) 0.356 -0.146* (0.079) 0.513 5688
Notes: (1) After replacing Djt in equation (7) with an indicator for villages that referred to HIV/AIDS as the most or second most
important health problem in a community in each wave, this gure reports the estimated impacts of HIV/AIDS on widows' consumption
by changing the exploited sample by the respondents' age. (2) Figures ( ) are standard errors. *** denotes signicance at 1%, ** at 5%,
and * at 10%. (3) Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered residuals within each village.
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Table S.8: Impacts on married women's bargaining power (OLS)
Dependent variable: A proportion of mother-related expenditures
Sample: Head's wives aged 15 to 50
Mother-related expenditures: (A) = (B )= (C) =
jewelry & perfume (A) + fabric, (B) + education
clothing, & shoes
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
No levirate marriage
 Aged 15 to 20 -0.004 -0.004 0.003 0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(0.005) (0.005) (0.011) (0.011) (0.007) (0.008)
 Aged 21 to 30 -0.003 -0.003 0.010 0.010 -0.011 -0.010
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
 Aged 31 to 40 -0.004 -0.004 0.003 0.003 -0.002 -0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Aged 15 to 20 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.004 -0.009 -0.008
(0.003) (0.003) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008)
Aged 21 to 30 0.001 0.001 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.007
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007)
Aged 31 to 40 0.000 0.000 -0.006 -0.006 -0.008 -0.007
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Education (years) 0.000 0.000 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Head's age (years) -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Head male -0.023* -0.023* 0.011 0.010 -0.014*** -0.017***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.018) (0.018) (0.005) (0.005)
HH size 0.000 0.000 0.001*** 0.001** 0.003*** 0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
HH land (acre) -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
HH total consumption - -0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Head's ethnicity YES YES YES YES YES YES
Head's religion YES YES YES YES YES YES
Village-time trend YES YES YES YES YES YES
R-squared 0.137 0.137 0.245 0.245 0.333 0.339
No. of obs. 1217 1217 1217 1217 1217 1217
Notes: (1) Figures ( ) are standard errors. *** denotes signicance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. (2) Standard errors are robust to
heteroskedasticity and clustered residuals within each village. (3) A head's ethnicity is classied into seven groups, i.e., Hangaza, Haya,
Nyambo, Shubi, Subi, Zinza, and other. (4) A head's religion is categorized into six groups, i.e., Muslim, Catholic, Protestant, other
Christian, traditional, and other.
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Table S.9: Threats to identication (OLS)
Dependent variables: Log of per capita consumption (TSH) No. of children
Sample: Females aged 15 to 28 Head's wives aged 15 to 50
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h)
No levirate marriage
 Widow -0.442*** -0.455*** -0.491*** -0.486*** - - - -
(0.155) (0.158) (0.148) (0.167)
 Aged 15 to 20 - - - - 0.052 0.069 0.068 0.002
(0.359) (0.338) (0.354) (0.379)
 Aged 21 to 30 - - - - 0.441 0.444 0.453* 0.403
(0.292) (0.277) (0.268) (0.287)
 Aged 31 to 40 - - - - 0.724* 0.728* 0.733** 0.594
(0.371) (0.369) (0.362) (0.362)
 Migrant in wave 5 0.017 - - - 0.125 - - -
(0.146) (0.268)
 Drop by wave 5 - -0.013 - - - -0.142 - -
(0.097) (0.348)
Widow
 Mortality rate - - 0.053 - - - - -
(0.048)
 No. of refugee camps - - - -0.140* - - - -
(0.074)
Aged 15 to 20
 Mortality rate - - - - - - -0.124 -
(0.131)
 No. of refugee camps - - - - - - - -0.091
(0.214)
Aged 21 to 30
 Mortality rate - - - - - - -0.068 -
(0.096)
 No. of refugee camps - - - - - - - -0.059
(0.098)
Aged 31 to 40
 Mortality rate - - - - - - -0.129 -
(0.088)
 No. of refugee camps - - - - - - - -0.191*
(0.110)
Migrant in wave 5 0.089 - - - -0.175 - - -
(0.138) (0.243)
Drop by wave 5 - 0.006 - - - -0.091 - -
(0.073) (0.185)
R-squared 0.394 0.391 0.392 0.393 0.730 0.731 0.731 0.731
No. of obs 1553 1553 1553 1553 1217 1217 1217 1217
Individual controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Village-time trend YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: (1) Figures ( ) are standard errors. *** denotes signicance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. (2) Standard errors are robust to
heteroskedasticity and clustered residuals within each village. (3) Individual controls include all regressors used in the analysis in Table 4
and Table 5, but the corresponding estimates are not reported here.
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Table S.10: Checking on inuences of sample attrition (OLS)
Dependent variables: Log of per capita No. of children
consumption (TSH)
Sample: Females aged 15 to 28 Head's wives aged 15 o 50
Trim: Top Bottom Top Bottom Top Bottom Top Bottom Top Bottom
16% 16% 30% 30% 30% 30% 30% 30% 30% 30%
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j)
No levirate marriage
 widow -0.414** -0.413** - - - - - - - -
(0.155) (0.155)
 Aged 15 to 20 - - 0.206 0.013 0.210 0.016 - - - -
(0.380) (0.389) (0.381) (0.388)
 Aged 21 to 30 - - 0.397 0.475* - - - - - -
(0.272) (0.280)
 Aged 31 to 40 - - 0.594 0.715* - - - - - -
(0.391) (0.365)
 Aged 21 to 40 - - - - 0.480 0.577* 0.389 0.570** - -
(0.302) (0.296) (0.234) (0.238)
 Age - - - - - - - - 0.184* 0.246**
(0.106) (0.109)
 Age squared - - - - - - - - -0.003* -0.004**
(0.002) (0.002)
Widow 0.106 0.148 - - - - - - - -
(0.097) (0.100)
Aged 15 to 20 0.055** 0.084*** -0.375 -0.464 -0.378 -0.467 -0.220 -0.455 - -
(0.027) (0.027) (0.359) (0.390) (0.359) (0.389) (0.250) (0.303)
Aged 21 to 30 0.000 0.000 0.370 0.313 0.301 0.229 0.372 0.235 - -
(0.000) (0.000) (0.263) (0.273) (0.272) (0.294) (0.236) (0.261)
Aged 31 to 40 0.000 0.000 0.497 0.477 0.583** 0.585* 0.656*** 0.590** - -
(0.000) (0.000) (0.340) (0.359) (0.283) (0.300) (0.245) (0.270)
Age (years) - - - - - - - - 0.282*** 0.297***
(0.097) (0.098)
Age squared - - - - - - - - -0.004*** -0.004***
(0.001) (0.001)
Education (years) 0.035*** 0.037*** 0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.010 -0.010
(0.005) (0.005) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013)
Head's age (years) -0.000 -0.000 -0.008 -0.011* -0.008 -0.011* -0.008 -0.011* -0.011* -0.015**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Head male 0.094** 0.118** 0.605*** -0.336 0.609*** -0.325 0.573*** -0.327 0.429** -0.299
(0.045) (0.045) (0.201) (0.533) (0.201) (0.523) (0.190) (0.512) (0.189) (0.432)
HH size -0.048*** -0.050*** 0.549*** 0.541*** 0.549*** 0.541*** 0.548*** 0.541*** 0.535*** 0.525***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.034) (0.032) (0.034) (0.032) (0.034) (0.032) (0.034) (0.031)
HH land (acre) 0.023*** 0.022*** 0.005 -0.002 0.005 -0.002 0.005 -0.002 0.007 -0.001
(0.003) (0.004) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
Head's ethnicity YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Head's religion YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Village time-trend YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
R-squared 0.398 0.376 0.719 0.722 0.718 0.722 0.718 0.722 0.732 0.736
No. of obs. 1518 1510 1124 1130 1124 1130 1124 1130 1124 1130
Notes: (1) Figures ( ) are standard errors. *** denotes signicance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. (2) Standard errors are robust to
heteroskedasticity and clustered residuals within each village. (3) A head's ethnicity is classied into seven groups, i.e., Hangaza, Haya,
Nyambo, Shubi, Subi, Zinza, and other. (4) A head's religion is categorized into six groups, i.e., Muslim, Catholic, Protestant, other
Christian, traditional, and other.
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Table S.11: Correlation between a household head and widowhood (OLS)
Dependent variable: One if a household head
Sample: Females aged 15 to 50
(a) (b) (c)
No levirate marriage
 Widow 0.033 0.043 0.038
(0.080) (0.081) (0.064)
No levirate marriage -0.002 - -
(0.017)
Widow 0.597*** 0.593*** 0.327***
(0.067) (0.068) (0.058)
Aged 15 to 20 - - -0.215***
(0.022)
Aged 21 to 30 - - -0.191***
(0.022)
Aged 31 to 40 - - -0.106***
(0.019)
Education (years) - - 0.000
(0.001)
Head's age (years) - - -0.004***
(0.000)
Head male - - -0.316***
(0.018)
HH size - - -0.005**
(0.002)
HH land (acre) - - 0.002**
(0.001)
Head's ethnicity NO NO YES
Head's religion NO NO YES
Village FE YES NO NO
Region-time trend YES NO NO
Village-time trend NO YES YES
R-squared 0.277 0.290 0.580
No. of obs. 2917 2917 2616
Notes: (1) Figures ( ) are standard errors. *** denotes signicance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. (2) Standard errors are robust to
heteroskedasticity and clustered residuals within each village. (3) A head's ethnicity is classied into seven groups, i.e., Hangaza, Haya,
Nyambo, Shubi, Subi, Zinza, and other. (4) A head's religion is categorized into six groups, i.e., Muslim, Catholic, Protestant, other
Christian, traditional, and other.
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Table S.12: Impacts on a probability of being a head's wife (OLS)
Dependent variable: One if a head's wife
Sample: Females aged 15 to 50
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
No levirate marriage
 Aged 15 to 20 0.051 0.057 0.049 0.049 - -
(0.075) (0.076) (0.075) (0.074)
 Aged 21 to 30 0.018 0.019 0.008 - - -
(0.073) (0.073) (0.074)
 Aged 31 to 40 0.034 0.038 0.029 - - -
(0.084) (0.084) (0.083)
 Aged 21 to 40 - - - 0.016 - -
(0.074)
 Aged 15 to 40 - - - - 0.028 -
(0.070)
 Age - - - - - -0.006
(0.014)
 Age squared - - - - - 0.000
(0.000)
No levirate marriage -0.478* -0.452 - - - -
(0.271) (0.279)
Aged 15 to 20 -0.517*** -0.517*** -0.522*** -0.522*** -0.505*** -
(0.070) (0.070) (0.069) (0.069) (0.064)
Aged 21 to 30 -0.144** -0.142** -0.136* -0.142** -0.152** -
(0.068) (0.068) (0.069) (0.070) (0.068)
Aged 31 to 40 -0.062 -0.062 -0.064 -0.054 -0.063 -
(0.078) (0.078) (0.077) (0.069) (0.066)
Age (years) - - - - - 0.089***
(0.013)
Age squared - - - - - -0.001***
(0.000)
Education (years) -0.007** -0.007** -0.007** -0.006** -0.007** -0.007***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Head's age (years) -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Head male 0.606*** 0.606*** 0.604*** 0.604*** 0.604*** 0.605***
(0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
HH size -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.020***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
HH land (acre) -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Head's ethnicity YES YES YES YES YES YES
Head's religion YES YES YES YES YES YES
Village leader char. NO YES NO NO NO NO
Village FE YES YES NO NO NO NO
Region time-trend YES YES NO NO NO NO
Village time-trend NO NO YES YES YES YES
R-squared 0.567 0.566 0.575 0.575 0.575 0.586
No. of obs. 2618 2566 2618 2618 2618 2618
Notes: (1) Figures ( ) are standard errors. *** denotes signicance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. (2) Standard errors are robust to
heteroskedasticity and clustered residuals within each village. (3) A head's ethnicity is classied into seven groups, i.e., Hangaza, Haya,
Nyambo, Shubi, Subi, Zinza, and other. (4) A head's religion is categorized into six groups, i.e., Muslim, Catholic, Protestant, other
Christian, traditional, and other.
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Table S.13: Assessing the quality of HIV/AIDS-related information of the KHDS (OLS)
Dependent variable: One if HIV/AIDS is the most or second most important health problem in a community
Sample: wave 5 (i.e., 2004) wave 1 wave 1 to 4
(i.e., 1991) (i.e., 1991
to 1994)
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h)
HIV prevalence of the nearest 2003?04 THIS community
Proportion 2.920* 2.597 - - - - - -
(1.494) (1.645)
One if proportion > 0 - - 0.373** 0.353** - - - -
(0.150) (0.161)
Mean HIV prevalence of 2003?04 THIS communities situated within 40-km radius from a KHDS community
Proportion - - - - 4.736 - - -
(3.006)
One if proportion > 0 - - - - - 0.492*** - -
(0.158)
The district-level HIV prevalence (proportion) - - - - - - 1.818** 2.722***
in 1987 based on Killewo et al. (1990) (0.756) (0.454)
Distance to the nearest - -0.004 - -0.004 - - - -
THIS community (km) (0.009) (0.008)
Wave FE NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES
R-squared 0.063 0.067 0.118 0.122 0.049 0.151 0.092 0.247
No. of obs. 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 204
Notes: (1) Figures ( ) are standard errors. *** denotes signicance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. (2) Standard errors are robust to




Figure S.1: A woman and the typical expected inheritors
Note: This diagram should be seen from the viewpoint of a female indicated by a shaded circle. Consistent with the convention of social
anthropology, the triangles refer to males with the circles meaning females. The vertical and horizontal links represent a descent bond and
a co-descent bond, respectively. The sign `=' indicates a marital relationship. In this gure that considers the case that a husband's father
as well as grandfather has two wives, the triangles depicted by dashed lines indicate the expected inheritors from the viewpoint of a female
represented by the shaded circle, i.e., her husband's brothers and cousins born to his uncles on his father side.
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Figure S.2: Graphical interpretation of the theoretical model
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Figure S.4: Age heterogeneity: Institutional change and widows' welfare (consumption per adult equivalent) (OLS)
Notes: (1) This gure reports the estimated 2 in equation (7) with 95% condence intervals by changing the exploited sample by the
respondents' age. (2) Age m in the horizontal axis means that the estimation uses data pertaining to female respondents aged 15 to m  1.
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Figure S.5: Age heterogeneity: Institutional change and widows' welfare (consumption per adjusted adult equivalent)
(OLS)
Notes: (1) This gure reports the estimated 2 in equation (7) with 95% condence intervals by changing the exploited sample by the
respondents' age. (2) Age m in the horizontal axis means that the estimation uses data pertaining to female respondents aged 15 to m  1.
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Figure S.6: Distribution of the number of children





















































16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51
age
Figure S.7: Age heterogeneity: Reduced-form impacts of HIV/AIDS on widows' welfare (consumption per adult
equivalent) (OLS)
Notes: (1) After replacing Djt in equation (7) with an indicator for villages that referred to HIV/AIDS as the most or second most
important health problem in a community in each wave, this gure reports the estimated impacts of HIV/AIDS on widows' consumption
with 95% condence intervals by changing the exploited sample by the respondents' age. (2) Age m in the horizontal axis means that the
estimation uses data pertaining to female respondents aged 15 to m  1. (3) The estimates and statistical signicance are reported in more
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Figure S.8: Age heterogeneity: Reduced-form impacts of HIV/AIDS on widows' welfare (consumption per adjusted
adult equivalent) (OLS)
Notes: (1) After replacing Djt in equation (7) with an indicator for villages that referred to HIV/AIDS as the most or second most
important health problem in a community in each wave, this gure reports the estimated impacts of HIV/AIDS on widows' consumption
with 95% condence intervals by changing the exploited sample by the respondents' age. (2) Age m in the horizontal axis means that the
estimation uses data pertaining to female respondents aged 15 to m  1. (3) The estimates and statistical signicance are reported in more
detail in Table S.7.
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GIS user community
Figure S.9: Position of the KHDS (red circle) and 2003?04 THIS communities (blue square)
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